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Summary 
 
The main purpose of this thesis was to analyse whether national human 
rights institutions (NHRIs) could work with peacebuilding and conflict 
transformation while following their mandate. The Commission for Human 
Rights and Administrative Justice’s (CHRAJ) work in the Northern Region 
of Ghana was studied as a starting point. CHRAJ, as well as other NHRIs 
working in conflict prone areas, can use their mandate to both prevent the 
spread of violent conflict through the promotion and protection of human 
rights and to transform conflict, building sustainable peace. 
 
NHRIs can engage in strategic activities that have as a goal the 
transformation of violent structures that contribute to conflict. They can also 
use their mandate to lobby the government into signing relevant human 
rights conventions; they can monitor the human rights situation at the 
national level and use the results of this monitoring exercise to promote 
activities that will positively affect the conflicting parties; they can 
cooperate with international organizations and other NHRIs that also work 
with peacebuilding to share experience, build capacities and develop 
partnerships; NHRIs can also use human rights education (HRE) as a tool to 
promote human rights and to change people’s perceptions and prejudices. 
HRE can be used in all levels of the educational system (helping young 
people change their perceptions and creating a more respectful and tolerant 
society), but it can also be used as a tool to address adults and make them 
perceive how their attitudes can contribute to either transforming conflict or 
maintaining the violent structures. NHRIs can also use their mandates to 
increase awareness of the population on both the importance of the 
promotion and protection of human rights as a whole, but also awareness-
raising campaigns can focus on discrimination patterns and prejudices that 
are an underlying cause for conflict. Lastly, those NHRIs that also work as 
quasi-judicial bodies and receive complaints from individuals can use these 
complaints to map the situation in a precise area and draw activities that will 
assist in the peacebuilding process by addressing the most common human 
rights violations and their root causes. 
 
CHARJ, as an NHRI, can use its mandate to address human rights violations 
in the Northern Region that can be said to have contributed to the explosion 
of the violent conflicts. CHRAJ can focus on the human rights complaints 
coming from the Northern Region and address them strategically, so that the 
measures taken can address the issues. Moreover, CHRAJ should use its 
education mandate to educate chiefs and work with them. Chiefs occupy a 
very important position in Ghanaian society and therefore they should be 
involved in peacebuilding activities in the Northern Region. Finally, 
CHARJ should conduct an awareness-raising campaign in the whole 
country to try to change the misperception that people from the north are 
naturally violent.   
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Abbreviations 
 
 
ADR  Alternative Dispute Resolution 
CAT Convention against Torture and other Cruel, 
Inhumane and Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
CEDAW Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women 
CMW Convention on the Protection of All Migrant 
Workers and Members of their Families 
CRPD Convention on the Rights of Persons affected by 
Disabilities 
CHRAJ Commission on Human Rights and Administrative 
Justice 
CHRGG Commission for Human Rights and Good 
Governance 
CPED Convention on the Protection of All Persons from 
Enforced Disappearances  
CRC Convention on the Rights of the Child 
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DRC Democratic Republic of Congo 
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1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Research Questions  
Can national human rights institutions work within their mandate in order to 
transform conflict and promote peacebuilding? 
 
Can the Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice in Ghana 
use its mandate to transform the conflicts in the Northern Region? 
1.2 Delimitations  
Looking into the mandate of national human rights institutions (NHRIs) 
alone without analysing the context and work of one NHRI would have 
made the thesis less complete. When the first research question was decided 
it was necessary to find which NHRI would be the object of study. The 
author’s first choice was the Uganda Human Rights Commission (UHRC). 
The idea would be to study UHRC’s work in Uganda and more specifically 
its work on the conflict in the north.  A quick look into the literature showed 
that a lot had already been produced about that conflict and about UHRC, 
therefore it would be a better idea to look into another country. 
 
Ghana was the suggestion of a conflict expert working at the Danish 
Institute for Human Rights, Ms. Mie Roesdahl. She had just taught a course 
on conflict management that had three participants from Ghana. All three of 
them worked at the Commission on Human Rights and Administrative 
Justice (CHRAJ) and had mentioned the conflicts in the north as a problem 
for the Ghanaian society. This suggestion fit very well with the author’s 
wish to work with conflict related issues, the African context and national 
human rights institutions.  
 
A first look into the Ghanaian context had shown the “Guinea-Fowl War” as 
the biggest and most violent conflict of that country, therefore, that was the 
conflict chosen. Nonetheless, a deeper study of the Northern Region (and 
the other two regions in the north Upper West and Upper East) has shown 
that the “Guinea-Fowl War” is not a single conflict and that the ethnic 
groups involved in the conflict are also involved in other conflicts relating 
to similar issues (chieftaincy, land disputes, participation, etc). As the 
purpose of the thesis is to look into the work of CHRAJ in the Northern 
Region, the thesis only analyses the “Guinea-Fowl War”. 
 
The choice of authors is based on the author’s experience working as a 
course assistant at the Danish Institute for Human Rights. The author has 
been an assistant for, among others, a five-week conflict management 
course to DANIDA Fellowship Centre partners and a weekend-long conflict 
management course for volunteers at the International Humanitarian 
Brigade. In these courses the author was introduced to the work of Johan 
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Galtung and John Paul Lederach, which are the main authors, used to 
explain basic ideas involving conflict transformation and peacebuilding. Ms. 
Michelle Parlevliet taught both courses and her work has been used because 
it presents a good mixture between theory and practice. Ms. Parlevliet has 
worked in the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa, at the 
International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and she has worked in 
Nepal as an adviser for DANIDA, further she was written extensively on 
issues connected to conflict transformation and peacebuilding. Her work has 
also been used because she is one of the first authors in the conflict field to 
try to use human rights principles and instruments to explain the root causes 
of conflict and how to transform conflict.  
 
Out of the nine human rights conventions within the United Nations (UN) 
only two were not mentioned as relevant instruments for peacebuilding and 
conflict transformation, namely the Convention on the Protection of All 
Migrant Workers and Members of their Families (CMW) and the 
Convention on the Rights of Persons affected by Disabilities (CRPD). There 
are several reasons for that. CMW is a very new convention with not so 
many ratifications and many of the “receiving” countries of migrant workers 
are not parties to the convention. Further, even though it can be found in the 
literature that migration may be a root cause of future conflicts, for the 
purpose of the thesis CMW has not been studied. CRPD was left behind 
mostly due to its very specific obligations put on states in relation to persons 
affected by disabilities than due to its utility for peacebuilding. This does 
not mean that the author thinks that including persons with disabilities is 
less important for the process of building peace. 
 
1.3 Methodology  
In order to write the thesis more than regular dogmatic method was used. 
This thesis contains an analysis of soft law (namely the Paris Principles), 
hard law (basically human rights conventions within the UN system and 
national law from Ghana). The work of law scholars is also used to explain 
the relations between law and social structures and to explain national law 
issues in Ghana. 
 
This thesis has also relied on conflict management, conflict transformation, 
conflict resolution and peace studies literature. The choice of materials on 
these fields was based on the author’s experiences as a course assistant at 
the Danish Institute for Human Rights and informal conversation with 
conflict practitioners.  
 
In order to write the chapter concerning the situation in Northern Ghana the 
author also had to rely on history and political science literature on Ghana.  
 
The last method used was interviews. The author went on a field research 
trip to Ghana where she interviewed mainly persons working at the 
Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice. The persons 
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interviewed were the persons available at the moment of the visit and that 
had some knowledge of the situation in the Northern Region. The author is 
not very familiar with interview techniques and how to go about in doing 
field studies, therefore, the interviews obtained are mainly of a qualitative 
nature and not quantitative. Further they have been used as inspiration for 
writing and as a reality check.  
1.4 Human Rights and Conflict  
“Suicide bomber kills scores in Iraq” (Aljazeera, 18 January 2011), “In 
Afghanistan, Insurgents let Bombs do Fighting” (The New York Times, 17 
January 2011), “Israeli tanks in fatal Gaza raid” (BBC News, 18 January 
2011), “Libya exodus sparks border crisis” (BBC News, 27 February 
2011), “Deaths in DRC 'failed coup attempt'” (Aljazeera, 27 February 
2011). 
 
Everyday world newspapers are replete with news of conflict. Civilians 
being killed in so called collateral damages, governments erupting in 
genocidal violence, refugee camps lacking sanitation, water and food 
supplies, “failed states collapsing in chaos”1, rival groups taking up arms, 
and so on. All these situations point out to the complicated relationship 
between human rights and conflict; how human rights violations can be both 
causes and consequences of violent conflict2
 
 and how challenging this 
theme is. Exclusion of societies from enjoyment of human rights can lead to 
an atmosphere of conflict – this illustrates causes; killings, disappearances 
and torture illustrate consequences. This thesis’ purpose is to analyse this 
relationship between human rights and conflict, focus on how human rights 
can be an instrument in conflict prevention and transformation, and how 
National Human Rights Institutions can play an important role in order to 
prevent the explosion of violent conflict. 
It is important to clarify here that the study of conflict relates to human 
rights promotion and protection, conflict management and implementation 
of international humanitarian law (IHL). Nonetheless this thesis will not 
focus on the phases of conflict where IHL would be applicable, this means 
that armed conflict, as defined in the Geneva Conventions will not be a 
direct object of study. This however does not mean that armed conflict will 
be left behind. There are other situations that can be considered conflict and 
that are not regulated by humanitarian law. Nevertheless some features of 
international humanitarian law might become an object of study, even if the 
aim is to determine the non-applicability of IHL. 
 
                                                        
1 Mertus, Julie A. and Helsing, Jeffrey H. (eds), Human Rights and Conflict – Exploring the 
Links between Rights, Law, and Peacebuilding (United States Institute of Peace, 
Washington, 2006), p. 39 
2 Parlevliet, Michelle, ‘Rethinking Conflict Transformation from a Human Rights 
Perspective’, Berghof Handbook for Conflict Transformation (Berghof Research Center for 
Constructive Conflict Management 2009) 
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Michelle Parlevliet3 uses the metaphor of an iceberg to explain how human 
rights can be both cause and consequence of conflict. The top of the iceberg 
symbolises the symptoms of conflict, with human rights violations that are 
very visible, as forced disappearances, torture as a political tool, rape and 
summary executions. The bottom of the iceberg, the hidden part, symbolises 
human rights violations that can be causes of conflict. “It represents 
situations where denial of human rights is embedded in the structures of 
society and governance, in terms of how the state is organised, how 
institutions operate and how society functions.”4
 
 An example would be the 
constant marginalization of a certain group by civil servants and police 
officers, or the repeated legislative process that excludes or denies access to 
certain goods to specific groups.  
“Denial of human rights as a cause of conflict gives rise to (symptomatic) 
human rights violations. Yet, a pattern of specific violations may, if left 
unchecked, gradually become a structural condition in itself that fuels 
further conflict – this is the case with systematic torture, indiscriminate 
killings and widespread impunity.”5
 
 These structural problems can 
characterize structural violence and be one factor that contributes to the 
explosion of violent conflicts.  
This idea presented by Parlevliet is closely connected to the idea of human 
needs. As Mertus and Helsing6 note, unsatisfied human needs can be a root 
cause to conflict. “Human rights abuses, like unmet human needs, threaten 
the security of individuals and social groups and, in so doing, create cycles 
of dehumanization based on fear.”7 To many of the human needs there can 
be found correspondent human rights and it is “the state’s inability or 
unwillingness to protect human rights and provide mechanisms for the civil 
resolution of conflict [that] may prompt groups to use force in pressing their 
demands for such rights, resulting in violent conflict both within and 
between states”8
 
.  
In order to build upon these ideas and use the interrelation of human rights 
and human needs, this thesis will also closely look into central definitions in 
conflict transformation and resolution research to be able to explain how a 
National Human Rights Institution (NHRI) can play a vital role in the 
transformation of conflict. More specifically, this thesis will look into 
structural violence as a violation of human rights and for that reason the 
area of work of NHRIs.  
 
The Ghanaian Commission for Human Rights and Administrative Justice’s 
(CHRAJ) work in the Northern Region of Ghana will be used as an example 
to illustrate how a NHRI can/should work on structural violence in order to                                                         
3 Ibid.  
4 Ibid, p. 5 
5 Ibid. 
6 Supra note 1.  
7 Ibid, p. 4 
8 Ibid. 
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construct positive peace. CHRAJ, a National Human Rights Institution set 
forth in accordance with the Paris Principles (1993) by the Constitution of 
the Republic of Ghana (1992) and the Commission on Human Rights and 
Administrative Justice Act (Act 456 of 6 June 1993), has a mandate that can 
be used to work in peacebuilding in Ghana’s Northern Region. This thesis 
will, therefore, address peacebuilding as an attempt “to transform the 
underlying issues that give rise to violent conflict and therefore [focus] on 
the ‘structural, relational and cultural roots of conflict’”9
 
.  The Commission 
can use its mandate regarding education (“to educate the public as to human 
rights and freedoms by such means as the Commissioner may decide, 
including publications, lectures and symposia”) as prescribed by Article 218 
(e) of the Constitution to approach the conflict related issues using conflict 
transformation methods in order to change the suppressing and 
discriminating societal structures. Further, the use of conflict management 
tools, such as mediation and negotiation, will be used in the analysis of 
CHRAJ’s work. 
Chapter Two will consequently focus on structural violence and human 
rights and try to provide a comprehensive analysis of structural violence as a 
cause of conflict. Furthermore, this chapter will present the current situation 
in Northern Ghana through a historical analysis of the area and the 1994-
1995 conflict, its causes and the present situation. Even though Northern 
Ghana is an area prone to violent conflict, it was necessary to delimit the 
subject of study. Due to the composition of the Region, its lack of 
development, the exclusion of certain groups, the high level of illiteracy, the 
centralisation of power within a few selected groups and the complicated 
procedures related to chieftaincy the Northern Region has experienced many 
different conflicts. Some of the most notable ones include “the Bimoba war 
against the Konkomba in 1986 and 1989; the violent clashes between the 
Nawuri and the Gonja … in 1991; the succession dispute among the 
Dagomba in 1991 and 2001…; and the protracted conflict between 
Mamprusi and Kusasi … in 2000”10
 
. All these conflicts are relevant, 
however the most devastating and extensive one was the Konkomba vs. 
Dagomba war in 1994-1995. Due to that and also due to the fact that many 
of the circumstances that were into place then are still present today, the 
latter was chosen as an object of study. 
In Chapter Three conflict resolution/transformation will be studied focusing 
on methods available to NHRIs as negotiation and third-party interventions. 
This chapter will provide the thesis with its theoretical backbone, as these 
are tools already used by NHRIs to transform conflict.                                                         
9 Khan, Naefa, “The Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice in Ghana: 
Working in the micro and around the macro”, Parlevliet, M., Lamb, G. and Maloka, V. 
(eds.) Defenders of Human Rights, Managers of Conflict, Builders of Peace? National 
Human Rights Institutions in Africa (Centre for Conflict Resolution, University of Cape 
Town, 2005), p. 65 
10 Tonah, Steve, “Theoretical Comparative Perspectives on Ethnicity, Conflicts and 
Consensus in Ghana”, Tonah, Steve (ed.), Ethnicity, Conflicts and Consensus in Ghana 
(Woeli Publishing Services, Accra, 2007), p. 4 
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Chapter Four will concentrate on peacebuilding: definition, elements and 
actors and NHRIs mandate to work in this area. It is important to understand 
what peacebuilding is in order to establish how NHRIs can contribute to it. 
 
Lastly, Chapter Five will be dedicated to CHRAJ in Ghana and its previous 
work in the Northern Region conflict and the challenges presented upon it.  
 
1.5 Terminology 
1.5.1 Conflict Management, Conflict Resolution and Conflict 
Transformation  
The terms conflict management, conflict resolution, and conflict 
transformation refer to tools and fields of study that relate to how peace can 
be achieved. They are terms that describe the various approaches to 
addressing conflict. The explanations and characteristics of each field differ 
also within the different areas. Here a few possible definitions have been 
selected in order to provide the reader with an idea of what these terms refer 
to. Conflict management “aims to limit and avoid future violence by 
promoting possible behavioural changes in the parties involved”. Conflict 
resolution, on the other hand, “addresses the causes of conflict and seeks to 
build new and lasting relationships between hostile groups”11
 
. 
Conflict transformation, nevertheless, is based on social justice and 
therefore more easily connected to human rights and the human rights 
discourse. “Placing constructive social change at its core, conflict 
transformation acknowledges the need for addressing power imbalances and 
recognizes a role for advocacy and the importance of voices that challenge 
the status quo”12
 
. Conflict transformation is about using conflict in order to 
change the power imbalances of a society making it a more just one.  
Lederach uses the term conflict transformation because it goes beyond the 
mere resolution of problems; the idea is to create a constructive change 
through conflict. He proposes the following definition: “conflict 
transformation is to envision and respond to the ebb and flow of social 
conflict as life-giving opportunities for creating constructive change 
processes that reduce violence, increase justice in the direct interaction and 
social structures, and respond to real-life problems in human 
relationships”13
 
. 
                                                        
11 Fisher, Simon; Abdi, Dekha Ibrahim; Ludin, Jawed; Smith, Richard; Williams, Steve; 
and Williams, Sue, Working with Conflict – Skills and Strategies for Action (Responding to 
Conflict, London, 2000), p. 7 
12 Supra note 2, p. 2 
13 Lederach, John Paul, The Little Book of Conflict Transformation (Good Books, 
Intercourse, 2003), p. 14 
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The term conflict transformation is seen as a wider and more comprehensive 
one, while conflict management is one of the first terms used in this field of 
study, and conflict resolution has in it an idea of ending, terminating, and 
not necessarily changing. Therefore, this thesis will use the term conflict 
transformation because it is in accordance with the issues it intends to 
address. However, some of the terms better relate to conflict management, 
when that is the case, the latter will be used instead.  
 
1.5.2 Understanding Conflict Transformation – An Overview of 
Key Terms and Expressions  
Firstly it is necessary to establish that conflict is not necessarily a bad and 
abnormal thing, nor are all conflicts violent ones. Conflict can be the fuel 
for change, positive change, and it is the way we deal with conflict that will 
determine its outcome. Conflicts are a fact of life and most of the times they 
are resolved without the use of violence. “Conflict is a relationship between 
two or more parties (individuals or groups) who have, or think they have 
incompatible goals”, whereas “violence consists of actions, words, attitudes, 
structures or systems that cause physical, psychological, social or 
environmental damage and or prevent people from reaching their full human 
potential”14
 
. 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1 – The ABC Triangule – Johan Galtung  
The issue at point here is that all human relations – economic, political, 
social – experience growth, change and conflict. Conflicts are the result of 
imbalances in these relations, as for example unequal wealth and access to                                                         
14 Supra note 11, p. 4 
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resources, unequal power and unequal social status. These inequalities can 
lead to problems such as discrimination, unemployment, poverty, 
oppression and crime. “Each level connects to the others, forming a 
potentially powerful chain of forces either for powerful change or for 
destructive violence”15
 
. 
Conflict researches affirm that suppressing conflict is negative, because it 
leads to future problems. They point out to the fact that conflict can be as 
much part of the solution as of the problem. Fischer et al. explains that a 
conflict becomes violent when “there are inadequate channels for dialogue 
and disagreement; dissenting voices and deeply held grievances cannot be 
heard and addressed; [and] there is instability, injustice and fear in the wider 
community and society”16
 
. 
Galtung17 has suggested that conflict involves three key elements: 
contradiction (the actual or perceived incompatible goals between the 
parties), attitude (parties’ perceptions and misperceptions of themselves and 
of others), and behaviour (how parties treat and interact with each other) (p. 
72). He explains that individuals and groups have goals that can become 
incompatible. When this happens there is a contradiction. “Any actor/party 
with unrealized goals feels frustrated and more so the more basic the goal, 
like needs and basic interests; frustration may be directed toward the holders 
of the goals, turning inwards as attitudes of hatred, or outwards as behavior 
of verbal or physical violence”.  This violence may be directed at those 
persons “standing in the way of the goals” and it may also create a spiral of 
counter violence. “The spiral of counter-violence becomes a meta-conflict 
(like meta-stasis related to cancer) over the goals of preserving and 
destroying”18   . 
In the conflict management literature one of the common terms to be found 
is conflict escalation. Conflict experts use a ladder as a metaphor to explain 
how conflict evolves and define escalation as the increase in intensity of a 
conflict. Else Hammerich19
 
 explains that even though all conflicts are 
different, there is a pattern for destructive escalation that can be found in all 
conflicts. The conflict ladder presented by her is divided in seven stages, 
namely disagreement, personification, expansion, communication stop, 
enemy images, open hostility, and polarisation. It is important to note here, 
that this model was designed mostly for inter-personal conflicts; however, it 
can easily be applied to social conflicts. The following illustration shows 
another possible model for conflict escalation: 
                                                        
15 Ibid. 
16 Supra note 11, p. 6. 
17 Galtung, Johan, “Violence, Peace, and Peace Research”, (Journal of Peace Research, 
Vol. 6, No. 3, pp. 167-191, 1969) 
18 Galtung, Johan, Conflict Transformation by Peaceful Means (the Transcend Method), 
(United Nations Disaster Management Training Programme, UN, 2000), p. 1 
19 Hammerich, Else, Meeting Conflicts Mindfully (Tibetan Centre for Conflict Resolution 
and Danish Centre for Conflict Resolution, Copenhagen, 2001). 
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Figure 1.2 – Conflict Escalation 
 
Druckman20 uses Fisher’s models to explain the escalation of societal 
conflicts, especially international ones, namely: discussion, polarization, 
segregation, and destruction. “At each stage the relationship between 
disputants changes. The preferred method of conflict management becomes 
increasingly competitive, going from joint decision making in stage one to 
attempt at destruction on stage four.”21
 
 Understanding escalation and the 
different stages of conflict is relevant because these different stages 
determine also the type of intervention and what should be done in order to 
prevent violent acts, or try to stop them. 
Together with conflict escalation it is important to mention conflict de-
escalation, which is the reverse phenomenon. As in conflict escalation, de-
escalation is not a linear process. During conflict new issues and conflict 
parties can emerge, power struggles can alter, the dynamics of the conflict 
and secondary conflicts and spirals can further complicate the situation. 
“The same is true for de-escalation, with unexpected breakthroughs and 
setbacks changing the dynamics, with advances in one area or at one level, 
being offset by relapses at others, and with actions of third parties 
influencing the outcome in unforeseen ways.”22
 
  
When referring to violent conflict it is also important to mention peace.                                                         
20 Druckman, Daniel, “Negotiating in the International Context”, Zartman, I. William and 
Rasmussen, J. Lewis, Peacemaking in International Conflict: Methods and Techniques 
(United States Institute for Peace, Washington, D.C., 2005) 
21 Ibid, pp. 92-93 
22 Ramsbotham, Oliver, Woodhouse, Tom and Miall, Hugh, Contemporary Conflict 
Resolution: The prevention, management and transformation of deadly conflicts (Polity 
Press, Cambridge, 2005), p. 11 
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More than that, it is important to differentiate between positive and negative 
peace. Negative peace is the absence of direct, physical violence. It refers to 
the end of abuses, such as rape, torture, killings, mutilation, displacement of 
people and destruction of property. Positive peace, on the other hand, 
“refers to the presence of social justice and political equality, including 
harmonious relationships within society that are conducive to mutual 
development, growth and the attainment of common goals”23. Peace can 
therefore be defined as absence of personal and structural violence24
 
. 
A few other terms deserve attention here. Parlevliet et al.25
 
 use the 
framework outlined by the Department of International Development of the 
United Kingdom to explore how NHRIs can work around, in or on conflict. 
This terminology will later be used to explain the work of CHRAJ, and 
therefore it needs to be clarified here. 
• Working around conflict – is treating conflict as an impediment or 
negative externality that is to be avoided. “The unwillingness of 
national human rights institutions to engage in conflict-related issues 
or situations, out of concern that such involvement may interfere 
with [the NHRI’s] activities.”26 When NHRIs work around conflict 
“the interaction between human rights promotion and protection and 
conflict issues and dynamics is […] not recognized”27
• Working in conflict – when NHRIs work in conflict they recognize 
that the implementation of their mandate “often involves addressing 
conflicts related to human rights concerns, and may take place in 
environments defined by conflict. This approach appreciates that the 
protection and promotion of human rights is inherently contentious 
and political, as it relates to the organisation of, and power-dynamics 
within, the state and society”
. 
28. NHRIs main objective is the 
protection and promotion of human rights, thus any impact on the 
issues and dynamics of a specific conflict happens indirectly. 
“Conflict is dealt with as it arises in the course of undertaking rights-
related activities, but is not a focus or objective of such efforts.”29
• Working on conflict – if an NHRI works on conflict it recognizes 
that the promotion and protection of human rights can directly relate 
peacebuilding efforts.  
  
 
The last terms to be dealt with here are protracted or deep-rooted conflict. 
Protracted conflict can be defined as “a conflict in which the issue(s) under                                                         
23 Parlevliet, M; Lamg, G and Maloka, V., “Introduction: Understanding conflict and its 
relationship with human righst”, Parlevliet, M., Lamb, G. and Maloka, V. (eds.) Defenders 
of Human Rights, Managers of Conflict, Builders of Peace? National Human Rights 
Institutions in Africa (Centre for Conflict Resolution, University of Cape Town, 2005), p. 
20 
24 Supra note 17. 
25 Supra note 23 
26 Ibid, p. 18 
27 Ibid, p. 19 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid. 
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contention are perceived by both adversaries to be significantly linked to 
existential group needs”30. It can also be defined as a long-term, ongoing 
conflict that permeates all aspects of society. In a protracted conflict, 
structural behaviour (ethnic, religious, linguistic, economic) affects obvious 
hostile behaviours (interaction) creating a complicated casual network that 
makes conflict difficult to “solve”31
 
. 
Deep-rooted conflict can be defined as “conflict, originating largely within 
states, which combines two powerful elements: potent identity-based 
factors, based on differences in race, religion, culture, language and so on, 
with perceived imbalance in the distribution of economic, political and 
social resources”32. It is primordial to explain here that identity in itself is 
not a cause for conflict, nonetheless, identity issues are more often than not 
very emotionally charged as “they go right to the heart of what gives people 
their sense of themselves, defining a person's bond with her or his 
community and defining the source of satisfaction for her or his need for 
identity”33
 
. 
1.6 The Paris Principles  
The United Nations General Assembly has adopted global principles 
governing the status and functioning of independent NHRIs. These 
principles are popularly known as the Paris Principles. They were adopted 
in 1991 and approved in 1993 by the General Assembly and are the 
universally accepted framework for NHRIs. According to them NHRIs shall 
ensure the effective implementation of international human rights standards 
and work to ensure that national legislation, regulations and practices 
conform to the fundamental principles of human rights. NHRIs have to 
work to promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
30 Friedman, Gil, “Conceptualizing Protracted Conflict and Protracted Conflict 
Management”, Starr, Harvey, The Understanding and Management of Global Violence: 
New Approaches to Theory and Research on Protracted Conflict (St. Martins Press, New 
York, 1999), p. 36 
31 Starr, Harvey, “Introduction: A Protracted Conflict Approach to the Study of Social 
Conflict”, Starr, Harvey, The Understanding and Management of Global Violence: New 
Approaches to Theory and Research on Protracted Conflict (St. Martins Press, New York, 
1999), p. 4 
32 Harris, Peter and Ben Riley (eds.), Democracy and Deep-Rooted Conflict: Options for 
Negotiators, (International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, Stockholm, 
Sweden, 1998), p. 3 
33 Ibid, p. 2 
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2 Structural Violence and 
Human Rights  
This chapter will study the relationship between structural violence and 
human rights and analyse the situation in Ghana’s Northern Region as an 
example of structural violence. Here the issue of unaddressed needs and 
rights as an element that can contribute to the escalation of conflict will also 
be studied. In the conflict literature, a lot of emphasis is put into human 
needs and how unaddressed human needs can contribute to the escalation of 
conflicts, this is why it is necessary to relate human needs to human rights. 
Further, as ethnicity is one form of identity and it plays such an important 
role in the Northern Region conflicts, it is necessary to explain what both 
identity and ethnicity mean.  
2.1 Human Rights and Human Needs 
 
Galtung and Wirak34
 
 studied the relationship between human rights and 
human needs where they determined that human rights and human needs are 
two different things; nonetheless, they also showed that human needs can be 
fulfilled through human rights, but there is not a one-to-one relationship 
between a human right and a human need. The fulfillment of a human need 
might require that a broad range of human rights be realized. This points to 
the indivisibility and interrelatedness of human rights, which cannot be seen 
alone, but must be studied as an indivisible group.  
One of the criticisms presented by the authors, is that the human rights 
discourse and human rights norms as a whole focus too much on 
punishment, and on the negative obligations of states. As stated by them “a 
typical aspect of the legal paradigm is that there is a reaction only in case of 
infraction of a legal norm. The public machinery is usually far richer in 
punishment than in rewards.”35
 
 Even though this assertion proceeds, it is 
relevant to emphasise that human rights norms go beyond punishment, they 
also require positive action from states (and contrary to Galtung and 
Wirak’s thesis, the state here is represented not only by the national 
government, but also by the lower level, community based governmental 
institutions). Norms dictated by the human rights machinery (UN treaties 
and regional ones) not only call for states to punish those who do not respect 
the norms, but they also call for states’ positive action in order to guarantee 
these rights. Furthermore, they create a channel for the citizenry to look for 
redress when the human rights “violator” is the state itself. 
Another point made by the authors is that the “human rights approach to 
implementation of human needs is institutional rather than structural. It is 
based on the ‘freedom from’ approach of protecting citizens against types of                                                         
34 Galtung, Johan and Wirak, Anders H., “Human Needs and Human Rights – A 
Theoretical Approach”, (Security Dialogue, pp. 251-258, 1977) 
35 Ibid, p. 255 
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insecurity…”36. However, human rights are about more than creating 
institutions, they are also about producing structural changes in society (like 
in the human rights-based approach to development context, that puts 
discriminated and vulnerable groups in the centre of development in order 
to build new structures that do not discriminate and exclude). It is true that 
“the state can build institutions referred to as the military and the police, to 
guard against external and internal sources of insecurity to citizens”37
 
, 
nevertheless the state can also create policies and encourage actions that are 
focused on the fulfilment of citizens’ needs based on the implementation of 
human rights and the punishment of those who disrespect the rules. 
The point made by Galtung and Wirak is that using human rights as an 
institutionalized way of fulfilling human needs can compromise some 
human needs in favour of others. “The formal, institutionalised human 
rights approach is one approach to the satisfaction of human needs, but 
these institutions may in turn be a source of institutionalized non-
satisfaction, often of the more non-material needs”38
 
. For them, it is 
necessary that all persons participate in the formulation of human rights 
norms and that all persons can reach the machinery, because human rights 
are built in the structure of the state.  
The institutional approach is distant, the structural would be more based on 
closeness, on making small units surrounding the individuals into major 
sources of need satisfaction, reducing the significance of such higher levels 
of social organization, as the national, regional, and global level. (…) smaller 
units may be much better at providing identity or at least major forms of 
identity; and – if they have adequate control over the factors of production – 
also of providing for the satisfaction of basic human needs.39
 
 
The human rights system does not contradict what Galtung and Wirak 
propose, on the contrary, they support each other. In human rights language 
it is necessary that the law that regulates both the state and its citizens needs 
to be made by the citizens. The big institutional human rights framework 
proposed by them requires “small” community based rights to be into place. 
“Citizens can make an appropriate use of their autonomy, as guaranteed by 
political rights, only if they are sufficiently in virtue of an equally protected 
private autonomy in their life conduct”40
 
. Every citizen, in every 
community, must have his/her human rights respected and protected in 
order to be able to participate and create new rights in the form of positive 
law.  
This idea is very closely connected to a human rights-based approach 
(HRBA) to development. HRBA seeks putting each individual and their 
community in the centre of development; it favours the smaller units and                                                         
36 Ibid, p. 256. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid, p. 257 
39 Ibid. 
40 Habermas, Jürgen, “Constitutional Democracy: A Paradoxical Union of Contradictory 
Principles?” (Political Theory, 29, pp. 766-781, 2001), p. 767 
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gives room to the development of identity. According to the UN41 there are 
several principles connected to HRBA; here emphasis will be given to 
participation and inclusion (empowerment), equality and non-
discrimination, and accountability and the rule of law. It is essential in 
development initiatives and in all human rights related programmes that 
individuals are empowered and are able to participate in decision-making 
processes. Every person and all peoples are entitled to active, free and 
meaningful participation in, contribution to, and enjoyment of civil, 
economic, social, cultural and political development in which human rights 
and fundamental freedoms can be realized42
 
.   
Participation and empowerment are interrelated. Participation is not only 
about consultation, but actual empowerment of citizens. It is necessary to 
create specific channels for participation throughout the programming 
processes focusing especially on the poorest of the poor and the 
marginalized. Through participation, it is possible to create meaningful 
channels for the individual to influence local and national politics. It is 
through participation that a real democracy is maintained.  
 
Empowerment is connected to inclusion, participation and accountability 
and therefore must include beneficiaries, stakeholders and partners when 
deciding development strategies and goals. Participation should be regarded 
as a tool and as a goal for development because the affected peoples need to 
own their project. Participation is closely connected to ownership and is 
therefore paramount in implementing human rights and fulfilling human 
needs. Empowerment should not only be a concern for the outcome of 
development, but also for the process by which it is achieved and for the 
organizations implementing it. It is through empowerment that the needed 
structural changes can come into reality.  
 
States and other duty-bearers have to comply with the legal norms and 
standards enshrined in human rights instruments. Where they fail to do so, 
rights-holders are entitled to institute proceedings for appropriate redress 
before a competent court or similar body in accordance with the rules and 
procedures provided by law. Duty-bearers can be held accountable for the 
non-compliance with human rights norms and standards. Accountability is 
essential in the maintenance of the rule of law and the rule of law requires a 
system that respects and protects human rights. 
 
The community needs information on what was done and how it was done, 
which requires transparency and openness. Information and free will- and 
opinion-formation are essential in a democracy where all individuals have 
their human rights and human needs fulfilled. Accountability and 
transparency are principles that walk hand-in-hand. They complement each                                                         
41 United Nations Development Group (UNDG). 2003. UN Statement of Common 
Understanding on Human Rights-Based Approach to Development Cooperation and 
Programming, UNDG 
42 United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). 1986. Declaration on the Right to 
Development, General Assembly Resolution 41/128 of 4 December 1986 
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other. Right-holders need to know what the government has done and how it 
has been done, in order to be able to claim their rights and hold the decision-
makers accountable. Moreover, it is necessary that the citizenry know the 
processes and ways to contact the government and the use of the state 
machinery to assert their rights. That is why the local and the national must 
supplement each other, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity43
 
. 
Accountability mechanisms are supposed to mediate relationships between 
two unequal partners with the aim of redressing the imbalances between 
them (as is the case of states and its citizens). That is why this thesis affirms 
that governments are to be held accountable for human rights violations. In 
order to do this accountability measures must contest power relations, 
legitimize marginalized groups, and transform the actors and structures 
involved. These elements endear accountability to people at the margins of 
society, providing them with a chance to be part of their own governments 
and claim their rights. 
 
Finally, in order to make human rights an instrument of change and actually 
a way of transforming government structures, it is necessary to follow the 
principles of equality and non-discrimination. Non-discrimination is a 
principle surrounding the whole human rights system and it is also a right in 
itself. Therefore, it is paramount that state institutions have mechanisms that 
can be used by all citizens without any form of discrimination (gender, age, 
sex, sexual orientation, marital status, colour, race, nationality, and so on). 
Additionally, the fulfilment of human needs might require that states take 
positive actions to empower groups that have been historically 
discriminated so they too can have their needs fulfilled. A good example of 
this kind of initiative can be found on the Convention on the Elimination of 
all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), which imposes an 
obligation on states that will help creating de facto and de jure equality 
between men and women in society.  
 
It is through “the inclusion of marginalized groups and with the 
empowerment of deprived classes, the hitherto poorly satisfied 
presuppositions for the legitimacy of existing democratic procedures are                                                         
43 The principle of subsidiarity has been part of Western legal and social culture for 
centuries; however, it is only with the advent of the European Union and the formal 
establishment of the principle in treaty law that it became popular in legal theory. One of 
the first manifestations of the principle can be found in the papal encyclical Rerum 
Novarum of 1891. The subsidiarity principle then, was established as the state should 
interfere in workers and families’ private lives in order to prevent the abuses of capitalism, 
however, there should also be room for the individuals and groups to make their own 
decisions. According to Carozza (2003), the basis of the subsidiarity principle is 
personalistic, and therefore “its first foundation is a conviction that each human individual 
is endowed with an inherent and inalienable worth, or dignity, and thus that the value of the 
individual human person is ontologically and morally prior to the state or other social 
groupings. Because of this value, all other forms of society, from the family to the state and 
the international order, ought ultimately to be at the service of the human person. Their end 
must be the flourishing of the individual.” (p. 42) The subsidiarity principle can also be 
found in German Constitutional Law and in EU Law, however, Carozza’s explanations are 
sufficient here. 
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better realised”44
 
 (emphasis added). It is through the implementation of 
rights and the respect for human rights (based on HRBA) that human needs 
are met. This is how the human rights system can work beyond the 
institutionalized manner proposed by Galtung and Wirak. 
2.1.1 Issues of Identity 
 
It is appropriate to look into issues of identity here because one’s identity is 
closely connected to one’s needs, and therefore it is connected to human 
rights and the way the human rights system can be used to prevent violent 
conflict. 
 
Identity is a complex concept. It is difficult to talk of one identity when 
human beings are composed of several identities. “Identity is a set of 
meanings that define who one is when one is an occupant of a particular role 
in society, a member of a particular group, or claims particular 
characteristics that identify him or her as a unique person”45
 
. Every person 
has multiple identities because everyone has multiple roles in society, is part 
of different groups and has different personal characteristics. A law student 
can also be a girlfriend, an intern, a Brazilian national, an immigrant to 
another country, a member of a gym and a researcher of conflict related 
issues, for example. 
Identities are connected to positions in society and therefore, both individual 
and society are important concepts for understanding identities. Individuals 
exist within the context of society. “No man is an island”. The relationship 
between society and individuals is of mutual influence. The society where 
the individual is influences his or her identity, as well as identity is 
influenced by the society surrounding the individual. 
 
Furthermore“[t]he formation of personal and group identity is a complex 
phenomenon, a mixture of psychological, biological, social, cultural, and 
environmental factors”46. The minds of people have developed to respond to 
the environment, to the relationships between them and the environment and 
minds are also capable of adjusting to needs, goals and desires47
 
. 
Issues of identity are fundamental in protecting a sense of self and group 
survival, and they become particularly important during conflicts. Identity 
shapes and moves an expression of conflict, often in terms of deeply felt 
demands and preferred outcomes, to presenting issues. At the deepest level, 
identity is lodged in the narratives of how people see themselves, who they 
are, where they come from, and what they fear and will become or lose. 
Thus, identity is deeply rooted in a person’s or a group’s sense of how that                                                         
44 Supra note 40, p. 775. 
45 Burke, Peter J. and Stets, Jan E., Identity Theory (Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 3 
46 Mann, Mali A., “The formation and development of individual and ethnic identity: 
insights from psychiatry and psychoanalitic theory” (The American Journal of 
Psychoanalysis, Vol. 66, No. 3, PP. 211-224, 2006), p. 211 
47  Supra note 45. 
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person or group is in relationship with others and what effect that relationship 
has on its participants’ sense of self and group. Identity matters are 
fundamental to conflict, yet they are rarely explicitly addressed in the 
conflict.48
 
 
The relation between role identity (“the internalized meanings of the role 
that individuals apply to themselves”) and group identity or social identity 
(“based on individual’s membership to certain groups”) is crucial in 
understanding how, sometimes, conflicts involving identity can escalate into 
violence49. Role identity and social identity are different, however they are 
both important in “understanding the types of identities that serve as basis 
for one’s identity standard in interaction”50
 
. 
It is critical here to clarify what role is. “A role is a set of expectations tied 
to a social position that guide people’s attitudes and behaviour.”51 The role 
of an employee for example is connected to doing its job properly, arriving 
on time, working hard, etc. The roles people have in society are constantly 
tested and verified. When two persons interact, it is not their entire persons 
who are interacting, but they interact with each other in terms of specific 
roles. “Interaction is guided by the principle of role reciprocity. For every 
role that is played out in a situation, there is a counter role to which it is 
related”52
 
. The role of teacher, for example, requires the role of student, as 
the role of mother requires the role of son or daughter.  
Social identity, on the other hand, is based on a person’s identification with 
a social group.  
 
A social group is a set of individuals who share the view that they are 
members of the same social category. Through a social comparison and 
categorization process, persons who are similar to the self are categorized 
with the self and are labeled the ingroup. Correspondingly, persons who 
differ from the self are categorized as the outgroup. Having a particular social 
identity means being like others in the group and seeing things from the 
group’s perspective. It is assumed that individuals as groups members think 
alike and act alike. Thus, there is uniformity in thought and action in being a 
group member. Individuals do not have to interact with other group members 
in order to think and act alike the group. Simply identifying with the group is 
enough to activate similarity in perceptions and behavior among group 
members.53
 
 
The fact that members of a group do not need to interact with other groups 
to recognize them as the ingroup, does not mean that the sense of “us” and 
“them” does not exist. Due to the fact that their similarities are so many, all 
others who do not fit in that group are part of the outgroup.  
                                                         
48 Supra note 13, p. 55 
49 Supra note 45. 
50 Ibid, p. 113. 
51 Ibid, p. 114. 
52 Ibid, p. 115. 
53 Ibid, p. 118 
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The set of features that distinguishes ingroup members from outgroup 
members also allows some differentiation among ingroup members. The idea 
of a group prototype contains these features and is therefore central in 
understanding this internal differentiation. Prototipicality represents the 
degree to which a group member exemplifies or is representative of the 
stereotypical attributes of the group as a whole by being most like ingroup 
members and simultaneously most different from outgroup members. The 
prototype is the interrelated set of perceptions, attitudes, feelings, and 
behavior that captures similarities among ingroup members and differences 
between ingroup members and outgroup members.54
 
 
Sometimes what can happen is that individuals see themselves as only part 
of the ingroup and not as unique individuals. When this happens there is 
what Burke and Stets55
 
 call depersonalization. This means that individuals 
take the group’s identity as their own. When this happens, individuals act in 
concert, identifying themselves and others in terms of group membership. 
This process intensifies the production of the ideas of “we” versus “them”. 
Further, group identity plays a very important role in conflicts, as they are 
such a big part of it.  
People are always simultaneously in a role identity and a group identity; 
therefore both role identities and social identities are relevant to the 
individual’s perceptions and actions. Understanding identities is relevant 
because they play a fundamental part in conflict, as it will be seen in the 
example of the conflicts in the Northern Region of Ghana. 
2.1.2 Ethnicity as Identity – A way of understanding pre- and 
post-colonial African agency 
 
The use of the word ethnicity as an element of identity is fairly recent in 
social sciences. It was first in the 1960’s that the term became recurrent in 
this area of studies. In the immediate post-independence period groupings of 
people were commonly called tribes56
 
. Tribe referred to a group of people 
who shared the same language, tradition and territory. However, by the late 
1970’s the term was replaced by ethnicity. The latter kept some of the same 
elements and expanded in others.  
Ethnicity is one in many social categories, which is used to create real or 
imaginary distinctions among different groups. It is a concept closely 
connected to ideas of identity. It is another way to differentiate the “we” 
from the “them”. Ethnic identity is a form of social organization.   
Ethnicity is an enigmatic, unstable and problematic notion. Like other key 
terms in the social sciences and history, it is at once a category ‘of social and 
political analysis’ and a category of ‘social and political practice’. It belongs 
not only to the theoretical repertoire of social scientists but also to the 
vocabulary of chiefs, politicians, local intellectuals, labour migrants and 
social movements. Unlike other basis of group cohesion such as class,                                                         
54 Ibid, pp. 118-119. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Supra note 10 
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religion or membership of a political community, it is a protean and 
polythetic category which rests on no single essential trait. It my drawn on 
traditions of origin or descent, possession of any number of cultural or social 
traits, language, religion, membership of (or opposition to) a polity or 
religion, or any combination of these; but at the same time it need not involve 
any particular one of these bases. This is why ethnicity, while having 
immense power to command subjectivities and hence to generate ‘real’ social 
and political effects, is also a ‘shadow theatre’ as Bayart put it. Thus while 
ethnic discourse argue in an essentialist manner and naturalise social 
relationships, the ‘content’ of any particular ethnicity is historically 
contingent.57
 
 
This is the reason why ethnicity in Africa had to be understood as part of 
African history. As it is only one of the several bases of identity – existent 
before colonial times and used during them by both colonialists and 
Africans. Ethnicity has to be analysed together with the various other basis 
of identity. Ethnicity is connected to several other identities, such as 
religion, class, status, and place of origin, but it is somehow stronger then 
they are. Ethnicity is dictated by birth and is therefore non-negotiable, and 
yet it is very fluid – changing a lot throughout history.   
 
Ethnic groups or tribes are said to be a creation of the colonizer. 
Nonetheless, to say that such groups did not exist in pre-colonial times is to 
try to invent history. What did happen with colonization is that groups that 
lived in clan basis and had almost no contact with their neighbour class 
were all of a sudden arbitrarily put to live together under the leadership of a 
ruler. “With time some of these amalgamated clans constituted themselves 
into the ‘ethnic groups’ as we know them today”58
 
.  
During colonial times different groups were gathered under the same 
colonies without any respect for their traditional socio-cultural boundaries, 
resulting in colonies replete with multiple traditional cultural entities. 
“These different groups within the colonies remained conscious of their 
different ancestral and historical origins; and over time, especially in the 
post colonial era, their political interests became intertwined with their 
ethnic identity.”59
 
 
Ethnicities as known today are neither “a hangover from a pre-colonial 
past”, nor are they “simply plucked from the air”. Even though colonialism 
might have modified the limitations for what an ethnic group is, they have 
not created a new institution. “Indeed there is good evidence to suggest that 
colonial administrators borrowed from African conceptions of political 
space as much as they reshaped it.”60                                                        
57 Lentz, Carola, Ethnicity and the Making of History in Northern Ghana (Edinburgh 
University Press, Edinburgh, 2006), p. 3 
 
58 Supra note 10, p. 8 
59 Ametewee, Victor K., “Ethnicity and Ethnic Relations in Ghana”, Ethnicity, Conflicts 
and Consensus in Ghana (Woeli Publishing Services, Accra, 2007), p. 27 
60 Lentz, Carola and Nugent, Paul, “Ethnicity in Ghana: A comparative perspective”, Lentz, 
Carola and Nugent, Paul (eds.), Ethnicity in Ghana: The Limits of Invention (Macmillan 
Press Ltd., London, 2000), p. 6 
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Lentz and Nugent use the metaphor of cards to explain how ethnicity works. 
For them, ethnicity functions as a joker in a game of cards, because “it can 
be introduced into various play sequences, taking on the characteristics of 
the ‘card’ (concept) it replaces”61
 
. It is due to the fact that it can be 
associated with a wide range of different collectivities that ethnicity became 
such an important political resource in Africa.  
This volatile nature of the term ethnicity and its use can be partly explained 
by the debates surrounding it. For some researchers (primordialists), 
ethnicity is connected to the primary bonds, the primordial ties that are 
deeply rooted in the past and “turn on a common history, culture and 
language”. On the other hand, constructionists understand that ethnic groups 
focus on the “manipulability and strategic character of ethnicity often seeing 
it as a grab for the pursuit of self interest”62
 
.  
In Ghana, for example, the ethnic groups “created” or reinforced by the 
colonizer have been used by the Ghanaian elites to establish their political 
base. The same ethnic groups that were excluded for the division of power 
during the colonial era have used this “ethnicity” to establish themselves in 
the political arena of modern Ghana and achieve their goals using the same 
methods used by the colonizer to alienate them.  
 
Ametewee explains that ethnicity has been used by Ghanaian elites to 
achieve their own goals. According to him, social class is more important in 
Ghana today than ethnicity is. Nonetheless, “when the elites have problems 
attaining their personal dreams they become the ardent advocates of ethnic 
equality”63
 
. Aapengnuo supports this view when he explains that ethnicity is 
not a source for conflicts in Africa. 
In fact, ethnicity is typically not the driving force of African conflicts but a 
lever used by politicians to mobilize supporters in pursuit of power, wealth, 
and resources. While the ethnic group is the predominant means of social 
identity formation in Africa, most ethnic groups coexist peacefully with high 
degrees of mixing through interethnic marriage, economic partnerships, and 
shared values. Indeed, if they did not, nearly every village and province in 
Africa would be a cauldron of conflict.64
 
  
2.2 Structural Violence and the Root Causes of 
Conflict  
The previous analysis of identity and ethnicity are necessary to understand 
how these concepts relate to structural violence. It is clear that identity and 
ethnicity do not determine whether a society has violent structures or not,                                                         
61 Ibid, p. 4 
62 Ibid. 
63 Supra note, p. 37 
64 Aapengnuo, Clement M., “Misinterpreting Ethnic Conflicts in Africa” (Africa Center for 
Strategic Studies, Africa Security Brief No. 4, ND4 Press, April 2010), pp. 13-14 
 25 
nonetheless, in several circumstances marginalized groups and the ones in 
power do not share the same group identity. Further, horizontal inequalities 
(between regional, ethnic or religious identity) can lead to political violence.  
 
The analysis of structural violence and human rights will be made based on 
Johan Galtung’s text “Violence, Peace and Peace Research” of 1969. 
Glatung’s text will be used to guide the understanding of structural violence 
as a possible element in the escalation of conflicts into violent conflicts. 
Moreover, there will be an attempt to connect Galtung’s theory to human 
rights and democracy, in order to explain how the protection and promotion 
of human rights can prevent the explosion of violent conflicts. 
 
The idea of human rights as principles to be universalized throughout the 
world taking different cultures and histories into consideration are closely 
connected to ideas of justice and fairness. “When fairness is absent, 
injustice and exclusion can act as stresses.” If the people feel that their 
reality and their surroundings are unfair there violence is more likely to 
occur. Even though “[j]ustice and fairness are difficult concepts to measure, 
(…) psychological experiments show that they can have value beyond pure 
material self-interest”65
 
. These ideas are closely connected to structural 
violence as an element that contributes to the escalation of conflict. The 
marginalization of certain groups, their repression and the suppression of 
their rights constitute indirect violence and can contribute to acts of direct 
violence. 
Violence and peace are correlated terms. According to Galtung, peace is the 
absence of violence. Therefore, the first task here is to define violence. 
“[V]iolence is present when human beings are being influenced so that their 
actual somatic and mental realizations are below their potential 
realizations”66
 
 (p. 168).  
The potential level of realization is that which is possible with a given level 
of insight and resources. If insight and/or resources are monopolized by a 
group or class or are used for other purposes, than the actual level falls below 
the potential level, and violence is present in the system. In addition to these 
types of indirect violence there is also direct violence where means of 
realization are not withheld, but directly destroyed. Thus, when a war is 
fought there is direct violence since killing or hurting a person certainly puts 
his ‘actual somatic realization’ below his ‘potential somatic realization’. But 
there is also indirect violence insofar as insight and resources are channeled 
away from constructive efforts to bring the actual closer to the potential.67
 
 
Here, to the effects of this thesis, the most important kind of violence is the 
indirect one, which is in the roots of structural violence. Structural violence 
can be defined as violence directed at groups making them unable to fulfil 
their potentialities. In this case the agent of the violence cannot be directly                                                         
65 World Bank, The World Development Report 2011 (The World Bank, Washington, DC, 
2011), p. 81. 
66 Supra note 17, p. 168 
67 Ibid, p. 169. 
 26 
identified. “The violence is built into the structure and shows as unequal 
power and in consequence as unequal life chances.”68
 
 Structural violence is 
not very easily seen or perceived, especially because many times the subject 
of structural violence is persuaded not to perceive the violence at all. (This 
is the case of, for example, domestic male violence against women, who are 
marginalized and have their rights suppressed and the rule of silence as a 
form of discrimination imposed upon LGBT persons all over the globe.) 
As proposed above, structural violence is connected to unequal distribution 
of power, of resources, and of opportunities. Inequality is behind structural 
violence. When one group holds all resources in detriment of another group, 
structural violence is present. Feudal-like systems perpetuate inequality 
patterns and many of the actors in these kinds of systems are deprived not 
only of their potential, but are indeed set to live under subsistence levels. 
 
Inequality then shows up in differential morbidity and mortality rates, 
between individuals in a district, between districts in a nation, and between 
nations in the international system - in a chain of interlocking feudal 
relationships. They are deprived because the structure deprives them of 
chances to organize and bring their power to bear against the topdogs, as 
voting power, bargaining power, striking power, violent power - partly 
because they are atomized and disintegrated, partly because they are 
overawed by all the authority the topdogs present.69  
Structural violence and direct violence can be connected but this is not 
necessarily true. Both seem to be more “natural” to humans and human 
societies than direct and structural peace are. Even if one type of violence 
does not presuppose the other, “there is the possibility that manifest 
structural violence presupposes latent personal violence”, as it can be seen if 
the structure is being threatened. If this happens, those who benefit from the 
structure will try to preserve the status quo. However, “those most interested 
in the maintenance of the status quo may not come openly to the defence of 
the structure: they may push their mercenaries in front of them.” In other 
words, they may send the police, the army or other forces to “deal with” the 
situation. Even though the violence committed by the police forces, for 
example, is direct, it is the result of deeply rooted structural issues70
 
.  
Structural violence, or social injustices, is maintained by the use of manifest 
personal violence. The persons in the top, the ones who benefit from the 
structure, try to keep their status quo using force. Whether “it means 
forceful maintenance of traditional social injustice that may have last for 
generations, or the forceful maintenance of some new type of injustice 
brought in by the attempt to overthrow the old system”.71
 
  
The repressed groups also use direct violence in order to try to achieve 
equality and better systems – in the popular named revolutions. However,                                                         
68 Ibid, p. 171 
69 Ibid, p. 177 
70 Ibid, p. 179 
71 Ibid, p. 184 
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the answer to these “revolutions” is usually more violence, which might 
create new forms of inequality and perpetuation of social injustices.  
 
Using the iceberg metaphor can be helpful to understand the relationship 
between human rights promotion and protection and structural violence. 
Referring to the causes of the conflict (the part of the iceberg, which is 
under the water), it can be said that the goal is to change the underlying 
conditions that have caused (are a cause) the violent conflict. The focus is 
then on structural violence, as presented above. The activities here are 
related to “institution-building, accommodation of diversity by protecting 
minorities, development and reconstruction, and strengthening the rule of 
law”72
 
. Structural violence is therefore deeply connected to malfunctioning 
states where rights are not respected and where there is no real democracy.  
In a system of rights, be it national or international – regulated by 
constitutional law or by internationally agreed laws, the state is the main 
actor regulating the conduct of individuals in matter of rights, liberties and 
powers73
 
 and, therefore, somehow accountable for patterns of structural 
violence and social injustice.  
States must have a system where citizens are right-holders, which means 
that citizens not only have a substantive right, “which is concerned with the 
practical purpose, namely the use, advantage or gain guaranteed by the 
right”, but also with procedural rights “which is a means of achieving that 
purpose, namely legal protection or cause of action”74. The structure of the 
state, its apparatus, has to be in place, in order to allow for citizens to really 
have rights. The mere legal text without possibility of having rights in 
reality is merely symbolic75
 
. 
Within any legal system it is crucial that individuals have the legal capacity 
(power or competence) to enforce a right76
 
. The texts of regional laws, 
constitutions, and international treaties must be enforceable and enforced in 
order to break patterns of discrimination and social injustices. 
Accountability mechanisms must be at place and the right to access to court 
and the right to fair trial must be more than just legal text. These 
mechanisms will assist those being discriminated (the victims of social 
injustices) in claiming their rights. 
The right to fair trial is paramount for the realization of human rights and 
also for the diminishing social injustices. Human rights as a legal system                                                         
72 Supra note 2, p. 11 
73 Alexy, Robert, A Theory of Constitutional Rights (translated by Julian Rivers, Oxford 
University Press, New York, 2010) 
74 Ibid, p.115 
75 The term symbolic here is used in accordance with Marcelo Neves’ (2005) definition of 
it. He refers to the lack of normative power of the rights (be them constitutional or present 
in human rights law) and the abuse of the juridical terms by the political powers. When 
emphasising the symbolic nature of rights Neves emphasises how the lack of 
implementation of these rights can conduct people to political apathy and cynicism.  
76 Supra note 73. 
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consist of holding governments accountable for their actions, especially 
those actions which violate individuals’ rights and perpetuate structural 
violence. Therefore it is crucial for the functionality of the system that 
individuals can actually rely on judicial mechanisms in order to have their 
rights fulfilled. As in Luhmann’s social systems’ theory, the right to fair 
trial, which is to say, the right an individual has to go to a court of law to 
reestablish a violated right to the staus quo ante, or the rights that secure 
that an individual brought to a court of law by the state (as is the case in 
criminal proceedings) is respected, is the human rights system way of 
testing its statements against its reality77
 
. 
The right to fair trial is connected with the procedural due process and the 
process as an institution created by the juridical order of a state or a 
community of states78. This connection exists because it is within a state (or 
a community of states) that is freely established by the people (who 
recognize themselves as the authors of the law that guide their actions79
 
) 
that the due process regulates the states in accordance with principles of fair 
trial. Due process (both procedural and substantial) regulates the entire 
governmental machine.  
As mentioned above, according to Alexy80, the state not only regulates 
individuals’ rights, but also their liberties. He explains liberties in the sphere 
of the constitution as constitutionally protected and guaranteed by the state. 
The main issue here is legal liberties – “a bundle of rights to do something 
and other objective norms which together secure to the constitutional right-
holder the possibility of carrying out the act permitted”81
 
.  
When constitutional rights are treated as defensive rights, then generally what 
it is meant is that they are constitutional liberty-protecting rights to omissions 
on the part of the state. These rights are combined with the power to 
challenge their infringement before the courts. When these three positions 
come together: a legal liberty, a right against the state to non-obstruction, and 
a power to challenge infringements before the courts, one has a completely 
constituted negative liberty right against the state.82
 
  
A negative right is essential for changing and challenging violent structures. 
It is only when individuals can act both individually and collectively against 
the oppressing state that structural changes can happen. Nonetheless, the 
state’s apparatus has to be in place (functioning state, access to courts 
guaranteed, and procedural and substantial rights in place) in order to allow 
for the exercise of negative liberty rights.  
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Guaranteeing rights, liberties and powers is however not sufficient to 
achieve social justice, it is also necessary to guarantee democratic and 
inclusive processes that challenge the structures present in states and allow 
for people to actually participate in their government. These rights (human 
rights as recognized today) need be practiced in order for the people of that 
state to live in a democracy that can be justified and also where “the people” 
can act in the global plan83
 
. 
Structural violence is also seen when one sector of a society is left behind in 
development (the same being true for countries in the global sphere), which 
leads this society to a “chain of exclusion” and consequently to political and 
economic poverty84. What happens to these “excluded people” is that, their 
dignity is removed from them, their quality as human beings is removed 
from them, “and as it is seen from the repression machinery: there is 
systematic non-application of fundamental rights and other juridical 
guarantees, physical persecution, ‘execution’ without accusation or due 
process, impunity of state officials, oppression and assassination”85
 
 – 
structural violence and direct violence meet. 
It is through a constitutional democracy that respects individuals’ rights, 
liberties and powers and works with factual and legal equality based on 
human rights that social injustices can be challenged and potentially direct 
violence too, creating more equal and justice societies where the likelihood 
for direct violence is diminished.  
 
2.3 The Situation in Northern Ghana  
The Northern Region of Ghana is a creation of British colonial rule and the 
largest region in the country. It has over two million inhabitants, according 
to the latest population census (2010). It is within the savannah belt and 
therefore it has a vegetation and climate much different from that of 
Southern Ghana. Northerners do not see themselves as the same as the 
people in the South and vice versa86
 
. Moreover, they speak different 
languages from those spoken in the South. Yet, the physical differences are 
not the most important aspect that divides south and north, the Northern 
Region lacks economic and political development – and that is a reality that 
goes beyond colonial times.  
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The British carried out an explicit program to isolate the north from the 
south. They turned the north into a vast “labor reserve”, because manpower 
was the only exportable commodity that the British immediately 
recognized.87
 
 
Today the north (which includes the Northern Region, the Upper West 
Region and the Upper East Region) is still the least developed part of 
Ghana. “Poverty is still endemic and the vagaries of the weather still pose 
perennial difficulties for the people and their communities”88. Most women 
in the region are illiterate and youth unemployment is severe.  Furthermore, 
the Northern Region has been the most violent area of Ghana. From 1980 to 
2001 the region experienced twenty inter-ethnic or intra-ethnic conflicts89
 
.  
The population of the Northern Region is divided “between at least 
seventeen autochthonous and linguistically distinct ethnic groups”90. These 
groups are organized in different forms, some of them have chiefs some of 
them do not even recognize the institution of chieftaincy91 and these 
conditions overlap with their self-recognized ethnical identity92
 
. Amongst 
the several ethnic groups are the Konkomba, Nanumba, Gonja and 
Dagomba, the groups involved in the 1981 (Nanumba versus Konkomba) as 
well as the 1994 (Konkomba versus Dagomba, Nanumba and Gonja) 
conflicts.  
The Dagomba group, together with the Gonja and Nanumba, is centralized 
and recognizes the institution of chieftaincy. They are also called majority 
groups. George Ekem Ferguson, a British official that travelled to the 
Northern Region between 1892 and 1894, described Dagbon (the region of 
the Dagomba) along with Gonja and Maprugu (region of the Mamprusi) as 
“countries with an organized government”93
 
. The Konkomba, on the other 
hand, were described as “wild tribes, naked and living in independent 
family communities” because they were a non-centralized group together 
with the Lobi, Grussi, Dagarti, and Kusasi. These groups are also known as 
minority groups. The history and relations between the centralized and non-
centralized groups influenced their political identity and their notions of 
social and political difference.  
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Another relevant aspect to be pointed out is that of religion. When leaving 
the bus in Tamale (the capital city of the Northern Region) one can see a 
large concentration of Muslims. According to Katanga94, more than fifty 
percent of the Dagombas were Muslims in 1984. Even though these 
numbers are likely to have changed in these 26 years, the signs of Islam are 
easily found in Tamale. On the other hand, many of the Konkombas are 
Christians – however not as many as they are Traditionalists, according to 
Katanga. Although the conflicts were not religiously motivated, the 
religious element was part of it. Katanga explains that the conflicts gained 
lots of religious labels. Dagombas, Gonjas and Nanumbas were labelled 
Muslims, whereas Konkombas were labelled Christians. “The pastor of the 
Presbyterian Church in Salaga was murdered by Gonjas at the outbreak of 
the war. As an Nchumuru, the Gonjas saw him as an enemy, not a pastor. 
The Catholic Church and mission compound in Yendi was burnt and 
looted… In the first four weeks of hostilities… a common outcry was that 
‘the churches are supplying arms to the Konkombas’”95
 
. Religion played a 
role in the conflicts and also in how the other peoples of Ghana saw and 
perceived the conflicting parties. 
“The noble elites of chiefly groups had increasingly converted to Islam on 
the course of the previous five decades, whereas most ‘educated’ members 
of their enemy groupings – the Konkombas and the Nawuri – had adopted 
Christianity in the same time period”96
 
. That is one of the reasons why the 
conflicting parties received the aforementioned labels.  
Land disputes and chieftaincy are also part of the “ethnic”97
 
 conflicts in the 
Northern Region. The ethnic groups that did not have a chief, especially the 
Konkombas, started seeing chieftaincy as a way of emancipating themselves 
and achieving political independence. The 1994 conflict is known for, 
among other reasons, have initiated when the Konkombas presented a 
petition for paramountcy in the National House of Chiefs. 
Land issues are closely connected to chieftaincy as from 1992 with the new 
Constitution; the chiefs became the owners of the traditional territory they 
occupied. The fact that other ethnic groups also lived in that territory was 
not considered in the constitutional text. This left the “acephalous” groups 
without a territory they could call their own. 
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2.3.1 Historical Background 
 
The pre-colonial narratives of the peoples of Northern Ghana illustrate how 
they arrived to their region and how the relationship between the different 
“tribes” was established. These narratives show mainly “arrival and 
settlement, thus providing a charter for present land boundaries and for 
social relations among villagers and with their neighbors”98
 
. 
During the colonial period, the British stationed in the North sought to 
maintain law and order and to do so they thought more convenient to leave 
the power in the hands of the people in its “traditional” way. Therefore the 
traditional tribal structures were maintained, each headed by a chief99. 
However, not all groups had chiefs and were centralized, some of the so-
called “tribes”100
 
 had non-centralized governments and because of that no 
chiefs, which contributed to marginalization and non-participation of some 
groups in the political sphere.  
Narratives and stories were and are a central part of the history of the 
peoples of the Northern Region. When the British arrived they used these 
stories to construct their colonies. Nonetheless, some stories were more 
relevant than others, and among those there are the stories told by the 
Dagomba people. Talton affirms that the Dagomba stories and narratives 
were the ones used by the British and “Dagomba efforts to associate 
Konkomba with a history in the region as conquered and enslaved peoples 
reflects the political weight that these labels acquired under colonial 
rule”101
 
.   
Even though these assertions from Dagombas seemed to be untrue. 
According to Brukum, Dagombas appear “never to have exercised control 
over Konkomba: administration took the form of slave raiding and punitive 
expeditions. The Konkombas were by no means assimilated”102
 
. 
Nevertheless, the British chose to ignore these evidences and use the 
Dagomba narratives to settle in the north. 
In 1897, Lieutenant-Colonel H. P. Northcott was appointed first chief 
commissioner of the Northern Territories. “In acquiring the territory the 
British sought to limit the influence of rival European powers along the 
trade routes” in the north103
                                                        
98 Supra note 86, p. 29 
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into the colonial administration and to do that he departed from the idea that 
“chiefs were the centre of power for all tribal groups, and each individual 
99 Ibid. 
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and community was part of a tribe”104
 
. His idea was to plant chieftaincy as 
the British strategy to govern the north. 
The British desired political stability, and they rationalized their strategy of 
political incorporation with the belief that Africans who lived in 
noncentralized societies were actually quite amenable to aligning themselves 
with centralized polities or that colonial rule was restoring the “traditional” 
political relationships. This was the political terrain that the British 
constructed from their own prejudices and information from informants 
among the centralized polities.105
 
 
Skalnik also affirms that the British preferred the centralized groups. 
According to him, “[t]he colonial administration and post-colonial regimes, 
not only in Ghana, were known for siding with those groups which had 
chiefs and ‘states’ and centralisation of political office”106.  The colonial 
regime, therefore, focused its policies on the centralized groups. The power 
of chiefs was increased as the British allowed “them to rule their subjects as 
far as was compatible with equity and good government. They were allowed 
to try matrimonial, land and farm disputes and petty assaults in their 
courts”107
 
; independently of their knowledge of the traditional rules of the 
non-centralized groups. 
It was only on 1 January 1902 that the British formally incorporated the 
Northern Region, then known as Northern Territories (which also 
incorporated what is now known as Upper West and Upper East Regions), 
to the Gold Coast Colony (known today as Ghana). The incorporation also 
stipulated that the African societies were supposed to maintain their own 
traditional practices “as long as they did not result in violence, involve 
practices repugnant to British laws, or impede the administration of the 
territories”108
 
. The British expected that the centralized powers would assert 
themselves upon the non-centralized ones. Conversely, centralized 
kingdoms exercised little influence on non-centralized communities.  
On August 6, 1914 the British and the French divided between themselves 
the German Togoland, which meant that a number of African societies came 
under the British domination, including the Konkomba, Chakosi, Nanumba, 
and Dagomba. After 1916, the British regarded Dagomba political authority 
as the traditional power and they hoped for an inclusion of the Konkomba 
under Dagomba rule. The British wanted to exercise political control by 
relying on the power of the chiefs. However, it was very difficult for 
Dagombas to impose themselves on Konkombas, as the latter did not see 
Dagombas as their authority. 
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In the 1920s British authorities proposed a ban on bows and arrows – 
weapons commonly used by Konkombas. The Chief Commissioner at the 
time “gave Dagomba nas a central role in its enforcement. He made the Nas, 
with police support, responsible for collecting Konkomba weapons and 
imposing fines in all culprits”109
 
. It was the first time that Dagomba actually 
had a mandate to assert their power over Konkomba. 
When the British introduced indirect rule in the Northern Territories in 1929, 
it marked a turning point in the relationship between Konkomba and 
Dagomba. As part of implementing indirect rule, colonial officials recasted 
African traditions, which led to the construction of customary law, a stronger 
chieftaincy, and finally courts.110
 
 
This indirect rule, named Native Authority, gave more power to Dagombas 
who could control not only the territories, but also the educational system 
and the courts system. “The British established native tribunals to operate 
along with magistrate courts. They did not base their concept of Native 
Authority on historical and empirical realities. Rather, they perceived the 
political realities that they confronted as aberrations of what ought to 
exist”111
 
. 
The chiefs could try all cases except criminal ones while the Native 
Authority system was in place. The centralized chiefs were also given 
“treasuries into which they collected taxes supposedly to be used for the 
development of their ‘native authority’ areas… British support for chiefs 
reached its apogee in 1938 with the creation of the Northern Territory 
Council which was a Chief’s Council”112
 
.  
These Native Authorities were reinforced in the 1930’s and 1940’s in the 
Northern Territories. The chiefs of centralized societies, as the Dagombas, 
for example, were brought to the centre of colonial administration and 
gained more power. Non-centralized communities had to come together 
around the symbols of power that were important to the British, namely, 
ethnic unity and chieftaincy. “Ethnicity was the means through which the 
British and Dagomba defined and disfranchised Konkomba, and it became 
the means through which Konkomba challenged Dagomba power, and by 
extension British policies”113
 
. 
By supporting one ethnic group over the other, the British intended to 
prevent the emergence of detribalized Africans. The British, as well as other 
Europeans in Africa, thought that by supporting the chiefs they would 
prevent the development of the territory-wide political consciousness. These 
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policies were in line with the British believe that, “if ever power were to be 
divulged at all in Afirca, it was to its natural rulers who were the chiefs”114
 
. 
Among the administrative measures adopted by the British in the Northern 
Territories, was, as mentioned above, the creation of courts – giving the 
chiefs powers to act as judges. Talton argues that these powers, together 
with the regular administrative powers, allowed chiefs to “exploit their 
neighbors with the support of the British colonial administration. They 
simply had to claim that their actions was a customary right or that they act 
on behalf of the district commissioner”115
 
. 
During the 1940’s greater Dagomba control and increased exploitation of the 
Konkomba influenced the development of a nascent Konkomba political 
identity as the many historically disunited Konkomba clans of the Oti Plain 
began to identify the Dagomba as their common subjugator and Dagomba 
exploitation as their common plight.116
 
 
After three decades of British rule excluding Konkombas, in 1945 the 
British started to change their tactics towards them; however the British 
needed the Konkomba to present themselves as a centralized polity in order 
to provide them with political power. The Konkomba started than to 
organise themselves in youth associations.  
 
In the pre-independence years youth associations were gaining ground in 
Ghana. Their struggle with other regional associations was “recruiting 
grounds for nationalist political parties”117. Many of those who were not 
part of the chiefs or the elders groups formed youth associations. They were 
the representatives of the commoners and their main goal, especially after 
World War II, was to advance education. “Individuals and groups had 
begun to regard education as an asset to the group as well as the 
individual.”118 The youth associations combine characteristics and functions 
of voluntary association, though membership is based either on territory of 
origin or ethnic affiliation. “The category ‘youth’ refers to the politically 
active, who regard themselves as being the public opinion leaders in their 
communities, and include biologically young males only in the very widest 
sense of the word.”119
 
  
In 1957 Ghana became independent from Britain, however “[t]he 
postcolonial state continued, and in many cases expanded, the institutional 
arrangements and administration of colonial rule”120
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the country, dividing ethnic groups between two or more districts to reduce 
the influence of tribalism. His administration also appointed Konkomba 
leaders to head districts – as it was the case with the creation of the Saboba 
district in 1963 and the appointment of Isaac Bawa as commissioner. The 
Saboba district was the first autonomous Konkomba political entity.  
 
From 1966 to 1969 Ghana was governed by the National Liberation Council 
(NLC), the party that took power from President Nkrumah in a coup. The 
NLC, contrary to Nkrumah, was not anti-chieftaincy. President Nkrumah 
saw chieftaincy, ethnicity and tribalism as sources of dispute in Ghanaian 
society, whereas the NLC gave room to chiefs and coupled districts created 
by the former leader together. In some cases, as in the case of Saboba and 
Zabzugu, uniting two districts was a source for dispute. 
 
Nonetheless, it is from 1969 to 1972, during the government of the second 
democratically elected leader, Prime Minister Kofi Busia, that the 
groundwork for the Konkomba conflicts with their centralized neighbours 
takes place. Busia was even more pro-chieftaincy than the NLC was. In 
1971 he passed Act 370, the Chieftaincy Act, which created the National 
House of Chiefs – “composed of all of the nation’s existing paramount 
chiefs, and chieftaincies, and [it] adjudicated particular land and chieftaincy 
disputes”121
 
.  
By creating the House of Chiefs, Busia did not increase the political voice 
and influence of every local society. Enhancing the role of chieftaincy in 
local affairs further institutionalized tradition, authority, and ethnic 
difference, which excluded most noncentralized societies and further 
entrenched common notions and practices that presented tradition and history 
as the exclusive domain of centralized societies.122
 
 
In 1972 there was another military coup in Ghana and Colonel Ignatius 
Acheampong came to power and ruled until 1978. In 1979 Hilla Limann 
was democratically elected. His most significant gesture was the 
promulgation of land reforms, which gave land ownership rights to 
Northern chiefs of centralized societies. One of the main setbacks of the 
reforms was the fact that “land historically occupied by groups that lacked 
an officially recognized chief legally became part of the domain of the 
neighboring chief”123
 
. 
In 1978 the government of Colonel Acheampong established the Committee 
on Ownership of Land and Positions of Tenants in Northern and Upper 
Regions, popularly known as the Alhassan Committee. “The Alhassan 
Committee was shouldered with the responsibility to create a uniform 
system of land tenure for the entire nation”124
 
.  
                                                        
121 Ibid, p. 133. 
122 Ibid, p 134. 
123 Ibid, p. 135. 
124 Ibid, p. 147. 
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The Konkomba Youth Association (KOYA) “submitted a memorandum [to 
the Alhassan Committee] laying claim to part of Dagbon, which [had been 
identified] as ‘belonging to Konkombas by right’. The memorandum was 
submitted ‘on behalf of the Chiefs and the people of Konkomba Traditional 
Area’”125
 
. The recognition of this land as Konkomba land would confirm 
the status of Konkomba as a legitimate Ghanaian tribe.  
The Committee dismissed the Konkomba claim in the following terms: 
 
We are therefore of the opinion that the land the Konkomba now claim 
should be vested in them is under the Ya-Na by conquest but is currently 
predominantly inhabited by Konkombas, thus their demand for lesser area 
than they once possessed. We therefore accept the claim of the Dagombas 
that the area claimed by the Konkombas is Dagomba land.126
 
  
This decision of the Committee further disempowered Konkombas and 
other non-centralized communities. It maintained the system created by the 
British, which recognized tradition and the history and stories of the 
centralized communities to be superior to those of the non-centralized ones. 
The decision also influenced the work and political strategies of KOYA. 
 
KOYA is a central organization to the comprehension of the Konkomba 
political structure and to understanding the 1994 conflict. The constitution 
of KOYA proclaimed the Konkomba unity, the district of Saboba as 
Konkomba traditional land, and asked for a Konkomba Paramount Chief127. 
KOYA was especially active in the district of Bimbilla, where Joseph Ali 
Kamshegu, the headman of the Konkomba community in that district took 
an active role to diminish Nanumba128
 
 influence in Konkomba matters. 
Kamshegu’s active role, together with the Konkomba social and political 
change (influenced by their growing economic power connected to yam 
farming) created dissonance in the social hierarchy of Northern Ghana. 
Moreover, in the beginning of the 1980s there was an escalation of tension 
between Konkomba and Nanumba in the Bimbilla District. Even though the 
government was aware of such occurrence it did not intervene. According to 
Talton, the government’s reluctance to act “was tantamount to a green light 
for violence”129
2.3.2 The Pito
. 
130  War – 1981 Conflict 
                                                        
125 Mahama, Ibrahim, Ethnic Conflicts in Northern Ghana (Cyber Systems, Tamale, 2003), 
p. 155 
126 Ibid, p. 157 
127 See Talton, 2010 and Mahama, 2003 
128 Alike the Dagomba in Dagbon, the Nanumba were the centralized power in the Bimbilla 
area. As a centralized power they could decide upon conflicts relating to marriage and land 
disputes. 
129 Supra note 86, p. 160 
130  Pito is a kind of beer produced by Konkombas in the Northern Region.  
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In March 1981 Kamshegu was kidnapped and threatened. He reported this 
to the regional commissioner in Tamale, who sent orders to the Bimbilla Na 
to guarantee Kamshegu’s safety. In the Bimbilla Na’s perspective the 
government was siding with Konkomba in the escalating conflict. After this 
episode KOYA and the Nanumba Youth Association got together to discuss 
the situation in the Bimbilla District. After a meeting took place on 23 
March 1981 both sides left hoping that they could resolve the issue 
peacefully. Even though the situation remained tranquil in the District the 
disputes between Kamshegu and the Bimbilla Na were not close to an end. 
 
Their dispute trickled over into the wider Nanumba and Konkomba 
communities; after their sons had a fight in a pito bar, on April 23, 1981, 
Kamshegu’s son stabbed Mamadu’s [the Bimbilla Na] son. Later, while a 
group of Nanumba men searched for Kamshegu’s son they attacked and 
ultimately killed three Konkomba men and a young Nanumba woman who 
they mistook for a Konkomba. On April 28, as a search party combed 
Konkomba villages in the vincinity of Bimbilla looking for Kamshegu’s son, 
Hamilton Salifu, a Nanumba, entered a compound and peered through one of 
its windows and was met by a bullet in the head that killed him instantly. The 
death toll in the conflict rose slowly at first, while the fighting remained 
limited to attacks on individuals, before Nanumba and Konkomba men 
organized to attack entire villages.131
 
 
With the “encouragement” of the national 
media the conflict became more and more 
violent, as more men organized themselves 
against the other group. In the beginning 
the causalities against Konkomba 
outnumbered the ones against Nanumbas, 
however Konkombas from the other 
Regions gathered the fight and made the 
Konkomba victories outnumber those of 
Nanumbas. As Konkombas took over 
villages they installed their own chiefs, in 
order to have their society recognized in 
the Ghanaian context.  
 
The national government interfered, 
especially in order to avoid that the conflict 
could spread to Tamale. They sent army troops to the conflict areas. “By the 
first week of July, the military had established itself throughout the 
Northern Region, with a especially strong presence in and around 
Bimbilla”132
 
. As order seemed to come to place again, the national 
government began to investigate how to address the issues highlighted by 
the conflict and which course of action to take.  
Limann, the president at time, convened a commission of inquiry to 
investigate the causes of the conflict and the possibility of reconciliation.                                                         
131 Ibid, pp. 160-161 
132 Ibid, p. 164 
Figure 2.1 – Daily Graphic, 14 
February 1994 – Author’s collection 
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However, on New Year’s Eve 1981, Flight Lieutenant John Rawlings 
carried a coup and removed Limann from power. He also suspended the 
work of the commission that never was reestablished. “The absence of 
enquiry to establish who was right, left the matter at large and provided a 
potent condition for [the 1994] war”133
 
. 
According to Brukum, after the Pito War Nanumbas were seeking to avenge 
their defeat. “Both Nanumbas and Konkombas were secretly arming 
themselves and looking for an opportunity to start a war”134
2.3.3 The Guinea-Fowl War and the Peace Process 
. The 
opportunity came in 1994.  
 
The 1994 conflict is Ghana’s most violent conflict and it was “the longest 
running and the widest spread ethnic conflict witnessed in modern 
Ghana”135. Although the conflict is known for its chieftaincy matters, and 
was called an “ethnic” conflict, it was much larger than chieftaincy and 
ethnicity. The conflict revolved around the economic growth of Konkomba; 
their lack of political participation in an area where tradition and chieftaincy 
shaped local politics; Konkomba social change influenced by Western 
education; migration; commercial farming; communal associations136
 
; and 
land related issues connected to the Land Tenure Act of 1979.   
In 1994 the “Guinea Fowl War”, as it is popularly known, exploded proving 
that there were still several issues to be dealt with when chieftaincy and 
issues connected to this institution are concerned. The root causes of the 
conflict are, nonetheless, yet to be tackled. “Although violent fighting is 
suppressed, the underlying causes of violence remain largely 
unaddressed.”137
 
 
Perhaps the most important (but certainly not the only) cause of the conflict 
is the economic marginalization of the Konkomba as well as their lasting 
cultural marginalization in the eastern peripheries of the Northern Region, 
which remain among the least developed parts of this massively 
disadvantaged region in terms of infrastructure and all other relevant 
indicators until at least the late 1990s.138
 
 
                                                        
133 Supra note 125, p. 2 
It is necessary to clarify here that determining who is right and who is wrong is not 
necessarily the most important activity to be undertaken in the aftermath of conflict. It is 
important to think about justice (punishing the guilty individuals) and reconciliation. The 
point is, though, that the Ghanaian government did nothing at the time. 
134 Brukum, N. J. K., “Chieftaincy and Ethnic Conflicts in the Northern Region of Ghana, 
1980-2002, Ethnicity, Conflicts and Consensus in Ghana (Woeli Publishing Services, 
Accra, 2007), p. 109 
135 Supra note 125, p. v 
136 Supra note 86. 
137 Kaye, J. and Béland, D., “The politics of ethnicity and post-conflict reconstruction: The 
case of Northern Ghana”, (Journal of Contemporary African Studies, Vol. 27, No. 2, PP. 
177-200, 2009), p. 180 
138 Supra note 96, p. 46 
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The issues at hand involve access to land and political participation, as 
chiefless societies do not have access to these goods. In the conflict 
resolution/transformation literature it is said that issues of social justice 
have not been addressed. As Bogner states, the result of Konkombas’ 
history is that they lacked “ways and means of conflict management and 
institutionalized social mechanisms or procedures that could have prevented 
the violent escalation of collective grievances between the Konkomba and 
their neighbors”139
 
. 
In their effort to conquer more political participation the Konkombas 
envisaged the solution for the problem in having a paramount chief in the 
Northern Region. Following the rules of the 1992 Constitution, KOYA 
presented a petition to acquire a Paramount Stool to the National House of 
Chiefs. The basic demand of the petitioners was for Paramountcy and 
Traditional Council, they also wanted a defined area of their own, the 
Konkomba traditional land140
 
. 
The Ya Na only heard about the Konkomba petition after approximately 
two months – as it was sent directly to the National House of Chiefs, and he 
declared the petition void, as according to the rules of chieftaincy the 
petition should have met him first. Moreover, the Ya Na was not satisfied 
with the fact that the Konkomba claimed ownership of land. The Ya Na said 
that the Konkombas had no land of 
their own in Dagbon.  
 
By December 1993 the tension 
between the Ya Na and Konkombas 
had increased. On 31 December 1993, 
two Konkomba men were bargaining 
over the price of a guinea fowl, when a 
Nanumba man over bid the Konkomba 
buyer. The two men, Nanumba and 
Konkomba, started a quarrel that 
escalated to physical violence. It is 
reported that on the following day the 
son of the Konkomba man murdered 
the Nanumba one in order to avenge 
the humiliation. “News of the murder 
spread, and both communities gathered 
to prepare for a fight”141
 
. The conflict 
had begun.  
During the first three months of 1994 
fighting was intense. The government had sent representatives of the armed 
forces to the region; however, in small numbers they could only secure the                                                         
139 Ibid, pp. 47-48 
140 Supra note 125 
141 Supra note 86, p. 173 
Figure 2.2 – Daily Graphic. 11February 
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areas of the districts capitals. The killing, burning of property and looting of 
animals was widespread in the other areas.  
 
Peace talks started already in April 1994, however these were not very 
successful, since Konkombas and Dagombas blamed each other mutually 
for having started the conflict. It was only on 9 June 1994, that a cease-fire 
accord was signed142
 
. Rawlings, the President of Ghana at the time, went to 
the Northern Region in November 1994 to converse with the parties. His 
visit is reported to have taken peace process forward.  
After the end of the first phase of armed fighting in 1994, the national 
government and – in an additional separate attempt – an informal consortium 
of international and local NGOs tried to bring about negotiations and a 
reconciliation between the ethno-political groupings involved in the armed 
conflict. This attempt resulted in the peace treaty in the year 1996 known as 
“Kumasi Peace Accord”.143
 
  
There were outbreaks of violence in 1995 in the Bimbilla District and also 
in the north of the Region. Nonetheless, the massive violence in the region 
had already ceased. NGOs, “religious organizations, and peacebuilding 
teams were at the forefront of sustaining peace in Northern Ghana. There 
were six peace meetings before the ‘Kumasi Accord’”144
 
 came to place.   
The text of the peace accord admits that the Konkomba are subjects of the 
kings of Dagomba and Nanumba in the respective parts of the conflict zone. 
It also confirms that Dagomaba and Nanumba kings hold, as their subject’s 
trustees, the allodial property rights for the lands inhabited by the Konkomba 
in the conflict zone. The Kumasi peace accord is most probably the first 
document signed by prominent representatives of the Konkomba that 
recognizes the Dagomba king’s claim to property rights regarding the land 
within their ancestral area of settlement.145
 
 
The Kumasi Accords brought about negative peace; nevertheless the 
situation for the Konkomba did not improve much after the conflicts. The 
Konkombas continued looking for a paramountcy; however, the problem in 
achieving it was not only related to the authorization of the Ya Na, but also, 
it was connected to the lack of consensus within Konkombas, as to whom 
ought to be the paramount chief. Even though the KOYA enjoyed broad 
respect in the political realm it lacked such influence when the issue was 
land, social relations and death, all linked to traditional matters and chiefs in 
the Northern Region. Many of the issues that triggered the conflict have not 
been addressed by modern Ghana; issues between Konkombas and their 
centralized neighbours are yet to be dealt with. 
 
One of these issues relates to paramountcy. Konkombas have been given 
three paramount chiefs nominated by the Ya Na. However this is not what 
the Konkombas were fighting for. “The unity that paramountcy was meant                                                         
142 Supra note 125. 
143 Supra note 96, p. 41 
144 Supra note 86, p. 175 
145 Supra note 96, p. 55 
 42 
to bring about still remains an elusive dream”146. The three paramount 
chiefs could never agree with each other one who was to be the chief of 
Konkombas and how to divide traditional power. The disagreements among 
the Konkombas grew worse and in the end the Konkombas were left in the 
same situation as before the conflict. “Konkombas still do not have a single 
paramountcy, although the chief of Saboba enjoys what seems to amount to 
primus inter pares status.”147
 
 
Several people died during the conflict (numbers can reach up to two 
thousand, however they vary considerably), the government claims to have 
used more than six billion cedis148 in trying to establish peace, houses were 
destroyed, animals looted and public buildings were burnt. Nevertheless, the 
consequences of the conflict go beyond material lost. According to Brukum, 
the militarization of youth is also a consequence from the war. “But even 
more alarming is the atmosphere of insecurity and distrust that the conflicts 
have engendered which has affected all socio-economic activities in the 
region. The disruption of the normal functioning of Northern societies still 
persists.”149
2.3.4 The Land Disputes and Chieftaincy 
 
 
After the independence in 1957 many attempts were made to try to 
coordinate the traditional structures with the “modern” British organization 
of the State. Nkrumah, the first Ghanaian president, wanted to “modernize” 
the country and he thought that chieftaincy stood in the way. However, 
modernizing the country proved to be a bigger challenge than expected as it 
became difficult for authorities to share the power with the traditional 
authorities (the paramount chiefs) and change the system. The chieftaincy 
institution was completely re-established in 1971 with the Chieftaincy Act 
(Act 370 of 1971)150
 
. The act nonetheless did not come to take a critical 
look at the chieftaincy institution and historical discrimination and non-
inclusion patterns were maintained.  
During the presidency of Limann land reforms were promulgated. These 
reforms “institutionalized control of the land under the authority of the 
‘original owners’, which with few exceptions was a position claimed by the 
chiefs of the historically centralized societies on behalf of their 
constituents”151
 
. 
The 1979 Constitution illustrates these policies. As it can be read in Article 
188, paragraphs 3 and 4, which stated that all lands in the Northern and 
Upper Regions in Ghana should be vested in any such person as who was 
the owner of any such land. This constitutional decision connected the                                                         
146 Supra note 88, p. 222 
147 Ibid, p. 227 
148 Supra note 134 
149 Ibid, p. 99 
150 Supra note 90, p. 46 
151 Supra note 86, p. 135 
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political power already vested in chiefs with land control enforcing the kind 
of administration present in the Northern Region since colonial times. 
 
The 1992 Constitution maintained the connection between chieftaincy and 
land ownership. Article 267 of the constitutional text vests all stool property 
in the recognized stools. The lands controlled by the stools are regulated by 
traditional rules and there is a special governmental commission monitoring 
the stool lands. 
 
The 1992 Constitution also addresses the issue of Chieftaincy coordinating 
the institution in Articles 270 to 277.  According to Article 277, a chief is “a 
person, who, hailing from the appropriate family and lineage, has been 
validly nominated, elected or selected and enstooled, enskinned or installed 
as a chief or queenmother in accordance with the relevant customary law 
and usage”. This was yet not sufficient to deal with the problem of the 
exclusion of certain groups from the political life, especially because chiefs 
and queenmothers are not democratically chosen, as they have to be part of 
the right family and lineage. Moreover, they are the “owners” of traditional 
land – as read in Article 267, and all non-centralized peoples living in that 
area are subjects to the chief. 
 
In line with widespread although not entirely undisputed legal opinion, the 
two constitutions of 1979 and 1992 created (or re-established) a legal 
situation in which the kings of these four groups [Dagomba, Numba, Gonja 
and Mamprusi] are regarded as the owners of all land in the Northern Region. 
Essentially, there neither has been nor is there at present any individual 
ownership of land in Northern Ghana, but only a form of corporate 
ownership of land. This means that the owner is a social group or collectivity, 
the rights of which are administered in trust by their traditional 
representatives. How these groups or collectivities are to be legitimately 
defined and delimited – whether as settlement group, a local genealogical 
group or a local cult association, a political collectivity (a dynastic polity, for 
example), or an ethnic group – was the precise subject of dispute at the time 
of the 1994 war (and in part until today).152
 
 
Article 270 of the Constitution establishes the institution of Chieftaincy, 
together with traditional councils, as it is recognised by customary law. 
Each region is to have a House of Chiefs, which elects five paramount 
chiefs from the region to the National House of Chiefs, as established in 
Article 271 of the Constitution. This constitutional provision impedes that 
any other ethno-political group who do not recognize the institution of 
paramount chieftaincy make themselves present in the National House of 
Chiefs.  
 
According to Brobbey, “there is no single indigenous Ghanaian who can 
deny as a fact that he belongs to a tribe or he is a member of a traditional 
area with a chief he owes allegiance. The chief is the unifying force in his 
society. He leads his people in times of war (as in the past) and in times of 
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crisis”153
 
 (p. 33). From the author’s point of view, this affirmation by 
Brobbey shows how outdated and sexiest the institution is. Even though the 
Constitution recognizes that queenmothers can act like chiefs, most of the 
leaders in Northern Ghana are male. Moreover, the position attributed to the 
chiefs as the guide and decider, removes autonomy and the possibility of 
agency from the people living within the chief’s kingdom. Furthermore, the 
fact that it is only the chief who controls traditional areas removes 
autonomy and political agency from groups who are nothing else but 
subjects of the king. 
This customary land tenure based on chieftaincy is a heritage from colonial 
times (as it has previously been shown), it is a strategic way for the 
government to gain control over land, natural resources and agricultural 
production to the expenses of the poor peasantry154
 
 (Amanor and Ubink, 
2008).  The entire chieftaincy and land tenure system is also detrimental to 
women as it can be read from Amanor and Ubink. 
[C]ustomary systems often embody patriarchal values and power, which 
seeks to exclude women from land. Women are not well positioned within 
customary political institutional frameworks or within local government 
frameworks to represent their own interests. Thus, the harmonisation of the 
customary with the formal, and the turn to the customary, often marginalise 
women’s rights, and serve to legitimate institutions that undermine women’s 
rights to land.155
 
 
Even though chieftaincy poses all these challenges to democracy, it is still a 
paramount institution in the Ghanaian context, as it has been shown above. 
In recent years there has been a movement in Africa to decentralise 
administration from national state agencies to community-based institutions. 
In Ghana this decentralisation process revolves around chieftaincy156
 
. 
Chiefs are not only responsible for their traditional duties, but also for 
development initiatives – donors and the World Bank have been funding 
foundations established by chiefs. Therefore chieftaincy has re-gained a lot 
of power recently. This can be explained by the way the chiefs administrate 
land tenure.  
Within the state sector, customary land relations in Ghana are based on a 
formulation that differentiates allodial and user (usufructuary) rights. Allodial 
rights are vested in chiefs who through their political hegemony are granted 
ultimate control over the land. This concept is ultimately derived from some 
notion of communal land tenure in which the land is vested in chiefs to 
manage on behalf of the community, or in which, the founder of the polity                                                         
153 Brobbey, S. A., The Law of Chieftaincy in Ghana – Incorporating Customary 
Arbitration, Contempt of the Court, Judicial Review (Advanced Legal Publication, Accra, 
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155 Ibid, p. 13 
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and the political order, chiefs acquired rights to the political allegiance of 
subject on their land. This is essentially a political definition of land rights, 
which empowers chiefs as the trustees of communities to control land. The 
‘subjects’ (the peasantry) only hold users rights in land, which confer on 
them rights to use the land to make a livelihood, but not rights to sell land. 
Only the products emerging from the use of land and from their labour 
belong to the subject of the chief, such as the farm plot, but the actual land 
belongs to the chief. This framework ultimately denies the peasantry secure 
rights in land by enabling them to be ‘extinguished by the action of a 
paramount power which assumes possession of the entire control of the 
land’.157
 
 
Economic matters aside, control over land also represents “judicial power”, 
in the sense that land disputes are usually arbitrated by the chiefs in the area 
disputed, especially if the parties in disagreement cannot afford to go 
through the state’s land sector agencies or courts. In the Northern Region 
there are only four kingdoms (Nanumba, Dagomba, Mamprusi e Gonja) that 
control all the land in the largest region of the country158
 
. 
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3 Conflict Management Tools 
 
Before analysing the work of the Commission in Ghana relating to the 
conflicts in the Northern Region, some clarifications on the meaning of 
conflict management tools and peacebuilding are needed. This chapter will 
concentrate on conflict management tools. 
 
As proposed above conflict is always dynamic, multifaceted, involves many 
actors and circumstances and therefore there are many ways to manage159
 
 
conflict. The approaches to conflict management are various and their use is 
connected to the kind of conflict, its escalation level, and the goal to be 
achieved. The image below illustrates some of the approaches to conflict 
and their “timing”. It also indicates the nature of the efforts (judicial or 
extra-judicial) and how they influence conflict. 
 
Figure 3.1 – Approaches to Handling Conflict 
 
The ways of dealing with conflict presented above can be divided in 
bilateral (negotiation) or third-party intervention (conciliation, mediation 
and arbitration). According to Bercovitch160
                                                        
159 The literature is extremely diverse in terminology, especially when the ways to deal with 
conflict are presented. As mentioned before, conflict transformation can be considered to be 
the deepest level of conflict resolution (Ramsbotham et al., 2005) or an entire process of its 
own (Lederach, 2003). This thesis will use the term “manage” at this point because the 
tools presented might not be sufficient to transform the conflict as it should be goal of the 
efforts, but thy are, nonetheless, important mechanisms to be used throughout the process. 
 these are two out of the three 
basic methods of conflict management.  
160 Bercovitch, Jacob, “Third parties in conflict management: the structure and conditions to 
effective mediation in international relations” (International Journal, 736, 1984-1985) 
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The first method would be the use of violence and coercion, both physical 
and psychological (the unilateral method). The other methods shown in the 
illustration, namely, litigation and legislation are not going to be dealt with 
at this point, especially because these are beyond the direct mandates of 
most NHRIs. Even though it is known that NHRIs can influence the 
legislative process through lobbying and advocacy. 
 
“Negotiation and mediation are the primary noncoercive methods by which 
actors in conflict settle their disputes. This holds true for all levels of 
conflict, from the individual to the international.”161
3.1 Negotiation 
 Because of their 
importance and range of applicability focus will be set on mediation and 
negotiation. This chapter will also discuss how NHRIs can work with these 
tools in order to transform conflict and build positive sustainable peace.  
 
“According to Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, to negotiate is ‘to hold 
intercourse with a view of coming to terms; to confer regarding a basis of 
agreement’.”162
 
 Even though this definition is very straightforward, the 
meaning of negotiation has changed a lot throughout the years. Game 
theory, social psychology, international relations and organizational 
behaviour are some of the fields of study that have influenced the meaning 
of negotiation and its use in conflict transformation. It is important to 
emphasise here that negotiation is a process through which two or more 
parties to the conflict try to reach an agreement through their own efforts. 
Negotiation can happen bi-, tri-, or multilaterally. Communication can 
happen face-to-face or at distance, it can involve a great deal of subjects and 
therefore it is very difficult to talk about a general theory of negotiation, 
therefore some possible theories will be briefly explained.  
 
Negotiation can be seen as a “bargaining game”. “According to this view, 
negotiation is a process by which parties move gradually from their own 
initial positions toward the position of others.”163
 
 
The bargaining process can be characterized in the following steps: firstly, 
each of the parties make their initial offers; secondly, the parties make 
commitments to certain positions in an effort to hold firm; after that 
“promises of rewards and threats of sanctions are issued to induce other 
parties to make concessions”; following that, one party moves closer to 
another as concessions are made; the next step is the retractions of previous 
concessions and offers as the parties draw apart again, lastly, “when the 
dynamics of concession making overcome the pressures to diverge, the                                                         
161 Bercovitch, Jacob and Jackson, Richard, “Negotiation or Mediation? An Exploration of 
Factors Affecting the Choice of Conflict Management in International Conflict” 
(Negotiation Journal, pp. 59-77, January 2001), p. 60 
162 Supra note 20, p. 81 
163 Ibid, p. 87 
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parties tend to converge upon agreement somewhere between their opening 
offers”.164
 
 The “Negotiation Diamond” below can illustrate the bargaining 
process. 
 
Figure 3.2 - The Negotiation Diamond 
 
Research into negotiation has shown that there different rhythms and 
patterns to negotiations. In the literature there are many different stages and 
turning points to the negotiation process, Roesdahl’s165
 
 Diamond is a good 
illustration of these different stages. One of the most important stages (or 
phases) of the negotiation process is setting the agenda, as this will be the 
guide for the entire procedure. It is important to guarantee that all parties 
have equal opportunities to present their arguments and demands, so that an 
agreement can be reached at the end.  
Another important phase of the negotiation process is the prenegotiation. 
“Experimental evidence suggests that prenegotiation activities affect both 
the prospects for entering negotiations and the ease with which parties 
negotiate.”166 The prenegotiation phase can be a study of the issues to be 
dealt with in the negotiation and a study of the other parties to the process, 
but it can also be a way of preparing the physical setting where the 
negotiation will take place. “Effective use of prenegotiation preparations 
may spell the difference between successful and unsuccessful outcomes.”167                                                        
164 Hopmann, P. Terrence, “Two Paradigms of Negotiation: Barganing and Problem 
Solving” (Annals of the American Academy of Political Science, Vol. 52, Nov. 1995), p. 26 
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3.2 Third-Party Intervention  
Third-party interventions have proven themselves to be helpful in the 
transformation of conflicts, even though neither researchers nor practitioners 
have agreed upon its precise content. There have been debates over whether 
third-party intervention should be impartial or partial, coercive or non-
coercive, state-based or non state-based, carried out by outsiders or insiders, 
but no consensus has been achieved. It can be said, nonetheless, that one 
way or another, third parties have helped conflicting parties by putting them 
in contact to one another, clarifying issues, setting agendas and formulating 
agreements168
 
. 
The thesis will shortly exemplify the different, more common types of third-
party interventions. As these interventions are not the main goal of this 
thesis the explanations provided will be concise and merely illustrative. 
3.2.1 Conciliation  
Conciliation is a type of third-party intervention. The peculiarity about 
conciliation is that it targets communication and information. Conciliation is 
a process to facilitate communication between adversary parties – the focus 
of conciliation is to define the terms of a potential settlement. It is a process 
very close to mediation that “refers to the intermediary efforts to encourage 
the parties to move towards negotiations”169
 
. 
Conciliation is particularly beneficial at the pre-negotiation stage, “where it 
has the effect of clarifying the agenda for subsequent discussion, 
encouraging the building of a ‘common mental map’; reducing tensions and 
facilitating greater understanding of each other’s aims and goals”170
3.2.2 Mediation 
.  
 
As the other methods presented (negotiation and conciliation), mediation is 
a process.  A process by which a third party intervenes and tries to assist the 
conflict parties to come to an agreement. It is another peaceful way to 
approach conflict. Mediation involves the “intervention of an outsider – an 
individual, a group, or an organization – into a conflict between” two or 
more actors. Mediation can also be seen as “the process by which the 
participants, together with the assistance of a neutral person or persons, 
systematically isolate disputed issues in order to develop options, consider 
alternatives and reach consensual settlement that will accommodate their 
needs”171                                                        
168 Supra note 22 
. “In conflict resolution literature, mediation is generally seen as a 
169 Ibid, p. 30 
170 Supra note 32, p. 106 
171 Folberg, J., and A. Taylor. Mediation: A Comparative Guide to Resolving Conflicts 
without Litigation (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1984), p. 7 
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process facilitated by an impartial, independent third party who has no stake 
in a specific solution to the conflict, and no bias towards any of the parties. 
The mediator seeks to facilitate an outcome to the conflict that is acceptable 
to all parties.”172
 
 
More importantly, mediation is a “noncoercive, nonviolente and ultimately, 
nonbinding form of intervention”173. Mediation is a “voluntary process in 
which the parties retain control over the outcome (pure mediation), although 
it is sometimes combined with positive and negative inducements”174
 
. The 
most relevant aspect of mediation is, nonetheless its voluntary nature. 
Conflicting parties voluntarily enter a mediation process. 
Mediation is especially important at the stage where at least one of the 
conflicting parties has realized that the continuation of the conflict will not 
help them achieving their goals, but where they are not capable of having 
formal negotiations yet. “At this point, face-to-face meetings may be very 
difficult to arrange, and mediation and ‘back channels’ become 
important.”175
 
 Nevertheless, it is imperative that the parties in conflict have 
tried their own conflict management tools before they enter into mediation. 
A successful mediation process requires that the parties at dispute want to 
resolve the conflict and that the mediators have an opportunity to get 
involved. It also relies on the skills of the mediator. Timing is another key 
issue when mediation is concern. “The most propitious time to initiate 
mediation is roughly halfway through the life cycle176 of a conflict, and 
certainly after the parties own efforts have failed.”177
 
  
Also relevant to the mediation process is when to mediate. Mediation might 
be more important/relevant, depending on the intensity of the conflict.  
 
Conflict intensity usually refers to such factors as the severity of the conflict, 
the level of hostilities, the number of fatalities, the level of anger and 
intensity of feeling, the type of issues at stake, and the strength of the parties 
negative perceptions. When conflict intensity is low, Rubin suggests that the 
parties are concerned with ‘mending their own fences’ and do not want third-
party intervention. Low intensity conflicts can usually be dealt with by the 
parties themselves. If the parties cannot do so, a mediator will come in as a                                                         
172 Maloka, Victoria, “Paradigm Shift? Building Capacity for Conflict Management and 
Peacebuilding: The Tanzania Commission for Human Rights and Good Governance”, 
Parlevliet, M., Lamb, G. and Maloka, V. (eds.) Defenders of Human Rights, Managers of 
Conflict, Builders of Peace? National Human Rights Institutions in Africa (Centre for 
Conflict Resolution, University of Cape Town, 2005), p. 141 
173 Bercovitch, Jacob, “Mediation in International Conflict: An Overview of Theory, A 
Review of Practice”, Zartman, I. William and Rasmussen, J. Lewis, Peacemaking in 
International Conflict: Methods and Techniques (United States Institute for Peace, 
Washington, D.C., 2005), p. 127 
174 Supra note 22, p. 29 
175 Ibid, p. 169 
176 Ramsbotham et al. (2005) also see conflict as a cycle. According to them conflict 
follows a progression from peaceful social change to conflict formation to violent conflict 
and then to conflict transformation and back to peaceful social change. 
177 Supra note 173, p. 145 
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catalyst for negotiations. In contrast to that, in high-intensity, dangerous 
conflicts, a primary task is to prevent further escalation, and to achieve this, 
mediators may adopt more active forms of intervention. High-intensity 
conflicts are associated with higher levels of mediation involvement.178
  
  
3.2.3 Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR)  
Alternative dispute resolution (ADR) is a general term, used especially in 
internal and international law, which refers to any kind of dispute resolution 
outside a court of law. In the literature, it is possible to find references to 
mediation under ADR. Here, the use of ADR will emphasise arbitration and 
binding decisions. However, it will be noted that, even though these 
decisions are binding, mediation principles might be used to reach a 
decision. Furthermore, in many cases, ADR decisions do not exclude the 
possibility of going to court.  
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) is primarily seen as a method for 
relieving the crisis of overburdened state courts facing impossible backlogs 
of unresolved cases. More positively it is also advocated as offering a 
cheaper, faster and more accessible form of justice for ordinary citizens, 
particularly the rural and urban poor, who do not have access to state justice 
either because of lack of resources, social exclusion or lack of physical 
access (distance). 
 
The essence of the modern ADR concept, as developed by its European and 
North American advocates, is the idea that a better form of justice can be 
obtained by focusing on mediation or the search for an agreed settlement, 
rather than binding adjudication by an external (usually state) authority. Both 
state and non-state institutions or mediators can offer ADR; what makes it 
different from the practice in formal courts is the procedure, which is ‘de-
legalised’, relying on an informal search for an agreed and just solution, as 
opposed to deciding who has won or lost. This emphasis on ‘better’ and 
‘non-compulsory’ justice distinguishes the recent ADR movement from the 
already well-established contractual forms of commercial ADR, which rely 
on binding arbitration and may exclude the right to go to court.179
 
  
In the European and North American comprehension, ADR has three main 
pillars: 
 
1) Disputes are related to individual rights and an agreement has to be 
reached by the individual parties. The parties are responsible for 
upholding the agreement, as there is no public authority to guarantee 
it – however courts can be assessed for the enforcement of the 
decisions; 
                                                        
178 Bercovitch, Jacob, “Mediation and Conflict Resolution”, Bercovitch, Jacob; 
Kremenyuk, Victor and Zartman, William, The SAGE Handbook of Conflict Resolution 
(SAGE Publications, London, 2009), p. 348 
179 Crook, Richard C., “Customary justice and local Alternative Dispute Resolution: What 
kind of protection can they offer to customary landholders?”, Ubink, Janine M. and 
Amanor, Kojo S., Contesting Land and Custom in Ghana: State, Chief, Citizen (Leiden 
University Press, Leiden, 2008), pp. 132-133 
 52 
2) ADR has to respect the due process – the procedure has to be fair 
and cannot deter individuals’ right to access to court; 
3) ADR is about reaching “win-win” situations, possibly with the 
assistance of a mediator who will assist the parties in finding a 
solution without intimidation or pressure (Crook, 2008). 
 
In many Western systems, ADR is closely connected to the Court systems. 
In the United States for example, both Federal and State Courts have 
mediation and arbitration programmes connected to the Court procedures. 
ADR can additionally be used as a strategy of NHRIs which have quasi-
judicial functions to address conflicts.  
 
Both arbitration and mediation are part of ADR. The arbitration process is 
closer to the court systems, the parties have little control over the process 
and little control of the outcome too. The “problem” with arbitration is that 
the parties lack ownership and in case of deep-rooted conflicts in society, 
this kind of decisions are usually inappropriate. “The legal nature of 
arbitration can, however, be useful in contributing to a settlement.”180
3.3 The Use of Third Party Intervention and 
Negotiation by NHRIs 
 
 
According to the Paris Principles181
 
, if NHRIs have quasi-judicial functions 
they should seek “an amicable settlement through conciliation or, with the 
limits prescribed by the law, through binding decisions, or, where necessary, 
on the basis of confidentiality” (4. a). This means that NHRIs can use 
conflict management tools to exercise their mandate. Even though the legal 
text only explicitly refers to conciliation, it can be inferred that negotiation, 
mediation and arbitration (binding decisions) are part of the repertoire of 
possible measures to be taken by NHRIs. 
According to the Office for the High Commissioner on Human Rights 
(OHCHR), some NHRIs are themselves a form of ADR, as “they were 
created to offer alternative redress mechanisms to the courts. In the event, 
many institutions, even those that do not handle complaints, use conciliation 
and/or mediation”182
 
. 
As this thesis focuses on the Commission for Human Rights and 
Administrative Justice (CHRAJ) in Ghana, this sub-chapter will focus on 
two other African NHRIs and their use of conflict management tools in 
order to 1) exemplify how NHRIs can work on conflict and 2) provide 
relevant information for a later comparison. 
                                                         
180 Supra note 32, p. 108 
181 United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). 1993. Principles relating to the Status of 
National Institution, General Assembly Resolution 48/134 of 20 December 1993 
182 Office for the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), National Human 
Rights Institutions: History, Principles, Roles and Responsibilities (Professional Training 
Series No. 4, Rev. 1, United Nations, New York and Geneva, 2010), p. 93 
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The Uganda Human Rights Commission (UHRC) was established in 1995 
by the Constitution of Uganda. It can, according to its mandate, receive 
individual complaints on human rights violations and work as a quasi-
judicial body.  
 
The commission handles complaints through its Complaints and 
Investigations Department, which interviews the complainant, takes a 
statement, and opens a file. The respondent is contacted by the commission 
to provide a statement, after which the complainant is asked to respond to 
this statement. If there are disparities between the accounts of the 
complainant and respondent, the commission will conduct an investigation. 
Following the investigation, the matter will be referred to the Legal and 
Tribunal Department [which has quasi-judicial powers] to decide whether the 
matter should be heard before a tribunal, or whether it could be settled 
through mediation.183  
UHRC operates at both the micro and the macro levels of conflict. Its work 
at the micro level relates to small-scale conflicts or disputes, such as issue-
specific, individual complaints, where mediation and arbitration (Legal and 
Tribunal Department) are the tools used to deal with the complaints. “At the 
micro level the commission directly intervenes in conflict situations by 
initiating a mediation process to resolve the conflict between two parties as 
an alternative to the tribunal process.”184
 
 
Another relevant activity of UHRC has been its involvement in the 
disarmament process in the Karamoja community working in the macro 
level. The Commission has worked together with the government to 
facilitate the process. Nor mediation or arbitration was used at this level, 
however, the role played by UHRC was essential to support the government 
and increase the Commissions visibility. 
  
It is important to mention here that the Commission in Uganda combines 
other peacebuilding and conflict transformation strategies to its mediation, 
arbitration and facilitation activities. UHRC is involved in civic education 
initiatives and sensitization workshops throughout the conflict prone areas 
of the country. This kind of initiatives help support peace talks and 
promotes an environment of peace. Further, they “promote” the 
Commission as a body equipped to deal with conflict. 
 
The Commission for Human Rights and Good Governance (CHRGG) in 
Tanzania also uses conflict management tools (mediation and arbitration – 
ADR) in its peacebuilding and conflict transformation strategies. 
“CHRAGG, like other national human rights institutions, works in conflict 
at a micro level through receiving and investigating complaints of violations 
of human rights and principles of good governance. In addition, it works on                                                         
183 Mottiar, Shauna, “The Uganda Human Rights Commission: Beyond protection and 
promotion of human rights”, Parlevliet, M., Lamb, G. and Maloka, V. (eds.) Defenders of 
Human Rights, Managers of Conflict, Builders of Peace? National Human Rights 
Institutions in Africa (Centre for Conflict Resolution, University of Cape Town, 2005), p. 
115 
184 Ibid, p. 118 
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conflict through its public hearings and other activities and strategies that 
have an impact on peacebuilding at a macro level.”185
 
 Alike UHRC, 
CHRGG sees conflict as a part of life and relevant for human rights 
protection and promotion. 
CHRAGG is an independent statutory body and the national focal point for 
the promotion and protection of human rights and good governance in 
Tanzania. It was formally established in March 2002, and replaced the 
Permanent Commission of Enquiry (PCE), which was formed in 1965 to 
guard against the possible misuse and abuse of power by public bodies. In 
fact, the PCE was the very first Ombudsman’s Office in Africa. While the 
PCE dealt primarily with administrative justice, CHRAGG engages with 
broader issues of human rights, as well as the contravention of the principles 
of administrative justice and good governance.186
 
 
CHRAGG, as several other NHRIs, has quasi-judicial powers. “CHRAGG 
is empowered to resolve complaints relating to human rights violations 
through conciliation, mediation and other forms of alternative dispute 
resolution. In practice, despite these provisions, CHRAGG conducts most of 
its work, particularly public hearings, through quasi-judicial means and 
follows the same procedure as an ordinary court of law.”187
 
 This 
characteristic of CHRAGG has been criticized because it makes the 
procedures conducted by the Commission very slow. Furthermore, they 
focus on the adversarial aspects of conflict resolution and do not work on 
building new understanding of the situation.  
In 2004, CHRAGG went through a capacity building session to improve its 
capacity to use ADR in its work. By using mediation, conciliation and 
arbitration the Commission is contributing to a broader culture of human 
rights and peace in society. Complaints handling and investigation are not 
an end in themselves and due to that, these activities can be used to enhance 
people’s understanding of rights and responsibilities, to analyse “how 
people’s relationships unfold, how the rule of law is upheld, and how larger 
issues of security, justice, equality and equity are affected”188
 
 (Maloka, 
2005, p. 147). The use of these methods has an impact on human rights 
promotion and protection as a whole.  
Where the mechanisms and processes used are adversarial, prescriptive, 
intimidating, and not conducive to rebuilding broken relationships, this may 
hamper the development of conditions leading to sustainable peace founded 
on human rights. In contrast, where methods are reconciliatory in nature, and 
provide space for raising awareness about the value of respecting human 
rights, these may contribute greatly to the end goal of complaints-handling 
and of peacebuilding, with respect for human rights.189
 
 
The examples presented illustrate how NHRIs can use conflict management 
tools to address both interpersonal and deep-rooted societal conflict. As                                                         
185 Supra note 172, p. 127 
186 Ibid, p. 131 
187 Ibid, p. 133 
188 Ibid, p. 147 
189 Ibid. 
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shown elsewhere in this thesis, societal conflicts have a strong relationships 
element. Using conflict management tools to re-build these relationships can 
help in the conflict transformation process as a whole and it can improve 
NHRIs’ work in peacebuilding.  
 
In order to better understand the work of NHRIs as quasi-judicial bodies, it 
is appropriate to explain here what this “quasi-judicial” function represents 
to NHRIs. In the present work, quasi-judicial bodies are understood as legal 
entities (created by law) that decide in a manner that cannot be considered 
“stricto sensu legally binding” and emit decisions that “do not constitute an 
enforceable legal title”190
 
. 
The term “quasi-judicial” is defined as “having characteristics of a judicial 
act but performed by an administrative agency or official”, and as 
“describing a function that resembles the judicial function in that it involves 
deciding a dispute and ascertaining the facts and any relevant law, but differs 
in that it depends ultimately on the exercise of an executive discretion rather 
than the application of law”. In those situations the particular procedural 
rules laid down by the institution itself or in its founding legislation, as well 
as principles of natural justice, apply. The latter is understood as rules of such 
a fundamental nature that they do not need a statutory basis, the two most 
important of which are nemo judex in parte sua, that nobody can judge a case 
in which he or she is a party, and audi alteram partem, that all parties in a 
dispute have the right to be heard.191
 
 
Alike national courts, NHRIs have to be independent in order to carry out 
their quasi-judicial mandate. Nonetheless, this does not mean that NHRIs 
can replace or substitute the ordinary justice system. They function by the 
side of the courts and represent an extra institution in the system for 
protection and promotion of human rights. Due to this, some core principles 
have to be carried out by NHRIs. These are: “the concept of ne bis in idem; 
respect for norms of due process, relating to impartiality, examination of 
evidence, witnesses, competence; confidentiality; and the right to 
compensation”192
 
. 
The quasi-judicial decisions of NHRIs can take different forms. They can be 
mediations, where no decision on the merits of the case is taken by an NHRI. 
“The procedure is optional, but once it has been accepted by the parties, 
they will also usually have agreed before hand that the decision must be 
followed; or in any case the agreement may state that either of the parties 
may appeal to court if not satisfied; the proceedings and outcome of the case                                                         
190 Schmidt, Markus,  “Follow-up Activities by the UN Human Rights Treaty Bodies and 
Special Procedures Mechanisms of the Human Rights Council – Recent Developments”, 
Alfredsson, Gudmundur; Grimheden, Jonas; Ramcharan, Bertrand G. and Zayas, Alfred, 
International Human Rights Mechanisms – Essays in Honour of Jakob Th. Möller, 2nd 
Revised Edition. (Mrtinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009), p. 25 
191 Kerrigan, Fergus and Lindholt, Lone, “General Aspects of Quasi-judicial Competences 
of National Human Rights Institutions”, Lindsnaes, B, Lindholt, L. and Yigen, K. (eds.) 
National Human Rights Institutions: Articles and Working papers,(The Danish Institut for 
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192 Ibid, p. 94 
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may be either confidential or public.”193
 
 
OHCHR explains, that mediation “in the human rights process requires the 
NHRI to take an active role in settling the dispute. The mediator has a 
structured role in allowing the parties to tell their side of the story, ensuring 
that the balance of power between the parties is equitable and facilitating the 
resolution of the dispute”194
 
. 
They can also be conciliations, where the NHRI takes a decision on a 
material subject matter, followed by the issuing of recommendations to the 
parties, optional for them to follow. “For instance the Commission may 
investigate a case concerning discrimination on the base of sex or ethnic 
origin in relation to employment and dismissal policies of a public 
institution, and suggest compensation in the form of employment or the 
payment of financial compensation in proportion to the actual effects for the 
person involved.”195
 
 
Lastly, the decision can be the result of arbitration, with legally binding 
force for all involved parties and enforceable by the NHRI itself.  
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4 Peacebuilding  
Chapter 4 will explore the meaning of the term peacebuilding and how 
NHRIs can work towards building peace. It is important to study 
peacebuilding here because it is a way through which NHRIs can approach 
violent structures in order to transform conflicts.  
Post-conflict peacebuilding can be defined as an “action to identify and 
support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order 
to avoid relapse into conflict”196
 
. This definition comes from the UN 
Agenda for Peace, an initiative of the UN Secretary General after noticing 
the deep changes happening in the world after the end of the Cold War. In 
1995, the Supplement to An Agenda for Peace extended this definition. 
Peacebuilding was then defined as: 
Comprehensive efforts to identify and support structures which will tend to 
consolidate peace and advance a sense of confidence and well being among 
people. Through agreements ending civil strife, these may include disarming 
the previously warring parties and the restoration of order, the custody and 
possible destruction of weapons, repatriating refugees, advisory and training 
support for security personnel, monitoring elections, advancing efforts to 
protect human rights, reforming or strengthening government institutions and 
promoting formal and informal processes of political participation.197
 
 
In 2001 the UN Security Council stated that peacebuilding is aimed at 
“preventing the outbreak, recurrence and continuation of armed conflict and 
encompasses a wide range of political, developmental, humanitarian and 
human rights programmes and mechanisms”198
 
. 
Taking the UN definitions as a starting point, peacebuilding can be defined 
as a process that envisages the changing of the structures that have 
contributed to the outbreak of the conflict. Peacebuilding is about 
constructing or reconstructing democratic institutions, accommodating the 
excluded, and building a more just and fair society. 
 
The importance of transforming institutions can be emphasised by looking 
at the relationship between weak institutions and violence. The World Bank 
uses a very helpful metaphor to explain this relationship.  
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The causal relationship between weak institutional legitimacy and violence 
may be compared to the relationship between the human body’s immune 
system and disease. Weak institutions make a country vulnerable to violence, 
just as a weak immune system makes a body vulnerable to disease. To restore 
a body to health means not only treating the disease but also restoring the 
body’s ability to fight off disease. Similarly with weak institutional 
legitimacy and governance. The cause of each outbreak of violence may 
vary, but the underlying reason for societies’ inability to resist stresses is that 
their institutions are too weak to mediate them peacefully. Durable solutions 
to violence, therefore, require more than addressing each individual stress—
they require action to address the underlying weaknesses in institutional 
legitimacy.199
 
 
Following this line of thought, this thesis will adopt Lederach’s approach to 
building peace. According to him, peacebuilding is more than the post 
accord reconstruction. Peacebuilding “is understood as a comprehensive 
concept that encompasses, generates, and sustains the full array of 
processes, approaches, and stages needed to transform conflict toward more 
sustainable, peaceful relationships.”200
 
 It integrates different roles, functions 
and activities. 
The World Bank has developed a similar framework on how states can 
respond to conflict, escape from violence and develop resilience. The 
bottom line is: institutions have to change (transformation) together with 
structures.  The World Bank’s approach to these kinds of changes can be 
divided into four steps.  
 
The first is the need to restore confidence in collective action before 
embarking on wider institutional transformation. Second is the priority of 
transforming institutions that provide citizen security, justice, and jobs. Third 
is the role of regional and international action to reduce external stresses. 
Fourth is the specialized nature of external support needed.201
 
 
Peacebuilding is a complex and long process that needs to focus on 
transforming institutions, changing patterns of behaviour, rebuilding 
relationships, making room for marginalized groups, including women, and 
looking for the necessary external support.  
 
Peacebuilding has to be thought beyond the big civil war destruction 
scenario. It should be thought as a strategy to deal with all forms of 
violence. After all, as the World Bank puts it, “the organized violence that 
disrupts governance and compromises development also includes local 
violence involving militias or between ethnic groups, gang violence, local 
resource-related violence and violence linked to trafficking (particularly 
drug trafficking), and violence associated with global ideological 
struggles”202                                                        
199 Supra note 65, p. 86 
. Peacebuilding as a process that transforms relationships and 
institutions has to be thought in all these contexts.  
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4.1 Elements and Actors 
4.1.1 Reconciliation  
One of the main elements of peacebuilding is reconciliation. Reconciliation 
can be defined as the restoration of broken relationships and learning to live 
non-violently with radical differences203
 
. Reconciliation is about rebuilding 
these connections and dealing with the violent past – more than looking at 
the acts of direct violence, peacebuilding must look into the violent 
structures and try to transform them. Lederach defines reconciliation as a 
place and a process where three paradoxes meet. 
First, in an overall sense, reconciliation promotes an encounter between the 
open expression of the painful past, on the one hand, and the search for the 
articulation of a long-term, interdependent future, on the other. Second, 
reconciliation provides a place for truth and mercy to meet, where concerns 
for exposing what has happened and for letting go in favor of renewed 
relationships are validated and embraced. Third, reconciliation recognizes the 
need to give time and place to both justice and peace, where redressing the 
wrong is held together with the envisioning of a common connected future.204
 
 
Reconciliation is about dealing with the present, recognizing the painful 
past and building a new future. Ramsbotham et al. (2008) explains that the 
process of reconciliation has four phases. Firstly it is important to accept the 
status quo, in order to end violence; secondly it is necessary to correlate 
accounts, people who have been through conflict have probably been 
through similar processes of discrimination and exclusion and have been 
victims of similar forms of violence, therefore it is important to see that the 
stories are not that different, in a way of overcoming polarization; the third 
phase constitutes that of building bridges, accepting diversity and starting 
opening channels for communication; lastly enmity should be put aside and 
new relationships should be built while the old ones are restored.  
 
Although there is a continuing general need for reconciliation within and 
between all societies in order to sustain social cohesion, the greatest difficult 
from a conflict resolution perspective comes when conflict has escalated 
through the stages of difference, contradiction, polarization and violence to 
the point where atrocities have been perpetrated and deep injuries received. It 
is reconciliation after violent conflict that poses the most acute challenge. In 
this circumstance it is rarely a case of ‘putting Humpty Dumpty together 
again’ in any simple sense. Too much has happened, too many relations have 
been served, too many norms violated, too many identities distorted, too 
many traumas endured. To reach transformative levels of bridging 
differences and restoring trust requires a capacity of innovation and creative 
renewal likely to be beyond the capacity of many societies in the immediate 
aftermath of violence.205
 
 
Therefore, reconciliation is so important. It is important to deal with the 
past, be it by punishing perpetrators and redressing victims or by                                                         
203 Supra note 22. 
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205 Supra note 22, p. 233. 
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collectively choosing to “forgive and forget” as proposed by Hannah Arendt 
(the case of Spain post Franco, for example). The importance of 
reconciliations resides on the fact that divided societies have to think of new 
paths to build a peaceful future.  
 
Reconciliation can also be defined as “a societal process that involves the 
mutual acknowledgement of past suffering and the changing of destructive 
attitudes and behavior into constructive relationships toward sustainable 
peace”206
 
. 
The author of the present thesis would add to this definition that it is crucial 
that structural inequalities and inequities are addressed during the process of 
reconciliation, emphasizing the need for the fulfilment of economic and 
social rights. Further, the change of attitudes and behaviours must include 
the destruction of old patterns of discrimination. Emphasis must be put on 
the importance of non-discrimination and equal treatment, in order to 
reshape the post-conflict society into a society where all individuals are able 
to participate.  
 
Reconciliation has acquired many shapes throughout modern history, the 
most popular of these being “truth commissions”. Truth commissions 
became particularly popular after the work of the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (TRC) in South Africa in the 1990’s. Freeman uses the 
definitions presented by Priscilla Hayner to explain what these commissions 
are. According to them, truth commissions are bodies that share the 
following characteristics: “(1) they examine only past events; (2) they 
investigate patterns of abuse committed over a period of time, as opposed to 
a particular event; (3) they are temporary bodies that finish their work with 
the submission of a report containing recommendations; and (4) they are 
officially sanctioned, authorized or empowered by the state”207
 
.  
Truth commissions have had different mandates and constitutions in the 
different contexts where they have operated. Especially relevant for this 
thesis is the fact that Ghana has had a truth commission. The National 
Reconciliation Commission (NRC) was established by Act 611 in 2002 to 
“investigate violations and abuses of human rights relating to killings, 
abductions disappearances, detentions, torture, ill-treatment and seizure of 
property suffered by any person within the specified periods”. The 
Ghanaian NRC was established to investigate human rights violations 
committed between 1957 and 1993, especially during periods of military 
rule208
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The Ghanaian NRC did not investigate the wars in the Northern Region, nor 
did it focus on any of the “ethnic” conflicts. The focus of NRC was the 
undemocratic governments, namely those between 4 February 1966 to 21 
August 1969; 13 January 1972 to 23 September 1979; and 31 December 
1981 to 6 January 1993209
 
. 
Another possible path to reconciliation is that of trials. The crimes and 
atrocities of the past can be brought to courts of law that will judge the 
perpetrators. Trials can happen together with truth commissions, they are 
not necessarily institutions that excluded one another. Trials should be 
considered in order to judge the most serious violations of human rights, as 
stated in the Rome Statue.  
 
Reconciliation, be it through truth commissions, trials or other forms of 
dealing with the past is a way of going down the escalation ladder. It 
requires, nonetheless, some sort of political closure and acceptance in order 
for it to take place – “at least to a point where return to violence has become 
unlikely”210
4.1.2 Approaches to Peacebuilding 
. 
 
In order to establish where NHRIs can work when peacebuilding is 
concerned – reconciling the divided society where they operate, some 
explanations are required. Here Lederach’s (1997) pyramid will be used to 
illustrate who are the actors and which approaches can be used in 
peacebuilding.  
 
 
Figure 4.1 – Actors and Approaches to Peacebuilding – Lederach, 1997                                                          
209 Ibid. 
210 Supra note 22, p. 243 
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The pyramid shows the affected populations in conflict situations and the 
different approaches to peacebuilding to be held at each level. On the left 
side, there are the kinds of leaders and the sectors where they come from, 
and on the right side, there are the conflict transformation activities that the 
leaders on each level might undertake.  
 
In the top of the pyramid there are the military and political leaders – who 
usually monopolize media accounts of conflict. In the middle, “are regional 
political leaders, religious and business leaders, and those who have 
extensive influence in sectors such as health, education and also within 
military hierarchies”211
 
. The bottom of the pyramid has the vast majority of 
the affected population at the grassroots level. Because the different groups 
of people found in each level of the pyramid can influence the conflict 
differently there are specific approaches directed at each of them. 
Top-Level Approaches: this represents the “top-down” approach. Here the 
peacemakers are usually public figures that have a public profile. Further, 
“the goal is to achieve a negotiated settlement between the principle high-
level leaders in the conflict”212. Another characteristic of the top-level 
peacebuilding approach is that it is often “focused at achieving a cease-fire 
or a cessation of hostilities as a first step that will lead to subsequent steps 
involving broader political and substantive negotiations”213
 
. 
Middle-Range Approaches: the middle group contains several different 
leaders present in different locations in the conflict. If they are integrated 
properly, these leaders might “provide the key to creating infra-structure for 
achieving and sustaining peace”214
 
. Due to its strategic importance the 
middle-range approach seems to be the most relevant and compatible with 
the mandate of NHRIs. The different approaches used at this level will be 
studied below. 
1) Problem-solving workshops: these are “informal, week-long meetings 
of the representatives of parties in protracted, deep-rooted, and 
frequently violent conflict in an informal, often academic, setting that 
permits the re-analysis of their conflict as a shared problem and the 
generation of some alternative courses of action, together with new 
options for a generally acceptable and self-sustaining resolution”215
 
. 
These workshops are relevant because they broaden participation in 
the peacebuilding process, allowing for a new “democratic culture” to 
evolve, while deepening participants’ analysis of the problem. 
These workshops should also be planned to happen in an informal and 
off the record way. This allows for participants to interact in ways that 
they had not tried before. The workshop also happens in a new                                                         
211 Supra note 22, p. 221 
212 Supra note 200, p. 44 
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environment where interaction with adversaries and development of 
relationships is encouraged. “The workshop provides a politically safe 
space for floating and testing ideas, which may or may not prove 
useful back in real life.”216
 
 
These types of workshop can be used by NHRIs in their mediation 
capacities. NHRIs can work as a third-party team that provides 
participants with an opportunity for a different and possibly more 
effective mode of interaction. Participants are also given tools to look 
into conflict with analytical and not coercive lenses. 
 
2) Conflict resolution training: NHRIs can also use their mandate to do 
trainings as they have two aims, the first one being awareness-raising 
and the other imparting skills. Even though conflict resolution training 
can be within NHRI’s mandate they do contrast to problem-solving 
workshops. “[T]he focus of training is internally rather than externally 
oriented. For the most part its purpose is to develop participants’s 
skills, not deepen their analysis of a given conflict situation.”217
  
 
Training can also be a strategic tool because it promotes 
peacebuilding capacities within the middle-range leadership. Training 
allows for knowledge to be transferred to those who might have a real 
influence in transforming the conflict. Further, planned having its 
strategic characteristics in mind, it might be a place for leaders from 
different sides of the conflict to meet.  
 
Grassroots Approaches: these are the most challenging of approaches (and 
also the most difficult for NHRIs’ work) as they face many challenges. The 
first difficulty is the sheer number of persons. The other challenge is that, 
“many of the people at this level are in survival mode in which meeting the 
basic human needs of food, shelter, and safety is a daily struggle”218
 
. 
Therefore, conflict transformation tools and peace talk is not likely to a 
priority to them. This does not mean, however, that there is no room for the 
work of NHRIs. 
Lederach presents the case of Somalis, who have a rich history of traditional 
mechanisms for dealing with interclan disputes. Many societies have these 
kinds of traditional systems and what NHRIs could do is support these 
existing informal justice systems to deal with conflict related issues. NHRIs 
could, for example, educate these “traditional judges” in how to take 
decisions in accordance with human rights principles and standards, so that 
they could also approach those issues lying at the bottom of the iceberg. 
 
After looking into the pyramid, it is necessary to look into the systems 
surrounding conflicts. Here another of Lederach’s tools will be use: the 
nested paradigm. This model postulates that conflicts can be addressed at                                                         
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217 Ibid, p. 48. 
218 Ibid, p. 52. 
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four dimensions or ‘levels of response’ which are interconnected, namely: 
the issue level, the relationship level, the sub-system level, and the systemic 
level. For peacebuilding to be successful all levels must be addressed.  
 
 
Figure 4.2 – Lederach’s nested paradigm 
 
 
Parlevliet et al. synthesizes Lederach’s example of youth armed gangs in 
Somalia.  
 
In this case the following must be taken into account: the specific gangs and 
their activities when yielding weapons (issue level); the relationship between 
these gangs and other social structures in the area in question (relationship 
level); the immediate political, social, economic and physical conditions in 
the geographical area in question that contributed to the creation of the gangs 
(sub-system level); and the overall structural conditions, including arms 
proliferation, power relations and distribution of political and economic 
resources (systemic level).219
 
 
When including peacebuilding in its activities, NHRIs will have to 
determine which level they will address and also in which way they will act. 
Concentrating at the issue level might be unproductive, as it will only affect 
the circumstances of a limited group of persons. When receiving 
complaints, NHRIs should evaluate in which level to act, further the kind of 
activity to be undertaken has to thought strategically in order to contribute 
to structural change. Parlevliet et al. gives the example of an NHRI that 
receives a complaint about torture in detention facilities. Investigating the                                                         
219 Parlevliet, M; Lamg, G and Maloka, V., “Introduction: Understanding conflict and its 
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complaint and providing redress for the victim does not involve the other 
levels of the problem. 
 
An NHRI can look at the complaint as a sign of issues involving the police 
and detained persons, especially if similar complaints have been received 
before, analyzing the problem in the relationship level. In this case the 
NHRI may note that: 
 
[T]he issue of torture is embedded in relationships between the police and 
civil society, or between the police and a particular identity group, and may 
involve police perceptions that certain citizens who are politically active are 
‘subversive’ and ‘threaten national security’. Consequently, it may decide to 
employ particular strategies to deal with these concerns, such as establishing 
and facilitating regular meetings between the local police and members of 
civil society or a cross-section of the community, or organising educational 
workshops for the local police on human rights and responsibilities.220
 
 
Further, an NHRI can decide to approach the issue by focusing on the sub-
system level. By doing this, an NHRI might notice that many of the 
complaints relate to a particular institution or detention facility, and that no 
proper command and oversight structures appear to exist there, for example.   
Alternatively, it might find that transparency and accountability is absent in 
the policing sector as a whole. Interventions at this level might entail 
investigating and compiling an extensive report on human rights violations 
by the police over a specific time period, and tracing lines of responsibility 
and accountability. In addition, there might be issues on the systemic level 
that are of concern to an [NHRI] and need to be addressed, such as: 
government’s use of security forces to repress civilians who are perceived to 
be in opposition to government; the role of the security forces in the political 
sphere; or the lack of civilian oversight over the security forces. National 
institutions may thus lobby for the creation of legislation, policies, codes of 
conduct and institutions (such as an ombudsman’s office) that will contribute 
to governing affairs related to the security forces in a more effective manner, 
and enhance their accountability to the civilian population.221
 
 
There are many ways in which NHRIs can address issues of conflict 
transformation and peacebuilding. These activities and their extent will 
depend however on the NHRI’s mandate and how this mandate is 
strategically used. Below, NHRI’s mandate and its applicability to 
peacebuilding will be studied.  
 
4.2 NHRI’s Mandate 
 
National Human Rights Institutions (NHRIs) are within the context of the 
state apparatus. They exist as a part of the state nonetheless they are 
somehow independent from it222                                                        
220 Ibid, p. 23. 
. Due to that, before discussing NHRIs 
221 Ibid. 
222 The characteristics of NHRIs presented here are, in the eyes of the author, very much 
similar to those of the Brazilian Ministério Público. The difference between them resides in 
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mandate and their work with peacebuilding, it is necessary to contextualise 
the space in which they operate. 
 
First and foremost, it is paramount to emphasise that states are the ones 
responsible for respecting, protecting and fulfilling human rights – they are 
the duty-bearers. The Administration, the Parliament and the Judiciary are 
the responsible for enacting laws, setting policy frameworks, taking judicial 
decisions, and monitoring the impact of their programmes and policies. The 
Judiciary enforces the rule of law and controls (in some countries) the 
constitutionality of the acts of the administration and of Parliament. 
 
Civil society plays a central role, whether through the dedicated work of 
NGOs at the grassroots level, or through religious institutions, community 
service organizations, professional groups or associations and trade unions. 
The media brings human rights issues and concerns to the attention of the 
broader public and provides a forum for discussion and debate. The 
education system ensures that students at all levels are exposed to human 
rights through awareness raising, sensitisation and courses. Business (the 
private sector) plays an increasingly important role as well.223
 
 
NHRIs exist in the midst of all these actors and therefore they are unique: 
“they exist in a dynamic position between States, civil society and other 
actors, offering a neutral and objective space in which to interact, develop 
human rights laws and policy, and exchange ideas”.224
 
 
The United Nations General Assembly has adopted global principles 
governing the status and functioning of independent NHRIs. These 
principles are popularly known as the Paris Principles225. They were 
adopted in 1991 and approved in 1993 by the General Assembly and are the 
universally accepted framework for NHRIs. According to them NHRIs shall 
ensure the effective implementation of international human rights standards 
and work to ensure that national legislation, regulations and practices 
conform to the fundamental principles of human rights. NHRIs shall protect 
and promote universal respect for and observance of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms226
 
.  
NHRIs work both in accordance with human rights policies (soft law) and 
human rights legislation (hard law). The Paris Principles set the general 
rules of the functioning of NHRIs; nonetheless states can adopt different 
shapes in order to better work at the national level. It is in fact the right of 
each state to choose the framework that is best suited to its particular needs 
at the national level. There are no uniform rules for how an NHRI is to                                                                                                                                              
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work, nor are there rules of which roles are they to play in order to promote 
human rights, social justice and sustainable peace. Diverse approaches have 
been adopted throughout the world for the promotion and protection of 
human rights at the national level. 
 
OHCHR-UNDP defines an NHRI as institutions “with a constitutional 
and/or legislative mandate to protect and promote human rights. (…) NHRIs 
are cornerstones of national human rights promotion and protection 
systems.” They also “serve as relay mechanisms between international 
human rights norms and the national level”227
 
. 
According to the Paris Principles NHRIs’ composition has to guarantee a 
pluralistic representation of society (this pre-requisite has been criticised228
 
 
because not that many NHRIs have staff that actually represent the plurality 
of the society where they are). The members of NHRIs have to be appointed 
through an official act that has a precise mandate, so that there is a 
guarantee of independence of its members. Furthermore, NHRIs have to 
have adequate funding (not that many NHRIs have the adequate funding to 
exist). The purpose of this funding is to enable it to have its own staff and 
premises, in order to be independent from the Government and not be 
subject to financial control, which might affect its independence. 
NHRIs operate as a bridge for dialogue and cooperation between national 
and international bodies, as well as between various national actors. The 
Paris Principles accordingly stipulate that National Human Rights 
Institutions shall be competent to engage in international cooperation with 
the United Nations and any other organization in the United Nations system 
– including those involved in peacebuilding efforts, the regional institutions 
and the national institutions of other countries.  
 
NHRIs are supposed to play a key role in both the promotion and the 
protection of human rights in their respective countries. NHRIs can take 
numerous steps to further the relationship between human rights protection 
and promotion and conflict transformation and peacebuilding; the mere fact 
that an NHRI takes on this area helps to give this relationship more 
credibility in accordance with human rights standards, thus something that 
can rightfully be demanded by citizens. 
 
NHRIs may also be given the authority to hear and consider complaints in 
individual cases, as it can be seen in the last part of the Paris Principles. In 
many countries, this is considered the most important part of their work. In 
many developing countries, NHRIs’ quasi-judicial activities are another 
means for the population who cannot afford litigation to have access to 
justice. 
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As presented above, NHRIs are very unusual institutions – “they are part of 
the State but are not part of the executive, legislative or judicial branches. 
They are arm’s length of national authorities and are funded primarily by 
the state”229
 
, and yet, they are independent from the state. 
4.2.1 Applying the mandate to peacebuilding  
In order to be able to effectively work with peacebuilding, there are some 
preconditions that an NHRI has to fulfil. 
 
1. “The main precondition is knowledge. The first step is to make sure 
that the NHRI has the necessary knowledge in house.”230 The NHRI 
must take action to ensure that there are staff members with 
knowledge of conflict transformation and peacebuilding. Ideally all 
professional staff members should have basic knowledge of conflict 
transformation, not only to identify its possible use in the context of 
the NHRI work, but also as a tool for dealing with conflict within the 
organisation231. “In addition, some staff members should be 
designated as experts on this field and receive the necessary 
training.”232
 
 
2. Another question concerns the administrative assignment of the 
responsibility of conflict transformation and peacebuilding. As 
shown above (the cases of the Tanzanian and Ugandan NHRIs), 
staffs working with complaints and settlement of disputes are 
familiarized with conflict management terminology and tools. 
Therefore, it would seem logical to have the conflict transformation 
and peacebuilding under this department. Another possibility would 
be to have the peacebuilding activities under the education 
department, because, as it has been shown above, a lot of the 
peacebuilding activities are related to education, sensitization, 
information and awareness-raising.  
 
3. Many NHRIs have incorporated the practice of making periodic 
strategic plans. Working through a strategic plan might be more 
productive and realistic rather than carrying out individual activities 
that might each be worthy and good, but not aim at changing the big 
picture. An NHRI that decides to really take on the challenges of 
peacebuilding and conflict transformation should consider making 
some sort of plan for the various activities it intends to carry out in                                                         
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this respect. “This makes it easier to assess if each of the planned 
activities are the most effective to achieve the desired goal and to 
plan the activities in such an order and manner as to maximise 
synergies.”233
 
 Thess strategic plans should also consider the need to 
address complaints received by the NHRI as a whole, instead of 
dealing with them one by one. Complaints might indicate certain 
areas that need attention relating to conflict transformation and 
peacebuilding. 
a. Some remarks must be made considering strategic plans. 
First and foremost, it is paramount to explain what is meant 
by the term strategy. According to Johnson et al., “strategy is 
the direction and scope of an organization over the long 
term, which achieves advantages in a changing the 
environment through its configuration of resources and 
competences with the aim of fulfilling stakeholders 
expectations”234
4.2.2 Legislative and administrative provisions of the country 
. This definition is very helpful in 
understanding how NHRIs can work on conflict. It is 
important for the NHRI to envision a peaceful society 
(direction) to be reached in the future (long term). The NHRI 
also has to use its mandate and experiences (advantages) to 
positively impact its surrounding environment, having in 
consideration both its financial and human resources in order 
to be able to promote and protect human rights of all persons 
living in that state (stakeholders). 
 
As set out above, NHRIs are meant to play a major role when it comes to 
ensuring that laws and administrative provisions and practices not only 
adhere to the minimum standards of human rights but both preserve and 
extend the protection of human rights. They shall ensure the harmonisation of 
national legislation and regulations with the international human rights 
instruments. In that connection NHRIs shall examine and report on 
legislation and administrative provisions in force and, if necessary, 
recommend the adoption of new legislation, the amendment of legislation in 
force and the adoption or amendment of administrative measures.235
 
 
There are no legally binding treaties that deal directly with peacebuilidng; 
nonetheless, if understood in the context of structural violence, 
peacebuilding is related to guarantying fundamental rights and promoting 
democracy in egalitarian societies. Therefore, all main human rights 
conventions can assist NHRIs in working on conflict. The International 
Covenant on Civic and Political Rights (ICCPR), for example, establishes 
on its preamble that the “recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal                                                         
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and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation 
of freedom, justice and peace in the world”.  
 
The text of the preamble of ICCPR is repeated on the preamble of the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). 
ICESCR is especially relevant for the work of NHRIs, as Article 13 imposes 
an obligation on states to educate their citizens to, among other things, 
achieve peace. The Article reads:  
 
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to 
education. They agree that education shall be directed to the full development 
of the human personality and the sense of its dignity, and shall strengthen the 
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. They further agree that 
education shall enable all persons to participate effectively in a free society, 
promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations and all 
racial, ethnic or religious groups, and further the activities of the United 
Nations for the maintenance of peace. (Emphasis added) 
 
The Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination 
(CERD) can also be of assistance for NHRIs dealing with conflict, as its 
preamble reads that “discrimination between human beings on the grounds 
of race, colour or ethnic origin is an obstacle to friendly and peaceful 
relations among nations and is capable of disturbing peace and security 
among peoples and the harmony of persons living side by side even within 
one and the same State” (emphasis added). The preamble of CERD is in 
close line with the ideas presented in Chapter 2. Discrimination is a form of 
structural violence and social injustice. Therefore, NHRIs should approach 
issues of discrimination as a form of addressing Parlevliet’s bottom of the 
iceberg. Further, the promotion of horizontal equality has been shown by 
the recent World Development Report (WDR) of the World Bank to be an 
element that diminishes the probability of violent conflict. 
 
The Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women (CEDAW) recognizes in its preamble that equality between men 
and women is required in order to achieve peace. Further, it states that 
women must participate in equal terms with men. NHRIs can, as part of 
their peacebuilding and conflict transformation efforts promote women’s 
rights and women’s participation in reconstruction and democratization 
initiatives. Promoting equality between men and women is also working to 
change the patterns present in the bottom of the iceberg, challenging power 
inequalities and violent structures. Further, the participation of women in 
peacebuilding has been recognized as a fundamental part of peacebuilding, 
conflict prevention, management and resolution by UN Security Council 
Resolution No. 1325. 
 
The Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment (CAT) can also be an instrument for NHRIs 
working on conflict. However, the emphasis of CAT is on the top of the 
iceberg. Torture can be seen as a “symptom” of conflict. Nonetheless, as the 
Committee against Torture has expressed torture, cruel, inhumane or 
degrading treatment can also be part of the structure, as it occurs with 
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violence against women. In its recommendations to Switzerland, the 
Committee emphasises the importance of dealing with violence against 
women and having redress mechanisms at place for victims236
 
.  
The Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) repeats in its preamble 
the text of the preamble of ICCPR and ICESCR. When peacebuilding and 
conflict transformation are at stake, CRC is of especial relevance as it 
imposes an obligation on states to educate children to live in a peaceful 
world. Article 29 of the Convention on the right to education is applicable to 
the work of NHRIs, as they can use their education mandate to emphasise 
the importance of respect and equality. 
 
Another important document related to the rights of children is the Optional 
Protocol (OP) to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the 
involvement of children in armed conflict. The Optional Protocol is relevant 
as it imposes an obligation on states to impede the recruitment of children 
and also an obligation to rehabilitate those children who have been child 
soldiers during conflict.  
 
The last Convention of special relevance to the work of NHRIs with 
peacebuilding and conflict transformation is the International Convention on 
the Protection of all Persons from Enforced Disappearances (CPED). As 
CAT, CPED emphasises the human rights violations on the top of the 
iceberg. Nonetheless, to stop them, structural changes must be made, and 
issues involving the armed forces and the police must be addressed. The 
police and the armed forces of countries that are going through a process of 
democratization might have been accustomed with patterns of violence and 
use of force that are not in accordance with human rights standards.  
There are several ways in which NHRIs could use this part of their mandate 
(influencing administrative and legislative provisions in accordance with 
international human rights law) to further the cause of peace building and 
conflict transformation. Remembering that the transformation of social 
conflict and building of peace require participation of the population 
affected, democratic decision making processes and most importantly, 
respect for human rights: 
 
1. NHRIs could decide to make a review of legislation and 
administrative regulations specifically focusing on building peace. 
The focus could be on areas of legislation that would seem 
particularly relevant for the enhancement of democratic institutions 
and mechanisms, as well as improvement of equal treatment and 
non-discrimination. The provision of effective remedies within the 
Judiciary is also part of the initiatives that can be undertaken by 
NHRIs. 
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a. One such area is non-discrimination and equal treatment 
legislation where the NHRI could for instance look at 
provisions on equal treatment and equal access to justice to 
men and women, to marginalized groups and ethnic and 
religious minorities; 
b. Another area is laws on property rights and access to land; 
such laws should allow for women and minority groups to 
have access to property and land without any form of 
discrimination; 
c. Laws considering natural resources, should also be the focus 
of NHRIs scrutiny, as they should include consultation 
processes involving the population residing in the area where 
these resources are; 
d. NHRIs can also look into criminal legislation to ensure that 
there are provisions in place prohibiting torture and other 
cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment; punishing violence 
against women, criminalizing enforced disappearances, 
criminalizing hate crimes, and punishing the perpetrators of 
gross human rights violations;  
e. Lastly, NHRIs should take look at legislation connected to 
participation. NHRIs should be a part of the elections 
process, ensuring that elections are free, just and respectful of 
democratic principles.  
 
“In this respect, the NHRI should not only indicate problematic 
provisions but also propose the necessary changes.”237
 
 (Spliid, 2011, 
p. 16) 
2. NHRIs are supposed to examine all pending legislation in addition 
to legislation already on the books to ensure adherence to human 
rights provisions – making sure that the legislation is in accordance 
with international human rights law. “Ideally, there should be 
systems in place to ensure that legislation is never passed by 
parliament without having been subject to scrutiny by the NHRI. If 
such systems are not in place, the NHRI should address government 
to ensure that all bills are transmitted to the NHRI for comments 
before or at the latest simultaneously with being presented to 
parliament.” 
 
3. Preferably, an NHRI should scrutinise all new administrative 
regulations, in addition to scrutinising the proposed bills. However, 
this might in itself be a too big of a challenge for the NHRI. The 
sheer volume of administrative decisions taken by the state might 
constrain the work of the institution. Nonetheless, it might be of 
critical importance for the NHRI to look into administrative 
measures connected to initiatives surrounding peacebuilding. 
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4.2.3 Monitoring and reporting at national level 
 
Monitoring is not an obligation of NHRIs according to the Paris Principles; 
however, “monitoring is an important means of ensuring that legislative and 
policy initiatives are being successfully implemented. NHRIs can use the 
results of monitoring activities to promote more effective implementation 
measures”238. “Monitoring is important because it provides concrete 
evidence of what is occurring. [It] also provides periodic and regularly 
collected data, sheds light on trends, signals progress or deterioration, and 
suggests areas for priority action.”239
 
 In order to effectively monitor how 
peacebuilding and conflict transformation initiatives are being implemented 
nationally, an NHRI could consider the following steps: 
1. “When receiving individual complaints the NHRI should not simply 
treat these on an individual basis but also consider them as a means 
of getting information on what goes on in the country. Information 
from individual complaints, respecting the tenets of confidentiality, 
should be systematised and taken into account as part of 
monitoring.”240
 
 
2. The Paris Principles require that NHRIs develop ties with civil 
society. Civil society is a primary source of information and human 
rights NGOs are knowledgeable about the human rights situation in 
the area where they operate. If an NHRI has close ties and regular 
interaction with civil society, it can obtain a lot of information about 
the general situation in the country. This relationship has to go 
beyond the mere contact with human rights NGO’s and also include 
other representatives of the society, such as women’s organisations, 
children’s organisations, community based organisations, rural 
organisation, trade unions, professional bodies (including law and 
medical societies), churches etc. “In addition to making sure that all 
kinds of reports from said groups are conveyed to the NHRI, the 
NHRI should also meet up with these groups to share 
information.”241
 
 
3. Another way of obtaining information on the human rights situation 
of the country is using the press. Not all the information used by 
NHRIs should come from the press, nevertheless, press releases, be 
they through the radio, TV or newspapers might given useful 
information on the general situation in the country, especially if 
done in a systematic way. 
 
4. Another important part of the monitoring process is going on visits 
around the country “Based on information from civil society and the                                                         
238 Supra note 223, p. xiv. 
239 Ibid, p. 37 
240 Supra note 230, p. 16-17 
241 Ibid, p. 17 
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press an NHRI should be able to decide where to go and whom to 
visit.”242 NHRIs should visit schools and other places where youth 
gather, as they should be involved in peacebuilding initiatives. 
According to a UNICEF report “whether the community is a war-
torn village or a refugee camp, young people will need 
encouragement and guidance to develop their potential and 
contribute to their communities. With adequate support and access to 
necessary resources, they can become agents for change and provide 
a foundation for rebuilding lives and communities, contributing to a 
more just and peaceful society”243
 
. Therefore it is crucial for NHRIs 
to visit the places where young people are, not only to certify if their 
human rights are being respected, but also to ensure that they are 
involved in peacebuilding initiatives. NHRIs’ representatives should 
also visit prisons and detention facilities and any other places where 
gross human rights violations are reported to be occurring.  
5. NHRIs should also monitor state policy connected to development 
and poverty reduction. Peacebuilding should not only focus on 
redress and punishment for violation of civic and political rights. 
After all, “if economic and social inequalities go unaddressed and 
the grievances of the poor and marginalized go unheard, we are left 
with only uncertain guarantees of nonrepetition. It is like treating the 
symptoms while leaving the underlying illness to fester”244. 
Sustainable peace is closely connected to respect for human rights, 
including economic and social rights. Therefore NHRIs should 
monitor Poverty Reduction Strategies in order to ensure that 
excluded and marginalized groups are included and that their voices 
and claims are being heard. As Kofi Annan said “[i]n an increasingly 
interconnected world, progress in the areas of development, security 
and human rights must go hand in hand. There will be no 
development without security and no security without development. 
And both development and security also depend on respect for 
human rights and the rule of law”245
 
. Strategies to development and 
development policies should also be addressed by NHRIs in order to 
make an “equality check”. Development has to include all the 
population without any form of discrimination following a human 
rights-based approach. 
 
NHRIs shall make reports and advise the government, parliament and any 
other competent body on the national situation for human rights in general                                                         
242 Ibid. 
243 UNICEF, Map of Programmes for Adolescent Participation During Conflict and Post-
Conflict Situations (UNICEF, 2003), p. 3 
244 Laplante, Lisa J., “Transitional Injustice and Peacebuilding: Diagnosing and Addressing 
the Socioeconomic Roots of Violence through a Human Rights Framework” (The 
International Journal of Transitional Justice, Vol. 2, Issue 3, 2008), p. 333. 
245 Annan, Kofi, “In larger freedom: towards development, security,  and human rights for 
all”, (UNGA, A/59/2005), Annex 2, para. 2 
 75 
and with respect to specific matters; on situations of human rights violations 
in any part of the country with proposals for mitigating actions; and on any 
human rights violation, in accordance with the Paris Principles. On the basis 
of monitoring as just set out, an NHRI should include matters with respect 
to peacebuilding in general reports on human rights to the relevant 
competent bodies. All such reports should in ordinary cases be shared with 
civil society and be disseminated via the press.246
 
 
4.2.4 Ratification of international human rights instruments  
NHRIs shall encourage ratification of international instruments. The UN 
human rights treaties, as cited above, are of key importance in building a 
just and peaceful society and NHRIs should take steps to encourage the 
ratification of these treaties. It is important not only to focus on the 
ratification of treaties and similar instruments but also on the scope of the 
reservations being made, as they should not diminish the impact and range 
of the treaties. NHRIs should encourage the withdrawal of reservations and 
the making of declarations that are against the purpose of the treaty just as 
much as they should encourage ratification of human rights instruments. 
 
An NRHI can use various methods to encourage ratification of international 
instruments: 
 
1. When making reports on specific areas of human rights, such as 
torture or enforced disappearances, or social and economic rights, an 
NHRI could include a section on international instruments that have 
not been ratified and that are relevant for this particular area of 
human rights.  
 
2. If the NHRI makes annual or other periodic reports on the general 
human rights situation in the relevant country – be it to parliament or 
to regional (like the African Commission) or international human 
rights bodies. A section on international instruments not yet ratified 
in such reports should be included.247
 
 
3. “In its formal and informal contacts with government and 
parliament, a NHRI can lobby for the ratification of international 
instruments.”248
 
 
4. When providing input to international examinations, especially of 
the more general kind such as the examination before the UN 
Human Rights Council (the Universal Periodic Review – UPR), an 
NHRI could highlight lack of ratification, as well as the reservations 
made and declarations not yet made. 
                                                         
246 Supra note 230, p. 18 
247 Ibid. 
248 Ibid, p. 18 
 76 
5. “As part of its research mandate, the NHRI could do research into 
the consequences of ratification, in particular the extent to which the 
relevant country already adhere to the provisions of the treaties and 
what further would need to be done to ensure full compliance.”249
 
 
The NHRI could also obtain information on the ratification status for 
countries in the same region and that are also going through 
peacebuilding. In case a state has not ratified a determined treaty yet, 
the process of implementation of the obligations imposed by the 
treaty in similar countries can be studied and used by the NHRI to 
show the consequences of ratification.  
6. NHRIs should keep in mind that even if a treaty, including a human 
rights instrument, has only been signed and not ratified, it still 
entails some obligations for the country. According to Article 18 (a) 
of the Vienna Convention on the Laws of Treaties, “a State is 
obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and 
purpose of a treaty when” it has signed a treaty but not yet ratified it. 
“The extent of this provision is not clear in international law but it 
can be argued that taking conscious steps that significantly 
deteriorates the situation with respect to a right in a convention that 
has been signed but not ratified is contrary to article 18.”250
 
 
4.2.5 International reporting  
The Paris Principles set out that NHRIs should contribute to state reports to 
United Nations bodies and to regional institutions and, where necessary, 
express an opinion in this respect, however with due respect for their 
independence. In some countries there is lack of clarity on the exact role of 
NHRIs with respect to state reporting to the various UN human rights 
committees and regional mechanisms like the African Commission on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights. Some governments believe that since they have 
established and are paying for NHRIs, NHRIs should be responsible for 
preparing the state reporting. In some cases this view is very much based on 
practical considerations. For countries with limited capacity there might not 
be the necessary human rights capacity in any state organ other than in the 
supposedly independent NHRI. In other cases, it is due to lack of 
understanding of the role of the NHRI, namely that being an independent 
institution it cannot be expected to uncritically defend the record of the state 
vis-à-vis various international bodies.251
 
  
NHRIs can play a role in reporting to international human rights bodies, 
however these activities should not interfere with their independence, this is 
what is meant in the Paris Principles. Governments cannot outsource their 
responsibility to report to NHRIs. State reports should, nonetheless, have 
input from the NHRI and representatives from civil society. States can 
receive this kind of input by organizing public hearings, sending 
questionnaires to different NGOs around the country and requesting direct                                                         
249 Ibid. 
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input from professional organizations, such the bar association of that 
country. If the country does not take any of these initiatives, it might 
become NHRIs responsibility to do so. “The results of such input could then 
be transmitted to the government to enable it to include it in its state report 
and be transmitted directly to the international human rights body in 
question; the UN human rights committees and the various regional bodies 
all welcome such shadow reporting.”252
 
 
After the report (or reports, including the shadow reports) is presented to the 
human rights treaty body, the Committee will come up with its concluding 
observations. It is part of NHRIs’ responsibilities to analyse these and 
monitor to what extent the state is implementing the concluding 
observations. This exercise should be part of the periodic reports of NHRIs. 
Additionally, NHRIs should use the contents of the concluding observations 
in its ordinary work. If the state is ignoring recommendations by 
international human rights bodies, NHRIs should make this information 
available to the correspondent human rights treaty body. In addition, the 
concluding observations can be used in the strategic planning of the NHRI. 
Concluding observations can shed light on the topics that need more 
attention by NHRIS. 
 
Some of the UN human rights committees request the state being examined 
to revert with comments to certain specific observations within a given time, 
typically within one year of the issue of the concluding observations. If the 
concluding observation in question contains any such requests, information 
from the NHRI will be welcomed by the UN human rights committee; lack of 
independent information makes it very difficult to gauge the veracity of any 
claims by the state. The NHRI can also play a role in assuring that civil 
society takes steps to play a similar constructive role when it comes to 
examination by UN human rights committees.253
 
 
4.2.6 International cooperation  
NHRIs have to cooperate with UN and its various agencies, regional 
institutions and other NHRIs, according to the Paris Principles. Part of such 
cooperation can be seen in the reporting done to human rights treaty bodies 
and to regional institutions, such as the African Commission. But there are 
also other ways in which NHRIs can use international cooperation to further 
peacebuilding and conflict transformation: 
 
1. The UN and the various regional organizations and human rights 
bodies have Special Procedures (Mechanisms)254                                                        
252 Ibid. 
, such as working 
253 Ibid, p. 20 
254 Special procedures is the general name given to the mechanisms established by the 
Human Rights Council to address either specific country situations or thematic issues in all 
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policy, research and logistical support for the discharge of their mandates. The African 
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groups and special rapporteurs. None of these special procedures are 
specifically focussed on peacebuilding. Nonetheless, there are many 
special rapporteurs within the UN system that work on issues that 
can directly impact the work of NHRIs that are involved in 
peacebuilding and conflict transformation initiatives. Referring back 
to Parlevliet’s255
adequate housing
 iceberg metaphor, these rapporteurs and working 
groups work both on issues that are considered to be consequences 
of conflict (like the Special Rappourteur on the human rights of 
internally displaced persons, the Special Rapporteur on torture, 
inhumane and degrading treatment, the Working Group on Arbitrary 
Detention, the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary 
Disappearances, the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary 
or arbitrary executions) and those considered to be the causes of 
conflict (like Special Rapporteur on  as a 
component of the right to an adequate standard of living, and on the 
right to non-discrimination in this context, the Independent Expert 
on the question of human rights and extreme poverty, the Special 
Rapporteur on the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest 
attainable standard of physical and mental health, and the Special 
Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences, 
to name a few). If an NHRI has become aware of an urgent issue 
with respect to peace building and “has not been able to get 
anywhere with the relevant authorities, it is possible to contact the 
Special Rapporteur and ask him or her to intervene. Unlike the 
various UN human rights committees, a Special Rapporteur can take 
steps immediately if he or she suspects that there are some important 
issues at stake. In such case the Special Rapporteur will normally 
open a dialogue with government”256
 
. 
An NHRI can also use Special Rapporteurs in less urgent 
circumstances. The Special Rapporteurs normally do country visits. 
When visiting a country the Special Rapporteur will normally want 
to visit the NHRI in that country; briefing the Special Rapporteur on 
the situation with respect to peacebuilding initiatives can be a very 
good way to put this issue on the agenda (if this is within the 
mandate of the Special Rapporteur).  
 
2. Despite differences in structure and capacity, all NHRIs work on the basis 
of the Paris Principles and face many of the same issues and challenges; 
therefore they should cooperate with other NHRIs. There are structures in 
place that can facilitate such cooperation, as for example the International 
Coordinating Committee of National Human Rights Institutions (ICC), the 
African, the American and the Asia-Pacific regional organisations of 
NHRIs. Consequently, if an NHRI decides that it wants to commence work 
within the field of peacebuilding or carry out special activities in this 
respect, it should contact other NHRIs, especially in countries that are                                                                                                                                              
Commission on Human Rights has similar working groups or rapporteurs, however they are 
called special mechanisms in the African context.  
255 Supra note 2. 
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facing or have faced similar challenges, and the relevant regional 
organisation of NHRIs for inspiration and information on experiences. 
Further, “the development consequences of violence, like its origins, spill 
across borders, with implications for neighbors, for the region and 
globally”257, this in itself invites NHRIs to work together regionally to 
promote peace and development.  Inviting colleagues from other NHRIs to 
provide experiences at workshops and similar gatherings is one possibility 
of promoting these meetings. “Another possibility is for NHRIs in the 
same area to come together and discuss issues of peacebuilding, share 
experiences and agree on the best step forward. The relevant UN 
institutions and agencies will normally be willing to provide assistance and 
expertise to such gatherings.”258
4.2.7 Teaching and research on human rights issues 
  
 
The Paris Principles provide that NHRIs should promote human rights, and 
one way of doing it is by using education as a tool. NHRIs can assist in 
formulation programmes for the teaching and researching human rights 
related issues. NHRIs can focus on equal treatment and non-discrimination 
as an approach to creating a culture of respect, and can they also initiate, in 
immediate post-conflict situations “problem solving workshops” and 
“conflict resolution training” involving middle-range leaders in the affected 
communities259
 
. NHRIs can also direct education initiatives to children and 
youth and empower them to be the drivers of change. There are various 
activities that an NHRI could decide to carry out within teaching and 
research: 
1. Human rights education (HRE). HRE is a fundamental tool for the 
promotion of human rights, and consequently for the promotion of 
understanding, respect and sustainable peace. According to the plan 
of action for the first phase (2005-2009) of the World Programme 
for Human Rights Education human rights education can contribute 
“to the long-term prevention of human rights abuses and violent 
conflicts, the promotion of equality and sustainable development and 
the enhancement of people’s participation in decision-making 
processes within a democratic system”260. HRE should start in 
school as it is a part of the right to education, as it can be read in 
General Comment No. 1 of the Committee on the Rights of the 
Child which states “the education to which each child has a right is 
one designed to provide the child with life skills, to strengthen the 
child’s capacity to enjoy the full range of human rights and to 
promote a culture which is infused by appropriate human rights 
values”261                                                        
257 Supra note 65, p. 65 
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secondary schools by training teachers, giving support to the 
development of curricula and educational materials, and working 
together with the competent authorities to promote an adequate HRE 
agenda.  
 
2. According to Spliid262
 
, in some countries human rights clubs have 
been established at schools. This can be a good way to encourage 
open discussions on human rights among children and adolescents. 
Especially when peacebuilding and conflict transformation are 
concerned, it is important to provide a safe environment for 
discussions. Consequently, NHRIs should consider steps to support 
the establishment of such human rights clubs and assist in providing 
material that can be used to stimulate constructive discussions 
relating to issues considered to be the causes of conflict, such as 
discrimination, marginalization and exclusion of certain groups in 
that society in the clubs.  
3. Human rights should also be taught at universities, in particular as 
part of the curriculum of law faculties. NHRIs should work with law 
faculties to ensure that peace education; basic principles of 
democracy and participation, and especially non-discrimination and 
equal treatment are part of the human rights curriculum. NHRIs 
should push for basic human rights being taught to all law students 
and more advanced training being available additionally. NHRIs 
should offer to assist in providing teaching materials and to provide 
guest lecturers for such teaching.263
 
 
4. “The Paris Principles also mention the participation in programmes 
for research in human rights matters. Proper and in-depth 
knowledge is an important steppingstone for all other activities, also 
when it comes to human rights.”264
 
 If it has the necessary resources, 
an NHRI can carry out its own research into matters relating to 
peacebuilding. If not, it can work with universities and other 
research institutions to further such research. One relevant study to 
be conducted by NHRIs in conflict prone areas could be on informal 
justice systems (IJS). NHRIs could try to identify how IJS in place 
can contribute to conflict transformation. Access to justice is 
fundamental in post-conflict and peacebuilding contexts. If the state 
is not well equipped to provide its citizens with access to the courts 
other possible initiatives must be taken into consideration, therefore 
the need to know IJS in place and ensure that those IJS comply with 
human rights.  
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4.2.8 Increase awareness of human rights  
NHRIs should take steps to increase public awareness about human rights 
and efforts to combat all forms of discrimination, especially through the 
dissemination of information and by making use of the press, as it can be 
read in the Paris Principles.  
 
1. NHRIs can initiate prejudice reduction programmes to address issues 
underlying the conflict and prejudices created or reinforced in the 
conflict aftermath. “This would point towards broad information 
campaigns, targeting all of the population. Such campaigns are often 
most efficient if planned and carried out in partnership with civil 
society and with relevant government structures”265
 
. These 
campaigns can have many elements: 
a. NHRIs can print and make available reading materials such 
as pamphlets and posters, for example.  Depending of the 
national context, these should be available not only in the 
official language but also in the most common other 
languages. “It is important not just to print pamphlets and 
posters but also to have a clear plan from the outset on how 
the material will be disseminated.”266
b. “A broad information campaign should include a media 
strategy. This includes both the more traditional media like 
radio, television and newspapers, and modern media like the 
Internet.”
 Civil society 
organisations should be involved in both the material 
development process and the dissemination of the material 
created. 
267 It is reported that in many developing countries 
radio still is the most accessible media. Consequently, it 
might be a good idea for NHRIs to focus on disseminating 
the message through the radio. Dramatised radio series have 
been used to “discuss difficult and sensitive subjects in 
various countries, e.g. to promote reconciliation in post-
genocide Rwanda”268
c. Ideally community outreach should be part of broad 
information campaigns. In addition to ordinary meetings with 
presentations and discussions, alternative ways of 
communication should be considered, such as drama and 
other kinds of performance. Forum theatre can be used as a 
technique to talk about conflict related issues. In forum 
theatre the actors (who are part of the community) perform a 
short scene; then the action is stopped as it reaches a crisis or 
a climax. Then members of the audience are encouraged to 
take up a role and to change the direction and the outcome of 
. 
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the action. This method is used for developing alternative 
ways to solve problematic issues and can be very helpful in 
conflict transformation. Further, the use of forum theater 
gives opportunities to community members to address issues 
and persons in a different manner, helping in the constructing 
of new perceptions. 
4.2.9 Human Rights Complaints  
Even though considering individual complaints is not mandatory for NHRIs, 
it is arguably the most important role for NHRIs in many countries, 
especially in countries where other avenues to access justice are in reality 
closed for most people. In many countries taking matters to court is 
complicated, slow and/or prohibitively expensive, and in such countries 
organs like NHRIs are the only realistic routes to justice. If an NHRI has the 
mandate to receive and consider individual complaints, there is no reason 
why it should not be willing to receive and consider them.269
 
  
The complaints handling mechanisms that are used by NHRIs have been 
explored in Chapter 3 where the quasi-judicial functions of NHRI were 
studied. One point that deserves attention here though is that the population 
must be aware of the work of NHRIs as a body that accepts individual 
complaints. It has been proven very helpful to use paralegals in countries 
where the regular judicial system does not work properly. NHRIs can 
provide the same kind of “services” in many countries where they operate.  
 
In Sierra Leone, an NGO has trained paralegals all over the country to assist 
communities to address disputes and grievances. These initiatives are 
reported to “have empowered clients (especially women) to claim their 
rights”. Additionally, “community perceptions of institutional fairness and 
accountability of the police, traditional leaders, and courts also improved”270
 
 
as a result of the work of the NGO. NHRIs can work following the same 
principles.   
4.2.10 International Commitments and Initiatives to work on 
Peacebuilding  
The international community has seen the positive relations between the 
work of National Human Rights Institutions and the prevention of violent 
conflict. During the 4th Conference for African Human Rights Institutions in 
Uganda, the Kampala Declaration was signed and among the resolutions 
and recommendations was the need for NHRIs to work with peacebuilding 
and conflict transformation. 
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In September 2004, during the 7th International Conference for National 
Human Rights Institutions held in Seoul, emphasis was given to the role 
NHRIs can play in conflict situations.  
 
[National institutions] can play a crucial early warning and mediation role to 
prevent conflict. During conflicts they can continue to monitor respect for 
human rights to ensure accountability. They can play a mediation role and 
monitor respect [for] peace agreements and promote the adoption of 
measures for national reconciliation. They can serve a vital role in helping 
States to identify security measures which both address legitimate security 
threats and ensure respect for fundamental rights and freedoms. They can 
review and analyse proposed legislation. They can engage in dialogue with 
governments and legislatures to find the best way forward. They can promote 
respect for human rights in times of crisis through public education 
campaigns and outreach. Because of their institutional role, they can raise 
sensitive questions that private citizens, standing alone, might hesitate to 
express publicly.271
 
 
The OHCHR book on National Human Rights Institutions published in 
2010, also emphasizes the important roles that NHRIs can play during and 
after conflict. OHCHR highlights some of the efforts that the NHRI can 
pursue during conflict, as promoting “dialogue between combatants”; 
promoting “the establishment and growth of peacebuilding mechanisms 
among representatives communities”; and encouraging “acceptable and 
necessary accommodation to deal with underlying human rights issues that 
may be at the root of the conflict”272
 
. 
In post-conflict situations the roles played by NHRIs might be different, 
especially because efforts connected with ensuring justice and reconciliation 
will be needed. OHCHR enumerates some of the initiatives that can be 
undertaken by an NHRI after conflict (especially those institutions 
established in the aftermath of the conflict as a part of the peace 
agreements). The NHRI can, for example, document past abuses, giving 
“victims a chance to be heard”, facilitating “the development of a databank 
that might be useful if a special process were put in place to deal with such 
abuses”, and by establishing a “historical record”273
 
. 
The NHRI can also support reintegration.  
 
With peace comes the demobilization of combatants, and with 
demobilization comes the need for rehabilitation and reintegration. National 
human rights institutions can play a role by preparing the terrain through 
community-centred awareness programmes, lobbying the Government and 
others to financially support the initiative to ensure that ex-combatants are 
trained and supported in their reintegration. Allegations of abuse should be 
dealt with quickly and effectively. Given the overwhelming need to support 
reintegration and harmony, non-adversarial approaches might be the most 
appropriate for dealing with potential problems.274
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Other efforts relating to integration are land distribution and returning 
refugees. In both cases NHRIs can play a role by using non-adversarial 
strategies (ADR) to approach the conflict. The NHRI can also support 
efforts to reintegrate child soldiers and child abductees. 
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5 Commission on Human 
Rights and Administrative 
Justice’s role to play in 
Northern Ghana  
The previous chapters have demonstrated that violence can be found at the 
structures of societies and how the case of the “ethnic” conflicts of the 
Northern Region are deeply connected to it. They have also shown how 
NHRIs can use their mandate and work on conflict in order to build peace.  
 
This chapter will focus on the Commission on Human Rights and 
Administrative Justice, Ghana’s national human rights institution and 
ombudsman, its mandate and the possibilities for concrete efforts towards 
building sustainable peace in the Northern Region. 
5.1 The Commission on Human Rights and 
Administrative Justice  
The Constitution of Ghana established the Commission on Human Rights 
and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ) in 1992; Chapter Eighteen of the 
constitutional text determines the mandate and rules regulating the 
Commission (Articles 218 to 230). CHRAJ is therefore a constitutional 
body, created as an independent institution, and “answerable neither to the 
Executive nor to the Judiciary, and to the Legislature only to the extent that 
it is required in Article 218 (g) of the 1992 Constitution to submit annual 
reports to Parliament”275
 
. The independence of CHRAJ is clearly stated in 
Article 225: “Except as provided by this Constitution or by any other law 
not inconsistent with this Constitution, the Commission and the 
Commissioners shall, in the performance of their functions not be subject to 
the direction or control of any person or authority”. 
Article 218 of the Constitution institutes the functions of the Commission. 
These are as follows: 
 
• Investigate complaints of violations of fundamental rights and freedoms, 
injustice, corruption, abuse of power and unfair treatment of any person by 
a public officer in the exercise of his official duties; 
• Educate the public as to human rights and freedoms. 
 
According to its Annual Report “the Commission’s vision has always been 
that of creating a free, just, and equitable society where human rights and                                                         
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human dignity are respected and power is accountable”. Furthermore, the 
Commission’s Mission Statement reads: 
 
The Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice exists to 
enhance the scale of good governance, democracy, integrity, peace and social 
development by promoting, protecting and enforcing fundamental human 
rights, freedoms and administrative justice for all persons in Ghana. These 
objectives will be achieved by: 
• Ensuring a culture of respect for the rights and obligations of all 
people in Ghana; 
• Dispensing and promoting justice in a free, informal and 
relatively expeditious manner;  
• Ensuring fairness, efficiency, transparency and application of 
best practices; 
• Using a well-trained and motivated workforce and the most 
modern technology.276
 
 
These statements are part of CHRAJ’s strategic vision and can be positively 
used in designing a satisfactory strategy for dealing with peacebuilding and 
conflict transformation, especially as emphasis is put on respect for people’s 
rights and on access to justice. 
 
As mentioned above, the Commission is a two-folded body that works as an 
ombudsman and a national human rights institution. Its human rights 
functions can be divided into two categories: protection and enforcement, 
and promotion and prevention. 
 
In order to protect and enforce fundamental freedoms, the Commission 
investigates individual complaints of human rights violations by persons and 
institutions. It is mandated to resolve these complaints through various 
methods, including mediation, negotiation and formal hearings.277
 
 (Emphasis 
added.) 
In order to promote human rights the Commission has to sponsor public 
education programmes, as mandated by Article 218 (f) of the Constitution 
(“the functions of the Commission shall be defined and prescribed by Act of 
Parliament and shall include the duty to educate the public as to human 
rights and freedoms by such means as the Commissioner may decide, 
including publications, lectures and symposia”.) (Emphasis added)  
The Commission has the constitutional authority to establish regional and 
district branches throughout the country as established in Article 220 of the 
Constitution. The Commission has regional offices in all ten capitals of the 
regions and has offices in 100 districts. The wide presence of the 
Commission throughout the country can assist it in its capacity of using its 
mandate to work on peacebuilding and conflict transformation. 
 
The Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice Act (Act                                                         
276 Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice 2005 Annual Report, 
CHRAJ, Accra, Ghana (2006) 
277 Ibid. 
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456) formally established CHRAJ in 1993. The human rights mandate of the 
Commission is established in Section 7 (a), (c), (d) and (f) as it can be read 
below.  
 
The functions of the Commission are:  
(a) to investigate complaints of violations of fundamental rights and 
freedoms, injustice, corruption, abuse of power and unfair treatment of any 
person by a public officer in the exercise of his official duties; 
 
(c) to investigate complaints concerning practices and actions by persons, 
private enterprises and other institutions where those complaints allege 
violations of fundamental rights and freedoms under the Constitution;  
(d) to take appropriate action to call for the remedying, correction and 
reversal of instances specified in paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of this subsection 
through such means as are fair, proper and effective, including: 
(i) negotiation and compromise between the parties concerned;  
(ii) causing the complaint and its finding on it to be reported to the superior 
of an offending person;  
(iii) bringing proceedings in a competent court for a remedy to secure the 
termination of the offending action or conduct, or the abandonment or 
alteration of the offending procedures; and  
(iv) bringing proceedings to restrain the enforcement of such legislation or 
regulation by challenging its validity if the offending action or conduct is 
sought to be justified by subordinate legislation or regulation which is 
unreasonable or otherwise ultra vires; 
 
(g) to educate the public as to human rights and freedoms by such means as 
the Commissioner may decide, including publications, lectures and 
symposia; (Act, 456) 
 
As it can be seen, the Commission’s mandate is broad and allows for 
investigators to take action by calling parties to settle the dispute. The 
author’s short experience at the Commission’s offices (the Head Quarters in 
Accra, the Office for the Great Accra Region, the Head Office for the 
Northern Region in Tamale, and the District Office in Yendi) has shown 
that most of the time, when complainants come to CHRAJ, a common 
dispute resolution mechanism used is mediation and not negotiation. 
CHRAJ uses its officers and mediators in many of the cases brought in.278                                                        
278 One case witnessed by the author goes as follows: A man, aged 53 who lived in the 
same house with his 4 siblings, all married and with children of their own. The complainant 
was adopted as a child, however his wife and children are unaware of this fact. It looks like 
one of his brother's wife knows that he is adopted. One day, in a quarrel, she called him a 
slave. She clapped her hands and called for the whole neighborhood's attention and said the 
complainant did not deserve to carry the last name he had and that he was a slave. 
  
 
The complainant than came to the Commission saying that his human rights had been 
violated and he asked the Commission to intervene and make his brother's wife apologize. 
The Regional Director and three of his employees sat together and discussed for 45 minutes 
whether or not this was a human rights issue and whether the Commission had mandate to 
interfere. They decided unanimously that there had been a human rights violation because 
calling someone a slave constitutes a very serious offense to a person's dignity. They also 
decided that the Commission had a necessary mandate to interfere. The parties were 
contacted and a mediation session should have taken place by now.   
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The Manual on Procedures for Investigations279 establishes that “ADR can be 
used to resolve complaints relating to administrative injustice (unfair 
treatment, victimization, etc.), family/child maintenance, personal dignity 
and integrity (e.g. discrimination), community disputes, etc and when a 
complaint/dispute is likely to be straightforward and relatively less 
contentious/litigious.”280
 
 
In its 2008 Annual Report the Commission gives a sample of some of its 
cases. Eight cases are listed and four of them are related to human rights 
issues. It is interesting to note that, the Commission functions as a first 
instance for cases where people either want to avoid the courts system or 
they are too poor to use it.  
5.2 The Commission Limitations in Working on 
the Conflicts in the North 
 
The Commission’s mandate limits its possibility to take action. It can only 
investigate complaints brought to it, or use education as means of promoting 
positive change. According to Mr. Al-Hassan Siedu, acting director of 
CHRAJ’s Northern Office, the Commission has chosen the latter as a way 
of acting, in order to promote human rights and create a society where 
individual differences are respected.  
 
In 1994, when the Guinea Fowl Conflict started, the Commission had only 
existed for one year, which in itself limited its capacity to work on the 
conflict. In addition, Mr. Siedu explains that in the aftermath of the conflict 
(and during the peace negotiations) there were several national commissions 
and NGOs more capable of dealing with complaints than CHRAJ. Further, 
these institutions were better known to the Ghanaian public at the time than 
CHARJ was. Some examples are the Red Cross and UNHCR (which 
assisted the displaced). 
 
During the interviews, many of the Commission’s employees affirmed that 
CHRAJ has never intervened in the Northern conflicts because it has never 
received a complaint relating to it. One of the Directors interviewed 
affirmed that one single complaint was received in the Accra Region 
relating to the conflicts in the north, however the demand of the complaint 
went beyond the Commission’s mandate. 
 
Another limitation to the work of CHRAJ in the Northern Region rests on 
constitutional law. As explained in Chapter 2, the conflicts in the north are 
connected to chieftaincy matters and issues connected to chieftaincy are 
under the jurisdiction of the judicial committees of the Houses of Chiefs. 
According to Articles 273 and 274 of the Constitution chieftaincy related                                                         
279 Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice, Manual on Procedures for 
Investigations, CHRAJ, Accra, Ghana (28 April 2008) 
280 Ibid, p. 46 
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matters are under the jurisdiction of the National House of Chiefs, the 
Judicial Committee of the National House of Chief and the Traditional 
Council. Because of that many of the complaints never even reach CHRAJ, 
and the ones that do are refused.  
 
Yet another issue that might be a constraint to the Commission’s work in 
the Northern Region is its budgetary limitations. According to Khan, “over 
the past few years, the Ministry of Finance has significantly reduced 
CHRAJ’s budget, which is a concern that has been raised in a number of 
CHRAJ annual reports”281
 
. In the last years CHRAJ has also relied on funds 
from donors like UNDP and DANIDA (CHRAJ, 2007). The budgetary 
constraints are very visible in the District Office in Yendi – the bailiff at the 
Office has to borrow the motorcycle from the National Commission for 
Civic Education (NCCE) in order to summon persons to appear before 
CHRAJ, as CHRAJ has no vehicle.  
The literature also points out to the high turnover of staff as a limitation for 
CHARJ’s more comprehensive and strategic work relating to peacebuilding. 
The fact that CHRAJ devotes most of its time and energy to dealing with 
individual complaints, without using them strategically might also hinder 
the expansion of conflict transformation work in the Northern Region.  
5.3 The Work of the Commission using Conflict 
Management Tools 
 
As mentioned in the previous section, CHRAJ is familiar with the use of 
ADR as part of its work. Any person in Ghana can lodge a complaint to the 
Commission, on its own behalf or on behalf of another person. According to 
the Manual on Procedures for Investigations “complaints must be lodged 
with the Commission not later than 12 months after the Complainant has 
had knowledge of the occurrence of the conduct/event complained of 
(Period of limitation)”282
 
. 
A complaint received by the commission will in all cases be logged by the 
registrar of the office. The complaint can be received in written or oral form 
and can, in practice, be in any of the major languages spoken in Ghana. 
Although the district and regional offices are not entirely staffed by local 
people, the practice is to ensure that every office has someone capable of 
speaking local languages who can receive complaints.283
 
 
After the complaint has been received the Director and the Investigator will 
sit together and discuss whether the complaint falls within the mandate of 
CHRAJ and the possible course of action to be used. This is called the                                                         
281 Khan, Naefa, “The Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice in Ghana: 
Working in the micro and around the macro”, Parlevliet, M., Lamb, G. and Maloka, V. 
(eds.) Defenders of Human Rights, Managers of Conflict, Builders of Peace? National 
Human Rights Institutions in Africa (Centre for Conflict Resolution, University of Cape 
Town, 2005), p. 67 
282 Supra note 278. 
283 Supra note 228, p. 13 
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Directors Meeting, and as the Manual on Procedures for Investigations 
explains it: 
 
The Directors’ Meeting is to consider complaints or information received for 
the purposes of determining jurisdiction, to allocate the complaints for 
investigations and to consider any other issues relevant to the complaints. 
These Meetings are convened two times a week: on Tuesdays and Thursdays 
or any other day that the circumstances of the time may determine.  In the 
regions, the Regional Director and the legal officers shall attend, while in the 
Districts, the District Director and the Assistant Registrar shall attend.284
 
 
After the Directors’ Meeting an Investigator is assigned to the case and the 
Commission contacts the Corresponded. The Correspondent is provided 
with sufficient time to respond. If he/she denies the accusation, both parties 
are brought in for ADR – conciliation or mediation. If this proves 
unsuccessful, the Commission decides whether a panel hearing is required 
and if so, a panel is constituted, chaired by a lawyer to consider the matter 
and issue its finding and recommendations back to the Commission. 
 
Even though the Commission is familiarized with typical conflict 
transformation terminology and it is used to work with ADR, “CHRAJ staff 
do not see ‘working with conflict’ to be a key component of their work. 
This is despite the fact that mediation is the dominant form of dispute 
resolution used by the commission in the handling of individual 
complaints”, and the fact that extensive training has been provided for 
CHRAJ staff in this regard”285
 
. 
“Neither the constitution nor the enabling legislation explicitly give CHRAJ 
the authority to conduct an investigation without receiving a complaint, 
although in practice it has done so.”286 CHARJ has conducted investigations 
concerning the rights of sick children whose parents refuse adequate 
medical treatment on the grounds of religious believes287, on trokosi288
 
, and 
on the conditions in detention facilities.  
Since 1995, the Commission has been conducting a nation-wide 
investigation of the conditions of prisons and police detention facilities289
 
.  
This exercise was also intended among other things, to find out the details 
and particulars of suspects who have been remanded into custody pending 
trial for an unreasonable period of time. The Commission publishes an 
Annual Prisons Report which is widely circulated and submitted to the 
relevant authorities.290                                                        
284 Supra note 279, p. 40 
 
285 Supra note 281, p. 72 
286 Supra note 228, p. 15 
287 Ibid. 
288 The trokosi is explained below. 
289 See: ICHRP, 2004; Khan, 2005; Bossman, 2006 
290 Bossman, Anna, The Anti-corruption Mandate of Ghana’s Commission on Human 
Rights and Administrative Justice (United Nations Conference on Anti-Corruption 
Measures, Good Governance and Human Rights, 8-9 November 2006. Panel 2: How 
Human Rights and Good Governance Principles can help in Fighting Corruption) 
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More recently the Commission decided to investigate the situation of the 
human rights of persons in the mining communities of Ghana. Due to 
allegations of “violent, illegal arrest and detention”; “torture of persons 
illegally arrested and detained”; “assault and battery”; and “interference 
against citizens in public protests against activities of mining companies”, 
CHRAJ “decided to conduct a nation-wide investigation to determine in a 
systematic manner the nature and causes of these violations”291
 
. The 
investigation’s foremost aim was to examine the state of human rights in the 
mining communities and the reasons for the increase in the number of 
reports.  
Even though the investigation is not a fault-finding one, it does not overlook 
the obligations and responsibility of any of the stakeholders as it explores 
ways of advancing human rights in mining areas. All role players had an 
opportunity to address the issues in a co-operative manner. The investigation 
also seeks to protect the rights and fundamental freedoms of people affected 
by mining operations across the country (…). It further aims to restore 
cordial relations between all groups in areas where mining takes place in the 
country and create a more conducive atmosphere for development.292
 
 
(Emphasis added)  
All these illustrate how the Commission has actually taken an active role 
(beyond the mere investigation of complaints and without being requested) 
in order to promote human rights. The lack of formal complaints has not 
impeded CHRAJ from taking up investigations and making 
recommendations when the Commission has seen it suitable.  
 
The more significant efforts of the Commission regardless of a formal 
request for investigation can, nevertheless, be seen in its work against 
harmful traditional practices, especially those that violate children’s and 
women’s rights. CHRAJ has effectively worked in the promotion of girls 
and women’s rights that were victims of trokosi. Trokosi literally means 
“slaves of gods”. “Tro means god and Kosi can be translated as virgin, slave 
or wife.”293
 
 
“Trokosi is a system in which a young girl, usually under the age of 10, is 
made a slave to a fetish shrine for offenses allegedly committed by a 
member of the girl’s family, like stealing or improper sexual relations.”294                                                        
291 Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice, The State of Human Rights in 
Mining Communities in Ghana, CHRAJ, Accra, Ghana (2008), p. 17 
 
292 Ibid. 
293 Bilyeu, Amy Small. “Trokosi – The Practice of Sexual Slavery in Ghana: Religious and 
Cultural Freedoms vs. Human Rights” (Indiana International and Comparative Law 
Review, No. 9, 1998-1999), p. 466 
294 Ibid., pp. 469-470  
Traditionally the offerings took the form of cattle, money, and liquor, but over time the 
practice changed from offering animals to offering girls. The practice changed due to the 
priests’ belief that only virgins could appease the gods. The change may also have been 
economically based. Long ago, family starting giving their daughters to the shrine because 
a girl was cheaper than a cow. (Bilyeu, 1998-1999, p. 472) 
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For it being a violation of girls’ human rights and for being a dehumanizing 
traditional practice, CHRAJ has decided to act upon the practice even if no 
complaints regarding trokosi have been brought to the Commission. 
 
CHRAJ worked with a local NGO, International Needs, to undertake public 
education on this matter, and engage in a dialogue with those who practise 
trokosi. CHRAJ was also involved in negotiating payment for the release of 
two thousand women from certain fetish shrines. CHRAJ tried to help these 
women reintegrate into society by facilitating life-skills training workshops. 
Some women had lived in the shrine for most of their lives: for example, 
CHRAJ found women over the age of 65 living in these shrines. According 
to Bossman, a purely legalistic approach would have been counter-productive 
in dealing with the practice of trokosi, as the tradition is well entrenched in 
certain sectors of Ghanaian society. Even if a court ruling existed that 
ordered the release of these women, they would not be accepted back into 
their families until the debt was paid or adequate compensation provided.295
 
 
The education process, nonetheless, went beyond the mere enlightenment of 
the priests towards human rights. The focus was also on teaching the priests 
and the community about the illegality of trokosi according to Ghanaian law 
and the actual criminal liability that would come with its practice. CHRAJ 
also emphasised the need to completely abolish the institution. According to 
Emile Short (the Commissioner), the practice was going on for so long that 
it was necessary to enter into dialogue first296
 
 before enforcing the law. 
The work of the Commission did not stop there. CHRAJ also worked in 
partnership with certain chiefs in its trokosi-related efforts. According to 
Commissioner Short “the chiefs were essential in facilitating the discussions 
that took place with the priests in order to negotiate the release of girls 
under their control”297. Chiefs, as well as other respected leaders, are still an 
essential part of the rural systems of Ghana and therefore central actors in 
activities to promote change.  Chiefs were therefore “engaged in direct 
dialogue with perpetrators, victims, other community leaders, and the 
community at large to facilitate understanding of the practice, while 
providing alternatives and avenues for abandoning the practice without 
losing status”298
                                                                                                                                             
The tradition requires that girls start their bondage as virgins. Once at the shrine, the priest 
is the only one who can decide when the girls have atoned for their sin and free them. They 
are expected to stay with the priest from the age of about eight to 15 and sometimes much 
longer. Sometimes, even lifelong servitudes may not settle the debt to the gods. (Bilyeu, 
1998-1999, p. 472) 
. CHRAJ made an effort to respect tradition and culture 
while challenging belief systems. Utilising reputable human resources 
 
Trokosi are the sexual property of priests, so by night, they are sex slaves. When a fetish 
slave starts menstruating, she undergoes an initiation ceremony after which the priest, or 
the custom would have it, the god through the human channel of the priest, can have sex 
with her whenever he wants. (Bilyeu, 1998-1999, p. 473) 
295 Supra note 281, p. 75 
296 Supra note 293 
297 Supra note 281, p. 75 
298 Ibid. 
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within the communities practising trokosi achieved this.299
 
 
CHRAJ has also used its mandate to influence the Legislative. Teams of 
investigators were sent to the shrines to study the practice. The investigators 
made recommendations to parliament to change the law in order to abolish 
trokosi. The Ghanaian Parliament enacted a new provision in the end of the 
1990’s changing the criminal code of 1960. The provision “specifically 
outlaws the practice of sexual slavery” and “refers to the Trokosi system 
and like practices as ‘customary servitude’ and imposes a minimum three 
year sentence for the violators”300
 
. 
An additional harmful traditional practice found in Ghana (especially in the 
Northern Region) is that of witch camps. These camps are created to house 
women (there is a very small number of men who are sent to witch camps) 
who are accused of witchcraft in their villages. 
 
When crops fail or children die of mysterious illnesses, the villagers of 
northern Ghana usually suspect that a witch is to blame. The accusation is 
most likely to come from within a family - the same feeling that binds a 
village together in adversity can be turned ruthlessly against a scapegoat, and 
it takes little more than suspicion for a witch to face death at the hands of a 
lynch mob. Fearing for their lives, hundreds of elderly women in northern 
Ghana have banded together for protection in sanctuaries known as “witch 
camps”.301
 
 
 
Regarding the witch camps the Commission has not been so active. The 
main concern of CHRAJ is with keeping the women in the camps safe and 
making sure that their basic rights are respected. No action towards 
changing beliefs or showing how the practices connected to accusing 
women of witchcraft violate women’s rights has been taken. According to 
Mr. Siedu, CHRAJ cannot act because attitudes towards peoples’ believes 
would violate the right to religion, and Ghana is a secular state that respects 
freedom of religion. 
 
A different way for CHRAJ to act is through education. The Commission 
itself says that public education has been a central part of its activities from 
the outset (as it is part of the constitutional mandate), however, this 
statement has been challenged by some organizations. ICHRP, for example 
says that it is clear that this aspect of CHRAJ’s work has been less                                                         
299 Notwithstanding CHRAJ’s relative success in addressing trokosi practices, questions 
can be raised as to whether such an approach undermines human rights standards, and 
whether issues of justice and accountability are compromised. However, the story of Abla 
Kotor illustrates the cultural hurdles faced by institutions such as CHRAJ, and lends 
credence to the methods adopted by CHRAJ and International Needs. Abla was sent to a 
fetish shrine at age twelve. After her release was negotiated from the shrine, no one from 
her family came to claim her due to fears that retribution from the gods might follow. Abla 
now attends school, but sleeps at the shrine at night, as she has no home. This is also the 
case with several other women. (Khan, 2005, p. 75) 
300 Supra note 293, p. 500. 
301 Vasagar, Jeevan, Witch Hunt (Guardian.co.uk, Tuesday 6 December 2005, 12.20 GMT) 
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prominent than in many other NHRIs. The reasons for this are probably 
connected the constant lack of resources. “In practice many educational 
activities have been funded by external donors rather than from the 
commission’s core budget.”302
5.4 Steps forward – Possibilities for CHRAJ to 
transform the conflicts in the Northern 
Region 
 
 
It is extremely difficult from an outsider’s point of view to try to propose 
suggestions that can effectively work. However, an attempt will be made 
here based on the matters presented above. The first action to be taken by 
the Commission in order for it to be able to work on the conflicts of the 
North is to allocate financial resources. “Easier said than done”, one would 
say, however small improvements could already contribute a lot to the big 
picture. A motorcycle for the Yendi District Office is one of the things that 
the Head Office should consider. This would make accessibility to remote 
areas around Yendi easier and could possibly contribute to CHRAJ’s 
visibility in the North. Moreover, the time saved between journeys would 
allow the personnel to think strategically about the complaints arriving at 
CHRAJ. 
 
Concerning the Dagomba vs. Konkomba conflict specifically, the following 
observations could be made. The way the media presented the conflict 
between Konkombas and Dagombas in the 1990’s has contributed a lot to 
create an image of the peoples of the North as being violent. Ghana had 
been relatively peaceful until the conflicts in the Northern Region began to 
explode and therefore this association by the people of the South became the 
way the peoples of the North are seen. Another initiative that CHRAJ 
should take is a process of demystification of the peoples of the North. 
CHRAJ could use its education and awareness-raising mandate to do this. 
 
Further, CHRAJ should consider working closely with NCCE (the National 
Commission for Civic Education) in order to promote this demystification 
process. The functions of NCCE, as established in Article 233 of the 
Constitution, are compatible with CHRAJ’s when it comes to human rights 
education. Therefore the two institutions should work together in order to 
avoid overlapping and to save resources. 
 
Labeling the people of the Northern Region will not help in a process of 
creating a more peaceful society. Moreover, it removes the responsibility of 
all state actors from acting in the North when a new conflict appears. If 
statements such as “the people of the north are violent” and “that is their 
nature” are seen as truthful by the other inhabitants of the country, there is 
no reason for any one to look into the structures that have contributed to the 
escalation of the conflicts to violence.  Of course, it is not within CHRAJ’s 
mandate to take this kind of initiatives isolated. Nonetheless, as part of its                                                         
302 Supra note 228 
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civic education initiatives (together with NCCE) the Commission could 
address patterns of discrimination, why they exist and how they contribute 
to the exclusion of certain groups.  
 
Middle-range strategies, as proposed in Chapter 4, should also be used in 
order to build peace, especially to address the chiefs. It is the view of the 
author that chieftaincy is an outdated, undemocratic, sexist and 
discriminatory institution. However, chieftaincy is there, it exists and it is 
protected by the Constitution. Problem-solving workshops involving chiefs 
from conflicting groups and their legal advisers should be considered by 
CHRAJ.  
 
Further, it is important to educate the chiefs on human rights issues and 
conflict management tools, as many people look for the chiefs’ assistance 
when they are faced with smaller conflicts. Chiefs should also be educated 
on the roles and functions of CHRAJ, so that they can refer complainants to 
CHRAJ’s offices, if more suitable.  
 
Capacity building, in line with what was done in Tanzania (as presented in 
Chapter 3) should also be considered by CHRAJ. The staff in CHRAJ is 
already familiar with mediation and conciliation and the positive aspects of 
these ADR methods to deal with conflict, therefore they would only benefit 
from capacity building sessions that focuses in the connections between 
violent societal conflicts and human rights violation and structural violence.  
 
It has been reported (private conversation with an NCCE employee) that the 
Konkombas are getting armed. In an area where conflict is recurrent and 
where the inequalities and inequities have not been addressed, having 
excluded groups being armed is a serious issue that must be dealt with. 
Disarmament is not part of CHRAJ’s mandate and it should not be only 
CHRAJ’s initiative. But the Commission could follow the example of 
UHRC and coordinate together with the police and other national authorities 
a disarmament programme for the Northern Region.  
 
CHRAJ should consider using the PESTEL framework to analyse its 
environment and to determine how it can work on conflict in the Northern 
Region specifically and in Ghana generally. More importantly, CHRAJ 
should consider designing a strategic plan for the north (which would 
include both the Northern Region and the two Upper – East and West – 
Regions).  
 
The PESTEL framework provides a comprehensive list of influences on the 
possible success or failure of a strategy. “PESTEL stands for Political, 
Economic, Social, Technological, Environmental and Legal.”303
                                                        
303 Supra note 234, p. 55 
 Politics 
highlights the roles of the government and is important for CHRAJ’s work 
both because of its financial implications, but also, because of the possible 
choice of partners for working on conflict to build peace in the North. 
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Economics refers to the macro-economic factors that can affect both 
CHRAJ, and the populations of the North – exchange rates can, for 
example, affect the prices of yams and consequently the economic situation 
of the peoples of the North. Social influences include changes in 
demographics. Slowly more and more girls are being educated in the North 
and the difference between the number of girls and boys that go to schools 
is still very big. CHRAJ has to take this into account, as women have to be 
involved in peacebuilding initiatives. Technology influences refer to 
innovations such as the Internet and therefore democratic digital inclusion, 
and also new weaponry. Both are issues that have to be taken into account. 
In the business language environmental refers to “green” issues, which are a 
different shade of green when conflicts are at hand. The environment has to 
be thought into the strategy in two ways: 1) the environmental costs of 
violent conflicts and 2) the environmental problems that can be at the 
bottom of the iceberg and contribute to causing conflict304
 
. Lastly, legal 
embraces legislative constraints and it can be exemplified here by both 
CHRAJ’s mandate and the National House of Chiefs jurisdiction on 
chieftaincy matters. PESTEL is used in companies and enterprises strategies 
and it can easily be used by CHRAJ to determine a more precise course of 
action in the North.  
The PESTEL framework should be combined with an analysis of CHRAJ’s 
core competences and resource. By doing this CHRAJ could think of a 
strategy that would address the following questions: 1) what can CHRAJ do 
that nobody else does? 2) Who can CHRAJ work with in order to build 
sustainable peace in the North? CHRAJ has to focus on their “best trait” 
(core competencies – the reason why they exist) in order to transform the 
conflicts in the North while working with other stakeholders.  
 
“According to Professor Quashigah, CHRAJ is better known among 
Ghanaians than the Legal Aid Board. A similar comment was made by a 
district officer, who maintained that CHRAJ is better known and perceived 
by ordinary Ghanaians to be more competent and capable in terms of 
service delivery than the Department of Social Welfare”305
 
. CHRAJ should 
use these advantages and design a strategy to building sustainable peace in 
the North.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                         
304 The environmental degradation of Ogooni Land in Nigeria, is one, out of several 
examples, of how environmental destruction can be one of the issues that make conflicts 
escalate into violence.  
305 Supra note 281, p. 69 
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6 Conclusion 
 
The relationship between human rights and conflict transformation is a very 
close one. It is impossible to talk about transforming conflicts and building 
sustainable peace without addressing previous human rights violations, not 
only those violations at the top of the iceberg, but also and most importantly 
those at the bottom. Violence, be direct or indirect, is recurrent if human 
rights are not protected and respected.  
 
It has been demonstrated that there are several links between Galtung’s 
(1969) structural violence and human rights promotion and protection. It is 
crucial to address issues of marginalization, exclusion and discrimination in 
order to promote sustainable peace. Further, it has been shown that the 
promotion of human needs can benefit from a human rights-based approach 
(HRBA). By using a HRBA individuals are put in the centre of policies, 
they are empowered to participate and they are given the tools and the 
knowledge necessary to hold their governments accountable. More than 
that, through HRBA discrimination patterns historically built can be 
addressed and the most vulnerable and discriminated groups are allowed to 
participate. Lastly, as Habermas (2001) puts it, a HRBA allows for the 
inclusion of the marginalized in a process that reinforces democracies and 
democratic principles. 
 
It is also been displayed that issues of identity are crucial in conflict related 
situations, as many times group identity is used as a tool for acting violently 
against other groups. The dichotomy “us” versus “them” is part of the 
process of formation of the self and gets stronger in groups. In these lines, it 
has been shown that ethnicity is one form of identity that somehow, mixes 
several types of identity within it and is used by different groups to achieve 
different goals. 
 
In the African context, ethnicity has been used both by the colonizer as a 
form of exploitation of certain ethnic groups, but it has also been used as an 
instrument for African agency. Especially in Ghana, ethnicity has been used 
to confirm histories of groups and to maintain patterns of subordination of a 
group over another. Ethnicity has been especially used by some African 
elites to channelize and promote their interests and to keep the most 
underprivileged people outside the political sphere. The constant 
marginalization of some groups has diminished their potentiality and 
therefore they constitute structural violence. 
  
The Northern Region of Ghana illustrates cases of structural violence, be it 
through the entire region’s exclusion, be it in the pattern of exclusion of 
certain ethnic groups. The Region’s conflicts between the Konkombas and 
the majority groups (especially the Dagombas) show how the combination 
of exclusion from the political structure, lack of development, and weak 
state institutions can be a trigger for violent conflict. Further, the conflicts in 
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the Northern Region demonstrate how there is no one cause for conflict and 
how unequal power structures are always an underlying cause for violence.  
 
Lessons learned from the conflict and the peace process are also related to 
the fact that, peace, sustainable, positive peace will not be achieved if issues 
related to social, economic and cultural rights are not addressed. Chieftaincy 
related issues and access to land rights have to be dealt with in order to 
prevent the escalation of social disturbances into violent conflict.  
 
In order to reach this conclusion some key processes were presented. 
Negotiation and different types of third-party intervention have illustrated 
different approaches to handling conflict. These approaches have been 
presented as peaceful ways of addressing conflict, each one of them having 
its advantages and drawbacks in different phases of the conflict. Some 
NHRIs are used to applying mediation, conciliation and negotiation as tools 
to address conflict, be it interpersonal or societal conflict.  
 
Peacebuilding has been explained as a process needed to transform conflict 
and build sustainable and lasting peace. In this process past differences and 
atrocities must be addressed, people must get the chance to talk about their 
pain their suffering and how difficult and challenging it is for them to 
forgive and forget what has happened. These processes have to be 
accompanied by punishment of perpetrators of gross human rights 
violations while also looking into processes that re-humanize conflicting 
parties and making room for differences.  
 
There are several different approaches to peacebuilding. It has been 
discussed how in the case of NHRIs the best approach might be that of 
addressing the middle range leaders, as they are more capable of addressing 
the problems in their communities. It is also through the middle-range 
leaders that strategic plans can be developed to think on how discrimination 
and inequality issues can be addressed.  
 
Even though the framework of action of NHRIs, the Paris Principles, do not 
explicitly say that these institutions have to work towards building 
sustainable peace, it has been proved that NHRI’s mandate can be used in 
this relation. NHRIs can use their capacities to influence the government to 
change legislation that is not in accordance with human rights principles and 
standards (and therefore can jeopardize peacebuilding processes). Further, 
NHRIs can examine pending legislation in order to certify that new laws are 
in accordance with human rights principles and standards and address 
discrimination issues. This exercise can be useful in preventing the 
explosion of violent conflict and also in transforming violent structures.  
 
NHRIs also have a paramount role to play in monitoring and reporting both 
in the national and international levels. This part of NHRIs mandate can be 
used to report on human rights violations and the actions governments are 
taking in order to improve their human rights records. NHRIs dealing with 
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conflict can put emphasis on the human rights issues that are connected to 
structural violence and work as stress factors for already fragile situations.  
 
NHRIs can also use their mandates to pressure their governments into 
ratifying human rights instruments, removing reservations and declarations 
that go against the treaty’s purpose and object. Another way of using NHRIs 
mandate in order to promote peacebuilding is by working with the media 
and civil society in reporting internationally. International pressure and 
support are important elements in the process of building peace.  
 
A key element of NHRIs’ mandate that can be used in peacebuilding is their 
education and information mandate. Human rights education can be used as 
a channel to promote an egalitarian society and also to promote peace. 
Educating through human rights, about human rights and for human rights 
can help in the establishment a culture of respect and it can also help 
prevent violent conflict in the long term. A long with education NHRIs can 
promote awareness-raising campaigns to address the underlying issues of 
the conflict and how they can be overcome in order to promote peace. These 
processes should also focus on promoting a better understanding of human 
rights and non-discrimination issues. 
 
Lastly, NHRIs should use their capacity as quasi-judicial bodies to address 
the conflicts that are presented by individuals, but they should also use the 
complaints brought as a way of analyzing societal issues as a whole. The 
complaints presented to NHRIs can draw a good map of the kind of 
violations happening in the country and assist NHRIs in designing strategies 
to address these conflicts. 
 
After the questions presented, this thesis can conclude that the Commission 
on Human Rights and Administrative Justice in Ghana, a National Human 
Rights Institution operating in accordance with the Paris Principles, can use 
its mandate to address issues of structural violence in the Northern Region 
of Ghana. 
 
CHRAJ as a Ghana’s NHRI can use its mandate to address the conflicts in 
the North. CHRAJ is already used to starting investigations on issues that 
are considered of importance to the Commission, such as trokosi and the 
situation in prisons. Therefore, the Commission should investigate the 
human rights violations connected to the conflicts in the Northern Region in 
order to design a strategic plan to operate in that region. CHRAJ needs to 
address the human rights violations at the bottom of the iceberg, such as the 
marginalization of the Konkomba, the Northern Region’s lack of economic 
development, and the discrimination of the peoples of the North. It is also 
crucial that the Commission thinks of ways of working with other state 
institutions, such as the NCCE in order to promote both human rights and 
peace education. Further, the Commission should especially consider 
involving chiefs in its operations in the north, as they still are very important 
figures in that region.  
 
 100 
List of Figures 
 
Figure 1.1 The ABC Triangle – Johan Galtung 
Figure 1.2  Conflict Escalation – Mie Roesdahl 
Figure 2.1 Daily Graphic, 14 February 1994 – Author’s private 
collection 
Figure 2.2 Daily Graphic, 11 February 1994 – Author’s private 
collection 
Figure 3.1 Approaches to Handling Conflict – Mie Roesdahl  
Figure 3.2 The Negotiation Diamond – Mie Roesdahl 
Figure 4.1 Actors and Approaches to Peacebuilding – John Paul 
Lederach 
Figure 4.2 The Nested Paradigm – John Paul Lederach 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 101 
Bibliography 
 
Aapengnuo, Clement M., “Misinterpreting Ethnic Conflicts in Africa” 
(Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Africa Security Brief No. 4, ND4 
Press, April 2010) 
 
Alexy, Robert, A Theory of Constitutional Rights (translated by Julian 
Rivers, Oxford University Press, New York, 2010) 
 
Amanor, Kojo, “The changing face of customary land tenure”, Amanor, 
Kojo and Ubink, Janine (eds.) Contesting land and custom in Ghana: State, 
Chief and the Citizen (Lieden University Press, 2008) 
 
Amanor, Kojo and Ubink, Janine, “Contesting land and custom in Ghana: 
Introduction”, Amanor, Kojo and Ubink, Janine (eds.) Contesting land and 
custom in Ghana: State, Chief and the Citizen (Lieden University Press, 
2008) 
 
Ametewee, Victor K., “Ethnicity and Ethnic Relations in Ghana”, Ethnicity, 
Conflicts and Consensus in Ghana (Woeli Publishing Services, Accra, 
2007) 
 
Annan, Kofi, “In larger freedom: towards development, security,  and 
human rights for all” (UNGA, A/59/2005) 
 
Avenhaus, Rudolf, “Game Theory”, Kremenyuk, Victor A. (ed.) 
International Negotiation: Analysis, Approaches, Issues (Jossey Bass, San 
Francisco, 2001) 
 
Awedoba, A. K., An Ethnographic of Northern Ghanaian Conflicts: 
Towards a Sustainable Peace (Sub-Saharan Publishers, Accra, 2009)  
 
Bercovitch, Jacob, “Third parties in conflict management: the structure and 
conditions to effective mediation in international relations” (International 
Journal, 736, 1984-1985) 
 
_________, “Mediation in International Conflict: An Overview of Theory, 
A Review of Practice”, Zartman, I. William and Rasmussen, J. Lewis, 
Peacemaking in International Conflict: Methods and Techniques (United 
States Institute for Peace, Washington, D.C., 2005) 
 
_________, “Mediation and Conflict Resolution”, Bercovitch, Jacob; 
Kremenyuk, Victor and Zartman, William, The SAGE Handbook of Conflict 
Resolution (SAGE Publications, London, 2009) 
 
Bercovitch, Jacob and Jackson, Richard, “Negotiation or Mediation? An 
Exploration of Factors Affecting the Choice of Conflict Management in 
International Conflict” (Negotiation Journal, pp. 59-77, January 2001) 
 102 
 
Bilyeu, Amy Small. “Trokosi – The Practice of Sexual Slavery in Ghana: 
Religious and Cultural Freedoms vs. Human Rights” (Indiana International 
and Comparative Law Review, No. 9, 1998-1999) 
 
Bogner, Artur, “The Peace Process in the Wake of Ghana’s Northern 
Conflict: Its Course and Its Conditions for Success”, Rosenthal, Gabriele 
and Bogner, Artur (eds.) Ethnicity, Belonging and Biography (Lit. Verlag, 
Berlim/Münster, 2009) 
 
Bordone, Robert, Dispute System Design: An Introduction, HNLR 
Symposium 2008, Harvard Law School, Friday, March 7, 2008. Available 
at http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/hnmcp/files/2008/03/dsdintroduction3-7-
08.pdf, accessed on 17 May 2011 
 
Bossman, Anna, The Anti-corruption Mandate of Ghana’s Commission on 
Human Rights and Administrative Justice (United Nations Conference on 
Anti-Corruption Measures, Good Governance and Human Rights, 8-9 
November 2006. Panel 2: How Human Rights and Good Governance 
Principles can help in Fighting Corruption) 
 
Brobbey, S. A., The Law of Chieftaincy in Ghana – Incorporating 
Customary Arbitration, Contempt of the Court, Judicial Review (Advanced 
Legal Publication, Accra, 2008) 
 
Brounés, Karen, “Reconciliation and Development”, Ambos, Kai; Large, 
Judith; and Wierda, Marieke (eds.), Building a Future on Peace and Justice: 
Studies on Transitional Justice, Peace and Development. The Nuremberg 
Declaration on Peace and Justice (Springer-Verlag, Berlin and Heidelberg, 
2009) 
 
Brukum, N. J. K., “Chieftaincy and Ethnic Conflicts in the Northern Region 
of Ghana, 1980-2002, Ethnicity, Conflicts and Consensus in Ghana (Woeli 
Publishing Services, Accra, 2007) 
 
_________, The Guinea Fowl, Mango and Pito Wars – Episodes in the 
History of Northern Ghana, 1980-1999 (Ghana University Press, Accra, 
2001) 
 
Burke, Peter J. and Stets, Jan E., Identity Theory (Oxford University Press, 
2009) 
 
Carozza, Paolo C., “Subsidiarity as a Structural Principle of International 
Human Rights Law” (American Journal of International Law, No. 97, pp. 
38-79, 2003) 
 
Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice Act (Act 456), 
1993  
 
 103 
Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice 2005 Annual 
Report, CHRAJ, Accra, Ghana (2006) 
 
Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice 2008 Annual 
Report, CHRAJ, Accra, Ghana (2011) 
 
Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice, The State of 
Human Rights in Mining Communities in Ghana, CHRAJ, Accra, Ghana 
(2008) 
 
Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice, Manual on 
Procedures for Investigations, CHRAJ, Accra, Ghana (28 April 2008) 
 
Concluding Observations of the Committee against Torture – Switzerland. 
Committee against Torture, forty-fourth session, 25 May 2010 
CAT/C/CHE/CO/6  
 
Constitution of the Republic of Ghana, 1992 
 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, Adopted and opened for signature, ratification 
and accession by General Assembly resolution 39/46 
of 10 December 1984, entry into force 26 June 1987 
 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women, opened for signature 1 March 1980, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13, entered 
into force 3 September 1981 
 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, G.A. 
Res. 2106 (XX), U.N. Doc. A/6014 (Dec. 21, 1965) 
 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted and opened for signature, 
ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution 44/25 of 20 
November 1989, entry into force 2 September 1990 
 
Crook, Richard C., “Customary justice and local Alternative Dispute 
Resolution: What kind of protection can they offer to customary 
landholders?”, Ubink, Janine M. and Amanor, Kojo S., Contesting Land and 
Custom in Ghana: State, Chief, Citizen (Leiden University Press, Leiden, 
2008) 
 
Danish Institute for Human Rights (DIHR), DIHR Planning System, Draft, 
Unpublished, 2011 
 
Druckman, Daniel, “Negotiating in the International Context”, Zartman, I. 
William and Rasmussen, J. Lewis, Peacemaking in International Conflict: 
Methods and Techniques (United States Institute for Peace, Washington, 
D.C., 2005) 
 
 104 
Fisher, Simon; Abdi, Dekha Ibrahim; Ludin, Jawed; Smith, Richard; 
Williams, Steve; and Williams, Sue, Working with Conflict – Skills and 
Strategies for Action (Responding to Conflict, London, 2000) 
 
Folberg, J., and A. Taylor. Mediation: A Comparative Guide to Resolving 
Conflicts without Litigation (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1984) 
 
Freeman, Mark, Truth Commission and Procedural Fairness (Cambridge 
University Press, New York, 2006) 
 
Friedman, Gil, “Conceptualizing Protracted Conflict and Protracted Conflict 
Management”, Starr, Harvey, The Understanding and Management of 
Global Violence: New Approaches to Theory and Research on Protracted 
Conflict (St. Martins Press, New York, 1999) 
 
Galtung, Johan, “Violence, Peace, and Peace Research”, (Journal of Peace 
Research, Vol. 6, No. 3, pp. 167-191, 1969) 
 
__________, Conflict Transformation by Peaceful Means (the Transcend 
Method), (United Nations Disaster Management Training Programme, UN, 
2000)  
 
Galtung, Johan and Wirak, Anders H., “Human Needs and Human Rights – 
A Theoretical Approach”, (Security Dialogue, pp. 251-258, 1977) 
 
General Comment No. 1, Article 29 (1): The General Aims of Education, 
Committee on the Rights of the Child, CRC/GC/2011/1, 17 April 2001.  
 
Gurr, Ted Robert, “Containing Internal War in the Twenty-First Century”, 
Hampson, Fen Osler and Malone, David M. (eds.) From Reaction to 
Conflict Prevention: Opportunities for the UN System (Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, London, 2002) 
 
Habermas, Jürgen, “Constitutional Democracy: A Paradoxical Union of 
Contradictory Principles?” (Political Theory, 29, pp. 766-781, 2001) 
 
________, “O Estado Nação Europeu Frente aos Desafios da Globalização” 
(Revista Novos Estudos. CEBRAP, Nov., 1995) 
 
Hammerich, Else, Meeting Conflicts Mindfully (Tibetan Centre for Conflict 
Resolution and Danish Centre for Conflict Resolution, Copenhagen, 2001). 
 
Harris, Peter and Ben Riley (eds.), Democracy and Deep-Rooted Conflict: 
Options for Negotiators, (International Institute for Democracy and 
Electoral Assistance, Stockholm, Sweden, 1998) 
 
International Council on Human Rights Policy (ICHRP), Performance and 
Legitimacy: National human rights institutions (ICHRP, Vesoix, 2004) 
 
 105 
Hopmann, P. Terrence, “Two Paradigms of Negotiation: Barganing and 
Problem Solving” (Annals of the American Academy of Political Science, 
Vol. 52, Nov. 1995) 
 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 
19 December 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, entered into March 23 March 1976 
 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for 
signature 19 December 1966, 993 U.N.T.S 3 (entered into force 3 January 
1976) 
 
Johnson, Gerry; Scholes, Kevan and Whittington, Richard, Exploring 
Corporate Strategy (Pearson Education, Edinburgh, 2008) 
 
Jönsson, J., “The Overwhelming minority: Inter-ethnic Conflict in Ghana’s 
Northern Region”. (Journal of International Development, 21, pp. 507-519, 
2009) 
 
Kampala Declaration. 2002. Fourth Conference of African National Human 
Rights Institutions, held 14–6 to 16 August 2002, Kampala, Uganda. 
www.sahrc.org.za/afr_sec_kampala_declaration.pdf  
 
Katanga, Justice, “An Historical and Ethnographic Commentary on the 
Northern Conflict”. Unpublished. Hardcopy available at the library of the 
Tamale Centre for Cross-Cultural Studies, Tamale, Ghana, (Undated)  
 
Kaye, J. and Béland, D., “The politics of ethnicity and post-conflict 
reconstruction: The case of Northern Ghana”, (Journal of Contemporary 
African Studies, Vol. 27, No. 2, PP. 177-200, 2009). 
 
Kerrigan, Fergus and Lindholt, Lone, “General Aspects of Quasi-judicial 
Competences of National Human Rights Institutions”, Lindsnaes, B, 
Lindholt, L. and Yigen, K. (eds.) National Human Rights Institutions: 
Articles and Working papers, (The Danish Institut for Human Rights, 
Copenhagen, 2001) 
 
Khan, Naefa, “The Commission on Human Rights and Administrative 
Justice in Ghana: Working in the micro and around the macro”, Parlevliet, 
M., Lamb, G. and Maloka, V. (eds.) Defenders of Human Rights, Managers 
of Conflict, Builders of Peace? National Human Rights Institutions in Africa 
(Centre for Conflict Resolution, University of Cape Town, 2005) 
 
Laplante, Lisa J., “Transitional Injustice and Peacebuilding: Diagnosing and 
Addressing the Socioeconomic Roots of Violence through a Human Rights 
Framework” (The International Journal of Transitional Justice, Vol. 2, 
Issue 3, 2008) 
 
Leal, Rosemiro Pereira, Teoria Geral do Processo. 5. Ed. (Thomson-IOB, 
São Paulo, 2004) 
 106 
 
Lederach, John Paul, The Little Book of Conflict Transformation (Good 
Books, Intercourse, 2003) 
 
_________, Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided 
Societies (United States Institute of Peace, Washington D.C., 1997) 
 
Lentz, Carola, Ethnicity and the Making of History in Northern Ghana 
(Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh, 2006) 
 
________, “Youth Associations and Ethnicity in Northern Ghana”, 
Ethnicity, Conflicts and Consensus in Ghana (Woeli Publishing Services, 
Accra, 2007) 
 
Lentz, Carola and Nugent, Paul, “Ethnicity in Ghana: A comparative 
perspective”, Lentz, Carola and Nugent, Paul (eds.), Ethnicity in Ghana: 
The Limits of Invention (Macmillan Press Ltd., London, 2000) 
 
Luhmann, Niklas, Social Systems. Translation by John Bednarz, Jr. with 
Dirk Baecker. (Stanford University Press, California, 1984) 
 
Mahama, Ibrahim, Ethnic Conflicts in Northern Ghana (Cyber Systems, 
Tamale, 2003) 
 
Maloka, Victoria, “Paradigm Shift? Building Capacity for Conflict 
Management and Peacebuilding: The Tanzania Commission for Human 
Rights and Good Governance”, Parlevliet, M., Lamb, G. and Maloka, V. 
(eds.) Defenders of Human Rights, Managers of Conflict, Builders of 
Peace? National Human Rights Institutions in Africa (Centre for Conflict 
Resolution, University of Cape Town, 2005) 
 
Mann, Mali A., “The formation and development of individual and ethnic 
identity: insights from psychiatry and psychoanalytic theory” (The 
American Journal of Psychoanalysis, Vol. 66, No. 3, PP. 211-224, 2006) 
 
Mertus, Julie A. and Helsing, Jeffrey H. (eds), Human Rights and Conflict – 
Exploring the Links between Rights, Law, and Peacebuilding (United States 
Institute of Peace, Washington, 2006) 
 
Mottiar, Shauna, “The Uganda Human Rights Commission: Beyond 
protection and promotion of human rights”, Parlevliet, M., Lamb, G. and 
Maloka, V. (eds.) Defenders of Human Rights, Managers of Conflict, 
Builders of Peace? National Human Rights Institutions in Africa (Centre for 
Conflict Resolution, University of Cape Town, 2005) 
 
Müller, Friedrich. Quem é o povo? A questão fundamental da democracia. 
(Tradução: Peter Naumann. Editora Max Limonad: São Paulo, 2003) 
 
 107 
Neves, Marcelo, “A Força Simbólica dos Direitos Humanos” (Revista 
Eletrônica de Direito do Estado, No. 4, 2005) 
 
Office for the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), National 
Human Rights Institutions: History, Principles, Roles and Responsibilities 
(Professional Training Series No. 4, Rev. 1, United Nations, New York and 
Geneva, 2010) 
 
Office for the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP), UNDP-OHCR Toolkit for 
Collaboration with National Human Rights Institutions (UNDP, OCHCR, 
New York, Geneva, 2010) 
 
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the 
involvement of children in armed conflict, adopted and opened for 
signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution 
A/RES/54/263 of 25 May 2000, entry into force 12 February 2002  
 
Parlevliet, Michelle, ‘Rethinking Conflict Transformation from a Human 
Rights Perspective’, Berghof Handbook for Conflict Transformation 
(Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management 2009) 
 
Parlevliet, M; Lamg, G and Maloka, V., “Introduction: Understanding 
conflict and its relationship with human righst”, Parlevliet, M., Lamb, G. 
and Maloka, V. (eds.) Defenders of Human Rights, Managers of Conflict, 
Builders of Peace? National Human Rights Institutions in Africa (Centre for 
Conflict Resolution, University of Cape Town, 2005) 
 
Plan of Action for the first phase (2005-2009) of the World Programme for 
human rights education (A/59/525/Rev. 1), 2 March 2005  
 
Pul, Hippolyt A. S., “Exclusion, Association and Violence: Trends and 
Triggers in Northern Ghana’s Konkomba-Dagomba Wars”, (The African 
Anthropologist, Vol. 10, No. 1, 2003) 
 
Quashigah, E. K. “The Ghana Commission on Human Rights and 
Administrative Justice”, Lindsnaes, B, Lindholt, L. and Yigen, K. (eds.) 
National Human Rights Institutions: Articles and Working papers,(The 
Danish Institut for Human Rights, Copenhagen, 2001) 
 
Ramsbotham, Oliver, Woodhouse, Tom and Miall, Hugh, Contemporary 
Conflict Resolution: The prevention, management and transformation of 
deadly conflicts (Polity Press, Cambridge, 2005) 
 
Roesdahl, Mie, Negotiation, PowerPoint Presentation, Conflict Management 
Course (DIHR, 2009) 
 
 108 
Roesdahl, Mie, Conflict Resolution, Human Rights and Development 
Planning, PowerPoint Presentation, Conflict Management Course (DIHR, 
2009) 
 
Schmidt, Markus,  “Follow-up Activities by the UN Human Rights Treaty 
Bodies and Special Procedures Mechanisms of the Human Rights Council – 
Recent Developments”, Alfredsson, Gudmundur; Grimheden, Jonas; 
Ramcharan, Bertrand G. and Zayas, Alfred, International Human Rights 
Mechanisms – Essays in Honour of Jakob Th. Möller, 2nd Revised Edition. 
(Mrtinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009) 
 
Seventh International Conference for National Institutions for the Promotion 
and Protection of Human Rights, Seoul, Republic of Korea, 14 – 17 
September 2004 – The Seoul Declaration 
 
Skalnik, Peter, “Questioning the Concept of the State in Indigenous Africa”, 
(Social Dynamics 9, 2, pp. 11-28, 1983) 
 
Spliid, Ulrik, UNFPA Handbook on Reproductive Rights for National 
Human Rights Institutions (The Danish Institute for Human Rights, 
Copenhagen, 2011 – Unpublished) 
 
Starr, Harvey, “Introduction: A Protracted Conflict Approach to the Study 
of Social Conflict”, Starr, Harvey, The Understanding and Management of 
Global Violence: New Approaches to Theory and Research on Protracted 
Conflict (St. Martins Press, New York, 1999) 
 
Talton, Benjamin, Politics of Social Change in Ghana – The Kokomba 
Struggle for Political Equality (Palgrave Macmillam, New York, 2010) 
 
Tonah, Steve, “Theoretical Comparative Perspectives on Ethnicity, 
Conflicts and Consensus in Ghana”, Tonah, Steve (ed.), Ethnicity, Conflicts 
and Consensus in Ghana (Woeli Publishing Services, Accra, 2007) 
 
UNICEF, Map of Programmes for Adolescent Participation During Conflict 
and Post-Conflict Situations (UNICEF, 2003) 
 
United Nations. 1992. An Agenda for Peace – Preventive diplomacy, 
peacemaking and peace-keeping, Report of the Secretary-General A/47/277 
- S/24111 17 June 1992. Available at 
http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/agpeace.html  
 
United nations. 1995. Supplement To An Agenda For Peace: Position Paper 
of the Secretary-General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the 
United Nations, Report of the Secretary-General A/50/60 - S/1995/1, 3 
January 1995. Available at 
http://www.un.org/Docs/SG/agsupp.html#POSTCONFLICT  
 
United Nations Development Group (UNDG). 2003. UN Statement of 
 109 
Common Understanding on Human Rights-Based Approach to Development 
Cooperation and Programming, UNDG 
 
United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). 1986. Declaration on the Right 
to Development, General Assembly Resolution 41/128 of 4 December 1986 
 
United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). 1993. Principles relating to the 
Status of National Institution, General Assembly Resolution 48/134 of 20 
December 1993 
 
United Nations Security Council (UNSC). 2001. Security Council addresses 
comprehensive approach to peace building in presidential statement. Press 
release SC/7014 on a statement by UNSC President Said Ben Mustapha at 
the 4278th meeting of the Council. 
http://www.un.org/news/Press/docs/2001/sc7014.doc.htm  
 
Vasagar, Jeevan, Witch Hunt (Guardian.co.uk, Tuesday 6 December 2005, 
12.20 GMT) 
 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969 (United Nations, Treaty 
Series, vol. 1155, p. 331, 2005) 
 
World Bank, The World Development Report 2011 (The World Bank, 
Washington, DC, 2011) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
